

# RISK MECHANISMS AND DESISTANCE FACTORS FACING RADICALIZATION

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## Practices Project (RIA)

Objective H2020-SEC-06-FCT-2016  
Research and Innovation Action (RIA)  
Partnership against violent  
radicalization in cities  
Project Number: 740072



## DOCUMENT PROPERTIES

Deliverable No.	
Work Package No	Work Package Title
Author/s	Dounia Bouzar
Contributor/s	Laura Bouzar, David Cohen, Alain Ruffion
Reviewer	
Name	
Date	
Dissemination Level	Public

## REVISION HISTORY WITH CONTRIBUTORS

Version	Date	Comments
Data transmission of the first 300 young people to Laura Bouzar for statistics 1	May 2017	200 "jihadists" and 100 "Pietist Salafists" youngsters
Transmission of data from 150 other young people to the team of David Cohen for statistics 2	June 2017	150 "jihadists"
Cross Analysis of Statistics 1 and Statistics 2	December 2017	
Writing of the DESISTANCE PRO grid with Laura Bouzar and Alain Ruffion (and drafting of the annex "PARTICULAR FOCUS ON THE ROLE OF THE PSYCHOLOGIST")		

*This document has been produced in the context of the Practices Project. The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 740072.*

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**TO CITE THIS RESEARCH, INDICATE :**  
**REPORT RISK MECHANISMS AND DESISTANCE FACTORS WRITTEN BY DOUNIA BOUZAR**  
**FOR PRACTICIES,**  
**PROJECT LEADED BY SÉRAPHIN ALAVA**



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*Acknowledgment*

I would like to thank all of the staff members or volunteers who contributed within the CPDSI in the reflection of how to save the young individuals who wanted to leave to Syria to accomplish “jihad”...

I would also like to pay tribute to the parents who contributed by transmitting us the personal and confidential datas (as much on the life of the young people prior to their radicalization as their communications on “jihadist” networks), without which any scientific study would have ever been possible.

I also thank Professor Seraphin Alava for giving us the opportunity to use this data in a scientific way.

## INTRODUCTION

Risk factors are defined as events or conditions associated with the increased likelihood of a negative event, such as a diagnosis of radicalism. Coming from developmental criminology, the challenge consists in better understanding the relationships between the risk factors and the results observed, in order to foresee the opportunities for intervention and prevention that could make it possible to change them. We will also work on the factors of desistance to better understand what mechanisms or factors are involved in the process of radicalization and deradicalization. These factors are those increasing the likelihood of successfully engaging in an exit process from radical engagement. These are dynamic, objective and subjective factors, which refer to the resources that the radicalized individual can have –keeping in mind that we must first have studied how the micro and macro factors can interact. Finally, the cross-comparison of the results on the risk factors and the factors of desistance will lead us to be able to study the so-called factors of "protection", which decrease the probability of the risk, and therefore build the prevention of the radicalization.

But since Horgan's article "From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Roads"<sup>1</sup> published in 2008, research on radicalization has ceased to focus on "why?" regarding the radicalization to focus on "how?": They abandoned the idea of looking for general causes to rather study "radicalization step by step"<sup>2</sup>. Gradually, this research evolves towards a processual<sup>3</sup> and configurational<sup>4</sup> interactional analysis. Radicalization is then grasped as the result of a process and therefore, "its field of study extends to other domains and other temporalities."<sup>5</sup>

Before Horgan's article, several variables had been proposed as causal or incentive factors for radicalization: psychopathological<sup>6</sup> and psychiatric<sup>7</sup> traits, mental disorders<sup>8</sup>, identity-related issues (aggressive and negative identity)<sup>9</sup>, psychological

<sup>1</sup>J. HORGAN, « From profiles to pathways and roots to routes: Perspectives from psychology on radicalization into terrorism », *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 2008, 618 (10), pp. 80-94.

<sup>2</sup>A. COLLOVALD & B. GAÏTI (eds.), *Democracy at extremes. On political radicalization*. Paris, The Dispute, 2006.

<sup>3</sup>S. GARCET, "A Psycho-Criminological Approach to Radicalization: The Model of 'Cognitive Self-Transformation and Meaning-Building in Violent Radical Engagement'", Liege Law School, 2016.

<sup>4</sup>O. FILLIEULE, "The disengagement of radical organizations. Process and Configuration Approach", *Social Link and Policies*, 2012, 68, pp. 37-59.

<sup>5</sup>G. BRIE and C. RAMBOURG, "Radicalization: Scientific analyses versus Political use" *Analytical synthesis*, ENAP, 2015

<sup>6</sup>W. MARTENS, "Terrorist with Antisocial Personality Disorder", *Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice*, 2004, 4, pp. 45-56; H. H. A. COOPER, "Psychopath as terrorist: A psychological perspective", *Legal Medical Quarterly*, 1978, 2, pp. 253-262; F. FERRACUTI, "Sociopsychiatric interpretation of terrorism", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1982, 463, pp. 129-140.

<sup>7</sup>F. J. HACKER, *Crusaders, criminals, crazies: Terror and terrorism in our time*, New York: Norton, 355 p., 1976; J. VICTOROFF, "The mind of the terrorist: a review and critique of the psychological approaches", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2005, 49 (1), pp. 3-42; R. BORUM, *Psychology of Terrorism*, Tampa, FL: University of South Florida, 78 p., 2004; M. CRENSHAW, "How terrorists think: what psychology can contribute to understanding terrorism?", in L. HOWARD (éd.), *Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses*, London: Praeger, 1992, pp. 71-80.

<sup>8</sup>A. SILKE, "Cheshire-cat Logic: The recurring theme of terrorist Abnormality", *Psychological Research, Psychology, Crime and Law*, 1998, 4 (1), pp. 51-69.

<sup>9</sup>L. BÖLLINGER, quoted in Rapin A.J., "The Evanescent Object of an Improbable Theory: Terrorism and the Social Sciences", *RMES Papers*, Volume V, No. 1, 2008.

tensions having their origin in early childhood<sup>10</sup>, narcissism<sup>11</sup>... Blaming these analyses of methodological bias, particularly leading to disqualify terrorist individuals and deny any political dimension<sup>12</sup> according to their critiques, established a rational reading of the commitment<sup>13</sup>, which considers the terrorist as a "normal individual" who made extreme choices. According to Brie and Rambourg, "Terrorism is analysed by a strategic approach that sees engagement as a form of political violence resulting from the instrumental behaviour of groups seeking to achieve, in a collective sense, their short-term or long-term goals"<sup>14</sup>. The action is based on a calculation in terms of costs and benefits on the chances of success of the operations, the risks in progress and the consequences of inaction<sup>15</sup>.

This approach is articulated with the organizational model based on the understanding of constraints that weigh on the underground organization and influence its orientations<sup>16</sup> which allows to deal with the problem of determining the choices made by the actors according to the constraints to which they are subjected.

This angle of strategic approach has been criticized as it didn't grasp sufficiently the interactions between "the phenomenological, cognitive and affective dimensions at stake in the "black box". It has consequences on the rationalization "of behaviours"<sup>17</sup> as much as an "under-socialization" of actors<sup>18,19</sup>.

So far, this researches on "why" did not manage to demonstrate the specificity of violent commitment to action. Their results don't allow differentiating forms of radical commitment from conventional<sup>20</sup> forms of engagement.

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<sup>10</sup>J. POST, "Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behaviour as a product of psychological forces" in Walter Reich (dir), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990, 25-40.

<sup>11</sup>E. D. SHAW, "Political terrorists: Dangers of diagnosis and an alternative to the psychopathological model", *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry*, 1986, 8, pp. 359-368; C. J. CLAYTON, S. H. BARLOW and B. BALLIF- SPANVILL, "Principles of group violence with a focus on terrorism", in H. V. HALL and L. C. WHITAKER (éds), *Collective violence*, Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1998, pp. 277-311; R.M. Pearlstein, "The mind-set of a political terrorist. Wilmington, Scholarly Resources, 1991.

<sup>12</sup>W. RASCH, "Psychological Dimensions of Political Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany", *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry*, vol. 2, 1979.

<sup>13</sup>T. SANDLER and H. E. LAPAN, "The calculus of dissent: An analysis of terrorists' choice of targets", Synthase, 1988, 76, pp. 245-61; M. CRENSHAW, "The logic of the terrorism: Terrorist behaviour as a product of strategic choice", in W. REICH (éd.), *Origins of terrorism: psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 7-24.

<sup>14</sup>G. BRIE and C. RAMBOURG, "Radicalization: Scientific analyses versus Political use" Analytical synthesis, ENAP, 2015..

<sup>15</sup>M. CRENSHAW, *Terrorism in Context*, University Park; 1991, "How Terrorism Declines", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 3, 1, 1996, 69-87.

<sup>16</sup>D. DELLA PORTA, *Social Movements, Political Violence and the State*, Cambridge University Press, 1995.

<sup>17</sup>R.V. CLARKE and D. B. CORNISH, "Modeling offenders decisions: a framework for research and policy", *Crime and Justice*, 1985, 6, pp. 147-185; D. B. CORNISH and R.V. CLARKE, "The rational choice perspective", in R. WORTLEY and L. MAZEROLLE (éds), *Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis*, Willan Publishing Cullompton, 2008, 294 p.

<sup>18</sup>B. DUCOL, "The Emotional Dimensions of Terrorism: Emotion, Violent Radicalization and Underground Political Violence", *Canadian Journal of Graduate Studies in Sociology and Criminology*, 2013, 2 (2), p. 89-98.

<sup>19</sup>S. GARCET, "A psycho-criminological approach to radicalization: the model of cognitive transformation of self and construction of meaning in radical violent engagement", Review of the Liège Law School, 2016.

<sup>20</sup>I. SUMMER, "Radical commitment, disengagement and deradicalization. Continuum and Fracture Lines", *Social Link and Policies*, n ° 68, p.17, 2012.

### Introduction

After Horgan's article, the researchers went on to analyse "how". They no longer regarded the commitment to terrorism as a kind of determinism, nor as a "reactive entity modelled and guided by hypothetical internal dimensions"<sup>21</sup> but as the result of an interaction between individual factors and social factors<sup>22</sup>. This implies "an analysis that resituates series of sequences specific to the existence, the path, the singular experiences of the individuals involved and the universes to which they belong and in which they evolve."<sup>23</sup>

But as Serge Garcet points out, "the consideration of individual variables has not been fundamentally re-evaluated in terms of this interactionism"<sup>24</sup>. Xavier Crettiez also notes that "While studies on the violence of terror<sup>25</sup> have long favoured a historical approach or centred on the struggle structures and interactions with the state or doctrinal evolutions as a grid to explain violence, they did not hardly take into account the subjectivity of the actors, the biographical routes or the psychological constructions which lead to the armed struggle<sup>26</sup>".<sup>27</sup> The 2017 report of the International Centre for Crime Prevention<sup>28</sup> highlights the fact that there is a significant qualitative bias in the validity of the data collected, since researchers have difficulty accessing empirical data through the Internet via individual or collective semi-structured interviews (often interviewed on the internet / social networks or in prison) and often work on individuals who are at the end of the radicalization process or who are totally radicalized.

Their cognitive-affective transformation is already carried out and the interviewees are only able to express their adherence to the ideology that has full authority over them. If this level of data and analysis is important, it's not exclusively representative of all the data needed to study risk factors. For example, if we take the analysis of the impact of people's socio-economic situation on their radicalization, it is difficult to "dissociate the ideological speech of victimization built around objective situations of discrimination, individual motivations where these environmental pressures have been treated by the cognitive and affective system of interpretation to define as much a relation to oneself as

<sup>21</sup>S. GARCET, *Ibid*.

<sup>22</sup>Approaches by Horgan, Della Porta, McCauley and Moskalenko or Mellis that will be discussed later.

<sup>23</sup>G. BRIE and C. RAMBOURG, "Radicalization: Scientific analyses versus Political use" *Analytical synthesis*, ENAP, 2015.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid* n°19.

<sup>25</sup>Quoted by the author: SOMMIER O. (Terrorism, Paris, Flammarion, 2000) proposes this term defining extreme violence ranging from mass terrorism to genocidal violence.

<sup>26</sup>Commented by the author : "The psychological approach often decried can however prove itself fruitful in two dimensions. The first is to grasp the psychological determinants of actors who engage in extreme struggles by best identifying the need for recognition or enhancement of self-esteem. The works of Michel Dubec on Jean-Marc Rouillan, founder of "Action directe", and those of Antoine Linier on the proletarian Left are as such enlightening: Michel Dubec, *the pleasure of killing*, Paris, Seuil, 2007; Antoine Linier, *Terrorism and democracy*, Paris, Fayard, 1985. The second dimension insists on the psychological effects of socialization within sectarian groups, the effects of clandestinity or closed group thinking (Irving Janis, *Decision Making. A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice and Commitment*, London, Macmillan, 1977).

<sup>27</sup>CRETTEZ X., "Thinking radicalization. A processual sociology of the violent engagement variables ", *French Review of Political Science* 2016/5 (Vol.66), p. 709-727. DOI 10.3917 / rfsp.665.0709.

<sup>28</sup>*An International Study of Stakeholder Engagement Issues*, International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC), 2017.



one's belonging and a social identity<sup>29</sup> in the form of a victim's posture".<sup>30</sup> The same questioning is used to analyse the psychological or cultural vulnerability factors: how do we balance things between the initial state of the individuals and the result of their cognitive-affective transformation once they have joined the group and the "jihadist" ideology?

Individual and collective qualitative data collected continuously during the follow-up of young people supported by the CPDSI from April 2014 to August 2016, through the access to their personal characteristics before their radical engagement, the follow-up and the measurement of the evolution of their definitions of themselves and society, and the study of the arguments that touched them to exit the radicalization, allow to build a first scientific contribution to this unthought-of in the literature regarding the etiology of the "jihadists": the question is to distinguish between the cognitive change brought by the process of radicalization and the initial state of the individual before radicalization, in order to better understand the interactions of the micro and macro factors that contributed to this path.

We will therefore be able to verify, among other things, the appropriation of the feeling of persecution conveyed by the "jihadist" speech and what reveals a personal situation of discriminatory experience or of popular social situations peculiar to the individual before his process of radicalization. This distinction only can help identify the radicalization steps without mixing the causes and effects (see STAGES OF THE RADICALIZATION AND DERADICALIZATION PROCESS) and thus identify the main risk factors for adapting the internal prevention strategies.

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<sup>29</sup>Ö. AYDUK and A. GYURAK, "Applying the Cognitive- Affective Processing Systems Approach to Conceptualizing Rejection Sensitivity", *Social Personal Psychology Compass*, 2008, September 1, 2(5), pp. 2016-2033.

<sup>30</sup>S. GARCET, "A Psycho-Criminological Approach to Radicalization: The Model of 'Cognitive Self-Transformation and Meaning-Building in Violent Radical Engagement'", *Liege Law School Review*, 2016.

This report is composed of four parts.

In the first part, we will characterize the main macro (socially-related) and micro (individual-related) variables, whose role in the radicalization process of 200 "pro-jihad" youngsters monitored by the CPDSI between April 2014 and August 2016 will be studied, stopped (by their parents or the police) before their departure to join Iraq or Syria, including some "going back individuals"<sup>31</sup> who are not incarcerated. Another study was alongside conducted on 150 other young people monitored by the CPDSI under the same conditions and led to the same results<sup>32</sup>. Next, we will compare two groups of 100 "jihadists" and 100 "pietist" Salafist (both groups from middle class families) to characterize the values of the variables in each group, and to identify similarities and differences in attempting to identify the role of these variables in the intervention of violence.

In a second part, it will be necessary to identify desistance factors by pointing to the significant variables called "of becoming"<sup>33</sup>: in other words, the social, psychological, medical, personal stories, family characteristics that can be notably found among young people who exited radicalization. Assuming that they had an impact on the future of the young individual, these variables will allow us to pounder on risk and desistance factors.

In the third part, we present the construction of a tool likely to help professionals to identify and manage the degree of desistance of a radicalized followed : the DESISTANCE-PRO BOUZAR-RUFFION grid, which will be transformed into computer software for professionals.

Finally, we share some remarks about primary prevention, along with two annexes, "PARTICULAR FOCUS ON THE ROLE OF THE PSYCHOLOGIST" and "GLOBAL STATISTICAL TABLES" (from which some summary tables are drawn from this report).

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<sup>31</sup>According to the expression used by the journalist David Thomson, it is about radicalized individuals gone on zones and returning in their countries of origins.

<sup>32</sup>This second quantitative study was conducted by the team of researchers and statisticians (Hugues Pellerin) of Professor David Cohen, who leads the child and adolescent psychiatry department of the Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital of Paris (available in French). Table BIS STUDY in I.2.4.

<sup>33</sup>This part of the crossover of significant multiple variables known as becoming was conducted in collaboration with the researchers and statisticians team of Professor David Cohen, who heads the Paediatric and Adolescent Psychiatry Department of Pitié-Salpêtrière of the Paris Hospital.

## METHODOLOGY

### Sample

350 young jihadists and 100 young Salafists, all monitored by the CPDSI from April 2014 to August 2016.

### Data collection

The individual and collective data were continually collected through the CPDSI monitoring of the treated young individuals, more particularly regarding their micro or macro personal characteristics before and during their radical involvement. The available material stems from the collection of the young people's narratives during their support for disengagement. It is a collection of individual interviews that are semi-directive or non-directive with youngsters and their families, or semi-directive group interviews during group therapy. In most cases, communications on social networks from their computers and their mobile phones were exploited by the multidisciplinary team of the CDPSI, through the trust bond with the relatives who asked for help. The viewed and/or exchanged videos were also analysed in order to better understand the individual's relation to propaganda.

### Data treatment

In the part I of this report<sup>34</sup>, we first put forward a quantitative study of these data, conveyed by statistical tables that we successively analysed (tables 1 to 16). Then, we operate a quantitative study of the 8 already discovered engagement motives<sup>35</sup> (determined by our team, between April 2014 and August 2016, from a continuous qualitative approach during the support and accompaniment of the young people) in order to search for the most frequent ones according to genre or social class. (Tables 17a, 17b, 19 and 20).

We also verified if the 8 obtained profiles by our qualitative approach<sup>36</sup> could be confirmed by a quantitative approach by being helped by the statistician of Professor David Cohen's team from the Paediatric and Adolescent Psychiatry Department of Pitié-Salpêtrière of the Paris Hospital.

The dimensional similarities between the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the "engagement motives grid" were listed in table 18 (details on the method of

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<sup>34</sup>A qualitative study of those same data can be found in the report RADICALIZATION PROCESS

<sup>35</sup>D., MARTIN M. What motives bring youth to engage in the Jihad? *Neuropsychiatr Enf Adolesc* 2016;64(6):353-59 [French].

<sup>36</sup>BOUZAR D., MARTIN M. *Ibid.*

calculus<sup>37</sup> and similarities correlated will be published in an international scientific article<sup>38</sup>).

In the part II of the report, we asked Hugues Pellerin, statistician from David Cohen's team, to proceed to crossed variables "of becoming", meaning that we searched<sup>39</sup> for the social, psychological, medical characteristics that could be present in the deradicalized group. We started from the principle that they could have had a positive impact on the fact that they succeeded in grieving the group and the "jihadist" ideology, in an identical national and international political context.

We then accomplished the same exercise for the youngsters group who did not disengage. Over a second phase, we analysed those results by crossing the quantitative and qualitative approaches, by reintroducing an anthropological analysis that re-contextualizes those results in the light of the acquired feedback in the accompaniment of those youngsters for a period of two years.

In part III, we crossed the micro and macro characteristics of the young people that were found in part I with the recruiters promises and the way they were manipulated in order to categorise them and offer "risk mechanisms" scenarios taking into account the interactive combination of micro and macro factors leading to radicalization. After highlighting the 8 risk mechanisms related to the 7 engagement motives, we proposed desistance factors corresponding to the noticed needs in each risk mechanism, in order to offer to the radicalized alternative involvements, while considering what underpinned their engagement (Table 23).

Finally, we proposed a new tool allowing social workers to adapt and measure the follow-ups of the "jihadists" they monitor, in collaboration with the psychanalyst Alain Ruffion. The BOUZAR-RUFFION DESISTANCE-PRO tool is a hetero-evaluated grid that can identify the needs of the youths the "jihadist" discourse offered to fill (and sometimes transformed it).

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<sup>37</sup>A scientific convention was signed between this team and the CPDSI. Each motive item was coded yes (present) or no (absent) in the dataset. The highest number of dimensions was determined by visual inspection of the MCA scree plot. Given MCA requirements, the analysis was performed on only individuals with full data available (N=122). For each individual, a main dimension (of the 8 dimensions, the dimension for which the percentage of individual contribution is maximal) was attributed based on the qualitative and MCA analyses, and these dimensions were compared using the chi2 test. We then constructed multivariate models to explore prognosis at FU. We created an ordinal prognosis variable with 4 states ranging from best outcome to worst outcome (4=no longer radicalized>3=disengaged>2=still radicalized>1=reached the IS or deceased). The multivariate models were run using two steps: first, univariate analysis was performed to explore which variables may be influential; second, we performed ordinal logistic regression, incorporating significant variables into the model using univariate analysis. The proportionality assumption was tested using the method by Brant (Brant, 1990). In the article that is quoted below, two models will be presented in order to predict prognosis during the follow-up: in the first model, the explicative variables are all the variables collected in table 1; in the second model, the explicative variables are the dimensions defined through MCA. See more details on article quoted below.

<sup>38</sup>CAMPELO N., BOUZAR L., OPPETIT A., HEFEZ S., BRONSARD G., COHEN D., BOUZAR D., Joining the Islamic State from France between 2014 and 2016: an observational follow-up study, about to be published in *The Lancet psychiatry*.

<sup>39</sup>The exact method of this statistics available in CAMPELO N., BOUZAR L., OPPETIT A., HEFEZ S., BRONSARD G., COHEN D., BOUZAR D., Joining the Islamic State from France between 2014 and 2016: an observational follow-up study, in *The Lancet psychiatry*, to be published.

It also offers alternative involvements from elements coming from their own radicalization trajectory, and verifies and measures their level of desistance from their level of resiliency (towards their primary needs).

## **SEMANTIC WARNINGS**

We had to make some semantic choices in the redaction of this report.

1) The term “jihadist” or “jihadism” when used to designate individuals linked to extremist groups using violence and defining themselves as being related to Islam is bracketed as we do not validate their communication strategy. Although it may be the purpose of these terrorist groups is to be perceived this way, their plans, actions and behaviours do not fall under jihad as a religious Muslim concept as defined for centuries in Islam. The designated young people by this term did not necessarily act out but organized themselves to join their “jihadist” group.

2) We will use the terms “radical” to qualify both pietist Salafists (who are non-violent) and “jihadists” (who are violent). Indeed, some processes are common to both movements. Agreeing with some other researchers, this term is to us unsatisfying: the term “radical” refers to the notion of “roots” which is not the case of “jihadists”. Still, it enables to qualify the discourse heard and then transmitted by the young people interviewed before they chose a violent or non-violent path.

3) We will use the terms “disengaged” for those who renounced to their group and to the use of violence, and “deradicalized” or “desisted” for those who grieved both the use of violence and the ideology it implies (“Only Divine law can regenerate the corrupted world”).

From our feedback, when using the exit of radicalization, “deradicalization” or “desistance”, it means to start from the individual, his experience, his engagement motive – whose logic was acknowledged and deconstructed (emotional, relational and ideological approach) – and, by questioning, be ensured that he finds himself the flaws of his primary engagement in order to build a new one, compatible to the social contract.

4) For language convenience, and also because psychologists estimate that the adolescence age is extending until the thirties, we will often indistinctly employ the term “young people” to designate individuals from this sample.

# I. STUDY OF THE YOUNGSTERS' CHARACTERISTICS FROM OUR SAMPLE


## I.1 PRESENTATION OF THE STUDY SAMPLE

This is to present the main features highlighted by our work on the 200 young "pro-jihadists" in our sample<sup>40</sup> in order to understand how the "jihadist" offer has been able to assert control over them.

We were interested in their family and personal history, but also in their family status when they were reported to the police, how they were cared for at the time, on their commitment motive to do "jihad", etc. These data were obtained directly (through interviews with parents and young people at the end of their follow-up) and indirectly (during youth monitoring, as explained in the "Methodology"). We cross-referenced data collected directly and indirectly, as well as data collected from parents and the radicalized individuals themselves.

For this study, we selected individuals whose parents contacted the CDPSI between April 2014 and August 2016 and for whom we have at least 95% of the data needed for our study.

Age of care for all social classes - Table 1



<sup>40</sup>Another study was alongside carried out on 150 other young people supported by the CPDSI under the same conditions and led to the same results (see. Table BIS STUDY). These statistics were conducted by Hugues Pellerin, of the team of Professor David Cohen, who heads the department of child and adolescent psychiatry at Pitié-Salpêtrière, Paris Hospital.

Age for care according to social class in % - Table 2

AGE FOR CARE	"JIHADIST" ALL SOCIAL CLASSES	"JIHADIST" MIDDLE CLASS	"JIHADIST" LOWER CLASS
<b>GIRLS</b> Between 13 and 17 years old	55	58	54
<b>BOYS</b> Between 13 and 17 years old	30	30	24
<b>GIRLS AND BOYS</b> Between 13 and 17 years old	47	49	44
<b>GIRLS</b> Between 18 and 25 years old	35	30	37
<b>BOYS</b> Between 18 and 25 years old	48	48	48
<b>GIRLS AND BOYS</b> Between 18 and 25 years old	39	36	41
<b>GIRLS</b> Between 26 and 30 years old	11	12	8
<b>BOYS</b> Between 26 and 30 years old	22	21	28
<b>GIRLS AND BOYS</b> Between 26 and 30 years old	15	15	15

CPDSI Tables 1 and 2 allow identifying during their follow-up only, within the CPDSI:

- 55% of underage girls and 30% of boys were between 12 and 18 years old;
- 48% of boys and 35% of girls were between 18 and 25 years old;
- 11% of girls and 22% of boys were between 26 and 30 years old.

The median statistical average age at the time of care by our services is therefore 19 years and a half.

To simplify the language used, and because psychologists believe that the period of adolescence extends to 30 years old, we will use indistinctly the term "young" to designate them.

These results are consistent with international figures. According to the United Nations, the average age of individuals on the path of violent extremism is surprisingly low: the average is between 15 and 35 years for foreign fighters<sup>41</sup>.

Other sources indicate that the average age of Europeans left to fight is between 18 and 29 years old<sup>42</sup>.

<sup>41</sup>United Nations Security Council, 2015b.

<sup>42</sup>Briggs Obe & Siverman, 2014.

In addition, the journey from initial interest in radicalization, to the promise of action and then to the integration of a foreign terrorist group, quickly accelerated<sup>43</sup>. In France, the Ministry of the Interior declares that 25% of them are minors<sup>44</sup>.

It appears that girls are radicalizing generally in a younger age than boys. We can hypothesize that the emergence of existential questions, search for place in society and / or in life in general happen earlier for girls than for boys. The relationship to the body can also be a trigger for girls. The puberty that transforms the body of young girls occurs at a fairly young age (on average the first pubertal sign usually appears around 11 years of age and the appearance of the first menstruation at 13 years of age). This can be the source of physical complexes that the radical group can use. In general, the guilt around all questions related to sexuality<sup>45</sup> punctuates the "jihadist" speech.

Age clearly appears as a risk factor: the younger people are, the more they look for a better world and a better future. It is no coincidence that the "jihadists", who propose an ideal, a group of peers and thrills, reach more easily the under 30s. We will come back to the question of age in Part II "becoming variables".

**Gender (%) - Table 3**

<b>FEMALE</b>	66,5 %
<b>MALE</b>	33,5 %

Table 3 shows that among the follow-ups operated by the CPDSI we find a majority of girls. However, in June 2015, national official figures estimated that there were 35% of French "jihadist" women<sup>46</sup>.

Our feedback suggests that parents of girls were more likely to call the UCLAT or CPDSI toll-free number than parents of boys. At least two hypotheses can explain this trend:

- The social breakdowns brought by the beginning of radicalization are systematically identified more rapidly among girls, which seems to show that parents follow more closely the daily life of their daughter rather than of their son;
- The change in the clothing and body appearance is more visible in a girl than in a boy – the greater autonomy left to the boy in the management of his daily life being identical in all social classes.

On the other hand, the prefectural and police authorities demand more "out of radicalization" support for girls than for boys. On the other hand, the prefectural and police authorities

<sup>43</sup>United Nations Security Council, 2015b.

<sup>44</sup>Report No. 2828 French National Assembly. June 2, 2015. <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/pdf/rap-enq/r2828.pdf>

<sup>45</sup>Many professionals testify to young girls wearing the jilbab to hide their overweight and protect themselves from body-related mockery they do not take, but also to hide the appearance of their breasts earlier than others.

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*



demand more "out of radicalization" support for girls than for boys. Sexual representations interact in the analysis of radicalized cases: boys are perceived as more violent than girls, and therefore less easy to "deradicalize". The police or prefecture departments have more confidence in girls to reintegrate into society and question their radicalism. A girl is perceived as someone who will harm herself: "surrogate mother" within the group, submissive wife and devoted to her husband locked inside her home, etc. A boy is perceived as someone who can hurt others: laying a bomb, physically attacking a person, etc.

Therefore, anti-radical prefecture cells tend to transmit more "girls files" to field workers and more "boys files" to specialized police services.

For the same reason, girls are also less easily identified as "jihadists" than boys. Institutions are more likely to classify them as "radicalized nonviolent (pietist Salafist type)" or in crisis of adolescence (with the need to separate from her mother for example). More evidence is needed from institutions and authorities to validate the "jihadist" diagnosis for a girl. The boy, for the same facts, will be "suspected violent"<sup>47</sup>.

**Social classes (%) - Table 4**

SOCIAL CLASS FAMILY OF THE RADICALIZED	
WEALTHY	06 %
AVERAGE	50 %
POPULAR	44 %

Concerning the results of Table 4, it's important to mention the limit of our sample which is consecutive to the modalities of the French national system for reporting radicalized people. For the CPDSI to be mandated, the signalling party had to enter first either the toll-free number or the prefecture of his department. If a family directly contacted us, the CPDSI had the responsibility to report the information to the Prefecture concerned. This procedure was part of our ministerial mandate as a Mobile Intervention and Public Team.

Our feedback demonstrates that reference adults of popular social classes have been more reluctant to call the Green Number, held by police forces, to the extent that:

- They knew that they wouldn't be able to afford a lawyer if their child was under surveillance following their call, even though this latter is not or no more radicalized;
- They didn't have a "network" to help them in the event of discriminatory treatment (black listed for housing HLM, fear of losing the custody of their other minor children, fear

<sup>47</sup>For instance: a boy who watched a propaganda video of ISIL, who quitted school and extra-curricular activities, will be targeted immediately as a "jihadist". A girl, with the same case file, will be followed for prevention and an educative investigation will be asked to measure her radicalism and her likely dangerousness.

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of dissemination of their name in the media, search in front of all the neighbours, fear of losing their job);

- They feared that reporting one of their children would make it impossible for the siblings to find a job or to pass competition exams;

- They had limited confidence in the governmental institutions;

- They sometimes considered radicalism (which they identified as a rigorous religious practice) as positive because their child was no longer hanging out aimlessly, no longer smuggling drugs, no longer stealing, no longer hanging out with his former associates considered harmful;

- They were afraid of the "jihadist" group active in their neighbourhood who know the address of their family and can put pressure;

- They didn't declare the departure of their child for the war zone (Syria, Iraq) in the hope of protecting him and bringing him back without going through prison (knowing that they cannot afford a good lawyer).

Moreover, it is difficult to assess the reliability of the result for the Wealthy, especially considering only 12 of the 200 young people in the sample (6%) belonged to this social class. Our experience feedback has shown that the latter is rather oriented towards private devices (psychologist, hospitalization, removal to a boarding school, etc.) from the beginning of the first signs of radicalization, which makes it possible not to leave any "track" in the institutional circuits that work in connection with the police administration. The same processes of judicial circuit avoidance are found in radicalization and delinquency management.

Nevertheless, our sample shows a real diversity of social origins within the radicals. Even though the lower class individuals are underrepresented (88 out of 200, or 44%), the strong presence of the middle classes (100 out of 200, or 50%) invalidates the hypothesis that radicalization would only occur as a reaction to a social and economic frustration and invalidates the belief that a situation of deprivation experienced by the young person would be a precondition of the radicalization process.

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### *Methodological note*

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The statistics on 200 "jihadists" constitute the raw material of Part I of this report, whose age, sex and social class have just been explained.

Part II will attempt a comparative study of 100 Pietist Salafists and 100 "jihadists" to reflect on the possible link between the two groups. The 100 Pietist Salafists we studied all belong to the average social class.<sup>48</sup>

In Part II, in order to gain access for our comparison of two groups from the same social class, we isolated the "subgroup" of the 100 "jihadists" of the middle class from the entire sample of Part I and we recalculated the statistics of the sub-group "Middle-class jihadists" in order to compare them with the statistics of the sub-group "Middle class Salafists". This led us to recalculate the statistics of "jihadists" according to the social class in order to compare them with their social class. It seemed more interesting for us to place the results related to the subgroup "jihadists" from the middle class in the various tables of Part I, those related to the "jihadists" subgroup of popular class, alongside the results of the group of 200 jihadists (all social classes as a whole).

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<sup>48</sup>Indeed, the popular classes did not ask for help to police authorities when their child was adhering to Salafism, insofar as he did not accomplish antisocial act. On the contrary, young Salafists often adopt a better behaviour towards addictive substances (alcohol, drugs) and delinquency. Families then do not think it is justified to signalize them to the police.

## I.2 - THE MAIN MACRO AND MICRO VARIABLES

The variables quantified throughout this chapter will be repeated in the other parts of the report, in an abbreviated form. In this chapter, we will take the time to clearly explain what they mean and what they correspond to.

### I.2.1 What has become of the young people studied, by what ideology have they went through and what has been their judicial follow-up?

**Condition of the young person after 2 years of follow-up (%) - Table 5**

CONDITION OF THE YOUNG PERSON AFTER 2 YEARS OF FOLLOW-UP	"JIHADIST" ALL SOCIAL CLASSES	"JIHADIST" MIDDLE CLASS	"JIHADIST" LOWER CLASS
<b>DERADICALIZED</b> (HAVE MOURNED THE UTOPIA OF DIVINE LAW TO MANAGE A SOCIETY)	57	62	51
<b>DISENGAGED</b> (BROKE UP WITH THEIR GROUP AND WITH VIOLENCE)	24	21	25
<b>SUBTOTAL% OF EXITS FROM VIOLENT RADICALIZATION</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>76</b>
<b>STILL RADICALIZED IN THEIR IDEOLOGY</b> (FAILURE)	11,5	11	14
<b>LEFT FOR THE COMBAT ZONE AT THE MOMENT WHEN THEIR PARENTS CONTACTED US</b> (COUNTED AS FAILURES EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS NO START OF SUPPORT)	7,5	6	10
<b>SUBTOTAL% OF FAILURES</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>STILL MUSLIM TODAY</b>	91	90	92

As the two subtotals of young people emerging from radicalism and failures show, there is no fundamental difference between the "jihadists" of the lower class and those from the middle class regarding their exit from radicalism.

Social class is irrelevant regarding the individual remaining or not Muslim once out of radicalization.

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One could have made the hypothesis of greater failure for people from the lower class for different reasons.

- The presence of a physical network (70% versus 48%) or a person close to them who adheres to the same ideology (50% versus 38%). Yet the attachment to the radical group is not automatically stronger when it comes to a physical group. The level of group dependence does not depend on the mode of relationship to the group (internet or physical) but the precision with which the group has identified the needs of the young person and adapted his speech to his needs. The group dependence emanates from the feeling of fusion between its members, who themselves are determined by the possibility of identifying with their new "brothers and sisters". If the interlocutors, whether physical or virtual, misunderstand the need of the young engaged, the latter will manage to break away and break with the group much more easily. A physical group that identifies the needs of the young person, however, remains more dangerous than a virtual group.

- The situation of poverty which often accompanies these families, and facilitates the possibility for the young person to project or / and believe in a beautiful future within a utopian society managed by the divine law. Yet, other reasons than the feeling of economic deprivation lead young people not to project themselves into society in accordance with their desires / projections.

- The difficulties / traumas experienced in their lives before their radicalization, generally more important among the popular social classes: (44% of violence suffered against 18% among the middle classes, 47% of violence suffered for one of their relatives against 20% among the middle class, 39% of sexual abuse / rape suffered against 25%, 25% of sexual abuse / rape suffered by one of their relatives against 8%, 28% of incarcerated relatives against 5%, 47% lived a controlled relationship with their parents against 37%, 27% were dependent on an addictive substance against 19%, 43% had relatives depending on a substance against 26% for the middle class... Young people of the same class marked by this more negative historicity emerge from radicalization like the others, although the presence of trauma facilitates the work of recruiters (who thus more easily understand the conscious and unconscious needs of the young person). We made the assumption that the one who has already experienced disappointment, betrayal, violence, disillusionment in his past has developed protective capacities over others in general, and any illusory promises. The initial risk factors turned into protection factors and then into resilience factors during their management.

### Ideology through which the young person has been through (%) - Table 6

Note : The young individual often went through several narratives, explaining a total which is different from a 100%.

IDEOLOGY	"JIHADIST" ALL SOCIAL CLASSES	"JIHADIST" MIDDLE CLASS	"JIHADIST" LOWER CLASS
ISIS/ISIL	86,5	90	84
AL QAEDA	24,5	18	31
OMAR OMSEN	15	16	14
SALAFI	27	23	32

#### Omar Omsen

The youngest (15% of our population), watched the famous 19HH videos of Omar Omsen (about 3 million views on Youtube from young Francophones)<sup>51</sup>. But in the end, they landed in the ISIL networks, better organized and more generous. Indeed, when organizing their departure, the young people discovered that the network of smugglers was more reliable and that the salary was more consistent with ISIL. They were phished by Omar Omsen and then turned to ISIL<sup>52</sup>.

#### The Salafist speech

A quarter of young people who became "jihadists" went through Pietist Salafism. We refer to the report STAGES OF THE RADICALIZATION AND DERADICALIZATION PROCESS to study the question of the porosity between the Salafist movement and the "jihadist" movement, as this is part of the national questions: what policy should be pursued in the face of these Pietist Salafists who share the same ideology of "jihadists" but who do not advocate violence?

<sup>49</sup>Behind the category AL QAEDA, we also integrate the small groups that were created at the beginning by taking an oath of allegiance to this base, by using and diffusing its propaganda principles, although those small groups (such as ex Jabatal Nosra, ex Front Ansar Dine, etc.) split up with Al Qaeda, in order to create "independent" movements. It was the case, as instance, in the end of January 2017 with the appearance of the group Hayat Tahrir al-Cham, regrouping 5 former small groups (Front Fatah al-Cham, Harakat Nour al-Din alZenki, Front Ansar Dine, Liwa al-Haq and Jaych al-Sunna)

<sup>50</sup>If we identify Omar Omsen as a branch himself, we are not in a realistic point of view of the organization of radical small groups in Syria and Iraq, but in a point of view of personal implication in the creation of specific propaganda mediums. If on an armed perspective, Omar Omsen is not only one of the second-in-command of the sub-groups affiliated to more structured instances, on a material point of view, since he is at the basis of the radicalization process mutation, he is a pioneer and an important actor. His videos contributed to the radicalization of many French-speaking youngsters as explains the paragraph of development concerning him and the report quoted below.

<sup>51</sup>See REPORT "THE METAMORPHOSIS OPERATED FOR A YOUNGSTER BY NEW TERRORISTS NARRATIVES", Dou-nia BOUZAR, Christophe CAUPENNE, Sulayman VALSAN, specialized on Omar Omsen narrative, available on [cpdsi.fr](http://cpdsi.fr).

<sup>52</sup>Omar Omsen has lost so many recruits that he developed a video "Once upon a time ISIL" to denounce the atrocities of the Islamic state, then by standing himself as a "true and noble jihadist".

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### ISIL versus Al Qaeda<sup>53</sup>

ISIL represented the most appeal for our young audience. For this new generation, the media and propagandist instrumentalization carried out by this contemporary group has had a much greater impact than the former movements born under the Al Qaeda affiliation. The group is aimed at a generation that does not necessarily have the historical "background" of Al Qaeda's fame. The great terrorist "aura" of Al Qaeda was based mainly on the attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York. The other attacks perpetrated by the group did not have this impact despite a number of significant casualties: Casablanca in 2003, Madrid in 2004, London in 2005.

Most of the young "jihadists" don't refer to the tiny terrorist groups based in Syria and Iraq that were originally affiliated with Al Qaeda, especially since this era refers to obsolete means of communication (K7 videos, K7 audio, CD, beginning of the mobile phone), physical networks too easily detectable and zones of combat too distant, unknown, hostile, not presenting a sacred space of the importance of Shâm (Great Syria). On the contrary, ISIL recruiters have built videos with substantial financial means, using the lifestyle codes of the new generations (images, sounds, propaganda through social networks), reinforced by the trivialization of the "salafization" of Islam in France is always more rapid with the appearance of internet and satellite channels. Indeed, ISIL took advantage of the fact that the Salafist movement has redefined a number of notions. For example, while the notion of hijra did not exist in the Muslim world except to designate the one of the Prophet who marks the beginning of the Muslim calendar (the Hegira), it has become ubiquitous in Salafist rhetoric. The "jihadists" then simply changed the place of emigration to be able to practice this Islam above ground ("without root" – hence the fact that the term "radicalization" drawn from "racine/roots" seems inappropriate.)

The difference in the ideology of the tiny terrorist groups based in Syria and Iraq initially affiliated with Al Qaeda between the lower class and the middle class (31% against 18%) can be explained by the fact that "jihadists" of the lower class have greater access to longer-established physical networks in priority neighbourhoods, many of which have remained linked to Al Qaeda's rhetoric.

Therefore, 86.5% of the 200 "jihadists" have validated ISIL's ideology, sometimes passing through other channels of entry or exit (Salafism, ex Jabhat Al Nosra, Omar Omsen in particular) but mainly letting themselves being seduced in the first place by the most effective propagandist.

The two most important "jihadist" groups in Iraq and Syria today: ISIL and Al Qaeda use completely different techniques to radicalize their recruits. ISIL uses a speech much more suited to young people with no knowledge of religious theology. They make their videos with images worthy of Hollywood movies and use arguments that affect young people. These videos aim to encourage young people to join their group and their project. They sell the "defensive jihad" as an advertisement for a tourist trip, highlighting the benefits that it

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<sup>53</sup>Behind the category AL QAEDA, we also integrate the small groups that were created at the beginning by taking an oath of allegiance to this base, *Ibid*.

will do to the person who will join (symbolic compensation in connection with the young characteristics). The videos of ISIL are individualized according to the ideals and the needs of the young people to better convince them.

Al Qaeda focuses instead on the need of "others": it puts aside the concerns of its recruits and focuses on the needs of the population, religion, the terrorist group that can change the world, and so on. Its videos are based on a theological project with religious texts to justify its actions and do not try to seduce. They are only looking for loyal Muslims who will fight to the death for their Creator. Its speech is therefore less accessible for a person without knowledge or theological interest. Young people seeking space and excitement will be less seduced by the speeches of Al Qaeda or its affiliated groups that focus on the need of Islam, the Muslim community, on God and not on the young own personal needs, and whose narcissistic effect is weak.

It should be noted, however, that many young people who have mourned ISIL are not yet ready to mourn the utopia of the "jihadist" ideology (the regeneration of the world by divine law). They then join Al Qaeda or its formerly or still affiliated groups, believing that one of these Al Qaeda-related groups is faithful to the teaching of Islam, does less exactions and really helps the persecuted populations. The relations that the new group Hayat Tahrir al-Cham have with the white helmets or the Free Syrian Army end up convincing them. What they found boring at first in the propaganda of the group in question will ultimately reassure them about the seriousness of the latter (after the discovery of the massacres carried out by ISIL). Concentration on the theological aspect is therefore the weak point and the strong point of Al Qaeda, depending on when the young person meets the speech and his motivation.

**Type of judicial measure after reporting the youngster (%) - Table 7**

TYPE OF JUDICIAL MEASURE AFTER REPORTING THE YOUNGSTER	"JIHADIST" ALL SOCIAL CLASSES	"JIHADIST" MIDDLE CLASS	"JIHADIST" LOWER CLASS
<b>EDUCATIONAL/MEDICAL/ PSYCHIATRIC</b> Follow-up in addition to CPDSI monitoring during the deradicalization process	52,5	52	54,5
<b>LOCKED UP</b> After the detection of his radicalization? (prison, closed educational centre, etc.)	27,5	26	28,4

The numbers have changed today. Since 2016, after the attacks committed on the French territory, there has been a higher rate of confinement (especially in terms of preventive detentions).

Our results show that social class is not discriminating in the decisions of monitoring and / or incarceration after detection of radicalization.



Educational and psychological care is automatic for minors (see Table 2 "age supported"). The 52.5%, 52% and 54.5% are close to our percentage of young minors: 47%, 49% and 44%. This correlation can be verified in Part II "becoming variables" and in Table C of the annex (minor-major comparison).

As soon as the "pro-jihadist" reaches the age of 18, the police service prefers to set up surveillance without the concerned individual being aware of it. When the adult appears to be at the beginning of his radicalization process, anti-radicalization cells delegate reintegration associations or local missions. The ideology and the relationship to the radical group are then rarely worked out.

## 1.2.2 – Variables related to the family context

Family status at the time of referral (%) - Table 8

FAMILY STATUS AT THE TIME OF REFERRAL	"JIHADIST" ALL SOCIAL CLASSES	"JIHADIST" MIDDLE CLASS	"JIHADIST" LOWER CLASS
SINGLE	72	75	68
MARRIED OR MARITAL STATUS	26,5	24	31
DIVORCED	1,5	1	1
AT LEAST ONE CHILD	21	21	22

This is to qualify the situation of the individual at the time of radicalization. When it comes to couples, the spouse is also radicalized. The situation of celibacy is relatively important in the statistics of this sample, which is not surprising considering the young age of the individuals who compose it. Moreover, it can be seen that the differences between lower class "jihadists" and middle-class "jihadists" are insignificant on this point.

Geographical environment of the radicalized family (%) - Table 9

GEOGRAPHICAL ENVIRONMENT	"JIHADIST" ALL SOCIAL CLASSES	"JIHADIST" MIDDLE CLASS	"JIHADIST" LOWER CLASS
COUNTRYSIDE	12,5	17	7
CITIES	52,5	83	14
POPULAR NEIGHBOURHOODS	35	0	80

Young people are recruited in all areas of the territory, whether rural or urban, from lower class neighbourhoods or not. We are witnessing a base of "jihadist" speech in all areas of the territory due to the adaptability of French recruiters. For the record, the figures of the Ministry of Interior<sup>54</sup> show that all departments of France are impacted, including the less populated like Creuse region. It means at least two things:

<sup>54</sup>Report n°2828 Assemblée Nationale Française. June 2, 2015. <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/pdf/rap-enq/r2828.pdf>

- The "jihadist" speech is not only authoritative over a population that has experienced situations of deprivation, injustice, stigmatization, discrimination, and internalized a lack of social hope (which does not mean that these factors are not facilitators);

- The geographical environment does not offer effective protection.

These percentages show the impact of the internet on the new generation, which allows "jihadist" recruiters to reach every young person regardless of their environment confirming that the "jihadist" discourse adapted to the reality of young people.

**Family Culture of the radicalized individual (%) - Table 10**

<b>FAMILY CULTURE</b>	<b>"JIHADIST" ALL SOCIAL CLASSES</b>	<b>"JIHADIST" MIDDLE CLASS</b>	<b>"JIHADIST" LOWER CLASS</b>
<b>ARAB-MUSLIM</b>	43	29	61
<b>JUDEO-CHRISTIAN</b>	62	81	39
<b>OTHER (ASIAN, ETC.)</b>	5,5	6	2

Let us specify beforehand that:

- Some families belong to two cultures (mixed marriages) which explains that the sum of the % is higher than 100.
- We have differentiated the culture of the family and the conviction of the family (see Table 11).

It should be noted at this stage that it appeared that the families of Arab-Muslim culture waited to call the Green Number only once their child was deeper radicalized compared to other families. Indeed, they feel that the resources within the family (grandparents who have remained in the country, close religious references, etc.) will suffice to put their child back on "the right path", given their proximity to the Muslim culture. For their part, the other families contact the authorities at the slightest Muslim sign, before even identifying a warning indicator of radicalization. Families, according to their culture, do not have the same degree of tolerance. It is not culture that distinguishes families from each other but their ability to alert and feel relevant to (inter)act with the radicalized youngster. This parameter also explains that families of Arab-Muslim culture are underrepresented in our sample, compared to national figures.

In our sample, as in the national figures, the diversity of the origins of the impacted families shows that the "jihadist" speech can be authoritative on people who have evolved in very different cultures.

The values of the variable "family culture" in Table 10 show that the social-cultural level acts as a significant protection factor for young people of Arab-Muslim culture, as there is 61% of young people from lower class and 29% of young people from the middle class. We



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hypothesize that this result is due to the fact that middle class Arab-Muslim families with access to culture transmitted elements of knowledge of the Arab-Muslim civilization to their children, directly or indirectly, and that it protects them from the manipulation of these same elements by "jihadist" speeches.

Knowledge of the Arab-Muslim civilization is therefore a protection factor. Indeed, the less knowledge the young person has of Muslim history and culture, the more affected he can be to the "jihadist" discourse that manipulates these elements for extremist political purposes as well as negative representations of Islam stemming from the public debate (Islam is in essence a violent religion, sexist, racist, etc.) not far removed from the actions of ISIL.

For their part, recruiters surf on these negative representations to justify their murders and to define them as simple "literally" applications of Islam. There is therefore, in the sense of Danièle Hervieu-Léger, a "mutual validation of belief"<sup>55</sup> not conscious of the French society surrounding the acts of ISIL, that only the instruction could deconstruct.

This would explain why young people from other cultures are less protected: the knowledge of history and Muslim civilization is not yet part of the French common culture transmitted to school, college, university, or in the prestigious universities; in competitions in the (higher) public service, candidates are not asked about this type of knowledge, etc. Thus, nothing allows the young people to acquire knowledge in this field that would enable them to identify the manipulations of the "jihadist" speech.

Therefore, even if the number of young people from families of North African descent at the national level is higher than those from other families, we are now questioning the interpretation that can be made. Contrary to what has been conveyed by certain political speeches, it is not the Maghreb culture of the youngster's family that appears as a risk factor but the lack of knowledge of the Arab-Muslim history and civilization.

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<sup>55</sup>HERVIEU-LÉGER Danièle, *Religion for memory*, Edition du cerf, Paris, 1993.

**Belief of the radicalized family (%) - Table 11**

Note : It should be noted that a young person may belong to a family with multiple beliefs (mixed couples), which explains why the sum of the percentages is higher than 100. As we can see, our sample includes many young people from mixed couples. Moreover, and from a methodological point of view, we emphasize that the families and young people have always very quickly expressed their own convictions (religious or philosophical) within the framework of data collections spaces (semi-structured individual interviews and / or working groups). This enabled them to question the question of the absence or the existence of an intra-family transmission, the unspoken ones, the pitfalls, the unifying moments, etc. Rich of this qualitative data, we decided to analyse them to help break the presupposed element still strong in certain speeches (in particular political) constituting to link the jihadist radicalization only to the families and young people of Muslim conviction.

BELIEF OF THE FAMILY	"JIHADIST" ALL SOCIAL CLASSES	"JIHADIST" MIDDLE CLASS	"JIHADIST" LOWER CLASS
PRACTICING CATHOLIC	13,4	21	3
NON-PRACTICING CATHOLIC	23,5	30	16
PROTESTANT	3	5	
PRACTICING MUSLIM	21	10	35
NON-PRACTICING MUSLIM	29	16	48
PRACTICING JEW	1	3	0
NON-PRACTICING JEW	3	7	1
ATHEIST	42,5	49	35

Table 11 shows that young people, whatever the type of belief of their family, all social classes can be attracted by the "jihadist" offer.

The latest national figures<sup>56</sup> show 51% of young people from Muslim families and 49% of "converts". It should be noted that these statistics are made from the surname of the family members and not from the declarations of the family members. A person with a Maghrebian name is considered "Muslim" in these national statistics. On our side, we classified in "Muslims", the families declaring themselves as such, without taking into account the surnames. In the same way, we classified as "atheists" the families declaring themselves as such, including those whose members have a Maghrebian first name.

The only trend that can possibly be found among believers is the lowest percentage of affected youth in practicing families (all religions combined). In the same logic, the percentage of young people from atheistic families is important, all social classes combined.

It can be hypothesized that the "great jihadist narrative" that offers a sacred substitute family that attracts less young people already enrolled in a peer group.

<sup>56</sup>Report No. 2828 French National Assembly. June 2, 2015. <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/pdf/rap-enq/r2828.pdf>

But there is no evidence that the "religious" characteristic of this peer group is more effective than a sports club or any other group (youth political activism group, green club, etc.). We didn't question this variable and cannot prove it scientifically, but it is possible that youngsters invested in a group of sports-type peers (or other) are protected from the great narrative "jihadist", in the same way as those who are registered in a group of "believers" type peers.

We didn't meet, within the young follow-up, personalities invested in collective movements (sports or socio-political) before their radicalization. We were rather dealing with hyper-sensitive young people, very mature or otherwise immature, socially isolated, in relationship difficulties with their peers.

At the age of adolescence (in the contemporary meaning of the term), is the risk factor part of the non-belonging to a religious movement or rather the extreme individualism that has become the rule of operation of an ultra-global society? What does our society offers as a great founding narrative, which gives effect of an initiatory founding rite<sup>57</sup> to pass from childhood to adulthood? Have educators not focused too much on individual follow-ups? Does National Education not put too much emphasis on personal merit rather than enriching teamwork? Is the "jihadist" speech authoritative in part because it proposes a group, a recurring and refined theme of its propaganda<sup>58</sup> ?

We suggest to retain as a risk factor the isolation of the young person, his non-participation in a collective movement (whatever it is), and not only the effectiveness of a religious practice, even if it is part of it.

#### Links to Immigration (to and including great-grandparents) (%) - Table 12

Note : Again, links to several immigrations being possible, the sum of the percentages exceeds 100.

LINKS TO IMMIGRATION	"JIHADIST" ALL SOCIAL CLASSES	"JIHADIST" MIDDLE CLASS	"JIHADIST" LOWER CLASS
AFRICA	8,5	4	14
MAGHREB	37	28	50
EUROPE	13,5	20	9
WEST INDIES	3,5	6	1
SOUTH AMERICA	0,5	1	0
ASIA	1	2	0
NONE	38,5	45	27

<sup>57</sup>See report STAGES OF THE RADICALIZATION AND DERADICALIZATION PROCESS.

<sup>58</sup>See report STAGES OF THE RADICALIZATION AND DERADICALIZATION PROCESS.

France experienced different episodes of immigration especially from its former colonies, and demonstrates a diversity of populations as reflected in this table. It does not concern our recent immigration sample, but the migratory story often related to the grandparents or the great grandparents, rooted in the family's unconscious. All the families of this sample have used French as a common and main language for several generations. We have also studied the details of these migratory stories to show their complexity: certain trajectories did not require significant linguistic or cultural change. According to us, there is no automatic correspondence between the migratory question and the question of cultural integration.

All these details noted, we can see that the migration history of the family appears as an existing risk factor (about 60% of young people if we bring together social classes and various origins). It can be hypothesized that the great jihadist founding narrative is more likely to affect young people whose families have experienced a change of territory<sup>59</sup> and / or who are referred to a foreign identity because of their physical characteristics (with all the problems of well-known identity that derive from it).

### 1.2.3 Physical proximity with a radicalized

**Radicalization declared or known to one of the relatives  
(before radicalization of the individual studied) (%) - Table 13**

<b>RADICALIZATION OF A RELATIVE</b>	<b>"JIHADIST" ALL SOCIAL CLASSES</b>	<b>"JIHADIST" MIDDLE CLASS</b>	<b>"JIHADIST" LOWER CLASS</b>
<b>YES</b>	43,5	38	50
<b>IF YES, WHICH RELATIVES?</b>			
<b>CLOSE FRIENDS</b>	39,1	34,2	34
<b>LOVE RELATIONSHIP</b>	39,1	55,3	30
<b>FAMILY</b> (Brothers and sisters)	19,5	5,3	36
<b>MOSQUE</b>	2,3	5,3	0

The radicalization of a loved one is not opposed to the radicalization by social networks. All the young people we followed used the internet and social networks at some point.

The entry into "jihadism" does not automatically depend on knowledge within this movement, since only about 40% of young people in our sample were associated with a close one already radicalized. Nevertheless, this figure is important: it means that prevention is not effective enough to detect and support those who propagate this ideology and that this ideology can be transmitted between friends, within a couple or family, without the social interlocutors being able to give the youngsters the necessary tools to protect themselves.

<sup>59</sup>See report STAGES OF THE RADICALIZATION AND DERADICALIZATION PROCESS.

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Note that 55% of young people from the middle social class have "jihadized" through their romantic relationship, against 30% from the lower classes. This shows that romantic relationships, more than friendly relationships, transcend barriers of territory and class. This figure has to be taken into account as we will see in Part III that the marital family status (with a "pro-jihadist" spouse) is one of the variables that seem to have a negative impact on the positive evolution of the youngster (and his exit of radicalization).

The percentage concerning the existence of an family member already radicalized attracts our attention (19% across all social classes). This figure is low when compared to the hypothesis that the "jihadist" ideology is transmitted as a family cultural datum that would deny democracy, denying the diversification of engaged in "jihadism" contemporary. But this figure is high if we question the effectiveness of the tools transmitted in terms of prevention: how to help a family, itself not radicalized, to preserve a young person when one of its members has already adhered to this ideology?

Few young people in this sample were approached in a mosque<sup>60</sup> by a "jihadist", which seems logical because "jihadists" refuse by definition to pray behind an imam who agrees to profess on a land governed by the human law. The clandestine "jihadist mosques" exist, but they are not the ones which are going to grip the youngster. Indeed, young people will attend them only when they already follow the ideology and are par of the "jihadist" network which will give the location of the address. It is extremely rare to be able to visit a "jihadist mosque" by accident.

In conclusion, if prevention on the net gives rise to major debates on what can be put in place with regard to the protection of the fundamental freedom of expression, giving the necessary tools to young people (and their families) so that they can unmask and deconstruct the "jihadist" ideology within their surroundings can and must be improved.

**Attempt of recruiting close relatives from their entourage (%) - Table 14**

ATTEMPT OF RECRUITING CLOSE RELATIVES	"JIHADIST" ALL SOCIAL CLASSES	"JIHADIST" MIDDLE CLASS	"JIHADIST" LOWER CLASS
<b>YES</b>	40	34	47
IF YES, WHO?			
<b>CLOSE FRIENDS</b>	26,3	20,6	27
<b>HIS FAMILY</b> (Brothers, sisters, parents)	35	26,5	46
<b>LOVE RELATIONSHIP</b>	23,8	32,4	27
<b>LINKED TO A PHYSICAL NETWORK IN ADDITION TO ITS INTERNET LINKS</b>	58	48	70

<sup>60</sup>Sébastien BOUSSOIS and Asif ARIF arrive to the same statements for Belgian young people: *"France-Belgium, The terrorist diagonal"*, foreword of Marc TREVIDIC, *La Boite à Pandore*, Eitons, 2016.

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*Part I*

We insist on the physical dimension because through internet and social networks, every brainwashed young individual becomes a "brainwasher" at a given moment, happy to preach "the good word that will regenerate the world".

Just like in the previous tables, we find the same dynamics concerning the knowledge, before radicalization of the young person himself, of a close radicalized. Young people from lower classes were more likely to recruit relatives and family members than other youngsters from the middle class (presumably due to physical networks more prevalent in lower class neighbourhoods than in bourgeois cities). But here again, the middle class individuals stand out by their ability to indoctrinate their lover or spouse (32.4% against 27% among young people of lower classes).



## I.2.4 The life story of the young person

Life elements before radicalization (%) - Table 15

Note : These table elements can of course be cumulative for the same young person.

LIFE ELEMENTS BEFORE RADICALIZATION	"JIHADIST" ALL SOCIAL CLASSES	"JIHADIST" MIDDLE CLASS	"JIHADIST" LOWER CLASS	YOUTH CONTROL GROUPS <sup>61</sup>
PSYCHOLOGICAL FOLLOW-UP	35	41	26	7
TS/SCARIFICATION	32,5	34	28	2
PHYSICAL VIOLENCE SUFFERED BY THE YOUNGSTER	30,5	18	44	2
HOSPITALIZATION IN PSYCHIATRY	12	11	14	
REAL OR SYMBOLIC ABANDONMENT EXPERIENCED BY THE YOUNGSTER	73	75	75	
DISEASES	14	15	10	
DEPRESSION (By medical opinion)	48	49	45	3,45
SEXUAL ABUSE/RAPE	31	25	39	Men: 5 Women: 10
IF SEXUAL ABUSE/RAPE, PARENTS ALERTED	17,7	36	6	
PSYCHOLOGICAL VIOLENCE, TRAUMA OTHERS	70	76	65	
DEATH IN THE ENTOURAGE	35	34	36	
ALCOHOL/DRUG ADDICTION	22,5	19	27	alcohol: 11 drugs: 5 à 10
PREVIOUS EDUCATIONAL FOLLOW-UP	23,5	16	34	
FUSIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ONE OF THE TWO PARENTS (78% with the mother)	54,5	66	40	
RELATIONSHIP OF CONTROL BY A FAMILY MEMBER (Father / mother / both parents)	42,5	37	47	

Before the compilation of these statistics, our previous works<sup>62</sup> estimated that at the time of each engagement there was a coincidence between a peak of high vulnerability of the young person and the introduction to the "jihadist" speech. We analysed how the recruiters diagnosed this vulnerability and proposed a motive of engagement "adapted" to this or that

<sup>61</sup>Data from control groups found in the study "santé 2010 INPES"

<sup>62</sup>BOUZAR D. & HEFEZ S., *I dreamed of another world, Teenage in the grip of ISIL*, Stock, 2017.

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type of vulnerability, so that the "jihadist" offer better corresponds to the "demand" of the young person<sup>63</sup>. But as any adolescent (in the extended interpretation of this term) is by definition vulnerable, we haven't characterized our youngsters by their vulnerability.

These statistics, that put together individual cases that we know well, force us to rectify this analysis: 73% of our young people report having experienced a symbolic or real abandonment; 70% have experienced severe trauma or psychological abuse; 48% were "depressed" by medical advice; 35% were followed by a psychologist; 32.5% scarified themselves or attempted suicide; 30.5% have experienced at least one physical violence that they consider to be serious; 31% have experienced sexual violence or rape; 22.5% had taken refuge in drugs or alcohol and felt "addicted" to its substance before their radicalization<sup>64</sup>. These statistics were made following the self-declaration of the youngster or the testimony of the family. It often took several months of follow-up for the youngster or a family member to dare talk about a traumatic event that the young individual experienced years ago. We believe that the results of these statistics underestimate the reality of traumatic events experienced prior to radicalization.

These statistics, and notably the 32.5% of the TS / scarification, must be placed in perspective with regard to the 37.7% of "problems with their body including self-mutilation" as noticed by Laurent Bonelli and Fabien Carrié<sup>65</sup> on the radicalized young individuals that are monitored by the Judicial Protection of the youth (P.J.J.).

As a methodological precaution, we checked the statistics of control groups<sup>66</sup>, indicated in the 4th column of Table 15. We have discovered the low rates of their percentages compared to ours. The huge gap between the results of the comparison groups and those of our young people is significant, even though we take into account the fact that these statistics were produced over a larger number of years and with a larger number of young individuals. These figures confirm the specificity of our sample.

Regarding the question of traumas, a parallel can be drawn with the studies that revealed a connection between trauma / psychological vulnerability and paranormal beliefs of the sectarian type<sup>67</sup>. The concern is not about reducing the jihadist commitment to a sectarian type of organization, but about highlighting the fact that the existence of a trauma fosters attraction and credulity towards what may be called "magical thoughts" and the discourses

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<sup>63</sup>BOUZAR D., MARTIN M. What motives bring youth to engage in the Jihad? *Neuropsychiatr Enf Adolesc* 2016;64(6):353-59 [French].

<sup>64</sup>BAZEX H, MENSAT J-Y (2016) Who are the French jihadists? Analysis of 12 cases to contribute to profile development and risk assessment of acting out. *Ann Med-Psychol Rev Psychiatry* 174: 257-265; BHUI K, EVERITT B, JONES E. Might Depression, Psychosocial Adversity, and Social Security Vulnerability and Resistance Against Violent Radicalization? *PLOS ONE* 2014; 9: e105918; ROLLING J, CORDUAN G (2017) Radicalization, a new adolescent symptom? *Neuropsychiatric Childhood Adolesc*. doi: 10.1016 / j.neurenf.2017.10.002.

<sup>65</sup>BONELLI I. & CARRIÉ F., Radicalism committed, revolts revolted, Survey of youth followed by the Judicial Protection of Youth, Université Paris Nanterre, ISP – *Institut des Sciences sociales du Politique*, 2018.

<sup>66</sup>Data from control groups found in the study « *santé 2010 INPES* »

<sup>67</sup>IRWIN HJ (1992), Origins and functions of paranormal belief: the role of childhood trauma and interpersonal control. *J. Am.Soc.Psych.Res.*, 86, pp. 199-208.; WILSON T., BARBER T., (1983), the fantasy-prone personality: implications for understanding imagery, hypnosis, and parapsychological phenomena; PERKINS SL. (2006), *Childhood physical abuse and differential development of paranormal belief systems*, *J Nery Ment Dis* 194, pp 349-355.

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that transmit them<sup>68</sup>. We have already highlighted in our first works<sup>69</sup> the link between the transmission of information by others and the emotional charge of the recipient.

Regarding the comparison of social classes, the differences concern the physical violence suffered by the young person and sexual abuse / rape (44% for the lower class against 18% for the middle class, and 39% against 25%), which can be particularly linked to the territorial environment that would be less secure in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. In a logical way, educational (institutional) follow-ups are more frequent among young people from families of lower class (34% versus 16% for the middle class), whereas psychological follow-ups (which can be non-institutional) are more common among middle class youth (41% versus 26% for the lower class). These results somehow appear high, but we do not have percentages from a control group. These figures are significant when we know that this variable (having been followed by a psychologist before radicalization) is one of the variables 'of becoming' (PART II).

*Note :*

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The important figures concerning the fusional relationship with one of the two parents (54.5% for all social classes) and the relationship of contree by a family member before radicalization (42.5% all social classes combined) are noteworthy when we know the importance of the fusional relation within the radical group. Psychiatrist Serge Hefez hypothesizes that a number of young people are sensitive to radical groups because they find a new grip that replaces the original family grip<sup>70</sup>. In other words, prior to radicalization, some would have developed a relational mode of operation based on the notion of control of others rather than exchange and reciprocity. The human relationship would already be perceived as a kind of danger for the dependence it can cause.

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The jihadist offer therefore not only affects young people "at a time when they are particularly vulnerable", as we thought until then. It can be said that, in general, young people affected by the "jihadist" ideology of our sample can be described as "vulnerable". We refer to the report STAGES OF THE RADICALIZATION AND DERADICALIZATION PROCESS to analyse how the "jihadist" narrative adapts its offers to the various (social and psychological) vulnerabilities of young people.

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<sup>68</sup>See F. CLEMENT, *The social determinants of credulity*, Librairie Droz, 2006.

<sup>69</sup>BOUZAR.D & HEFEZ.S, *I dreamed of another world, Teenage in the grip of ISIL*, Stock, 2017

<sup>70</sup>BOUZAR D. & HEFEZ S., *Ibid*.

### Elements concerning the family before the beginning of radicalization of the young person (%) - Table 16

Note : The elements of this table can of course be cumulative for the same family.

ELEMENTS CONCERNING THE FAMILY	"JIHADIST" ALL SOCIAL CLASSES	"JIHADIST" MIDDLE CLASS	"JIHADIST" LOWER CLASS
DIVORCE OR DEATH OF ONE OF THE PARENTS	56	55	59
SERIOUS ILLNESS DECLARED FOR ONE OF THE RELATIVES	32,5	26	36
DEPRESSION DECLARED FOR ONE OF THE RELATIVES	42	45	40
SEXUAL ABUSE / RAPE DONE BY ONE OF THE RELATIVES	16	8	25
PHYSICAL VIOLENCE DONE BY ONE OF THE RELATIVES	30,5	20	47
ADDICTION (ALCOHOL/DRUG) OF ONE OF THE RELATIVES	32,5	26	43
INCARCERATION OF ONE OF THE RELATIVES	15	5	28

The elements concerning the family before the beginning of the radicalization of the young individual reveals an environment that can be described as "insecure" in general: 32.5% of parents experienced a serious or recurrent illness, 42% a depression 30.5% experienced physical violence, 16% sexual abuse / rape, 32.5% took refuge in an addictive product and 15% were incarcerated. The percentages are lower for middle-class families, not only for physical and sexual abuse, but also for serious illness, addiction, and incarceration. Only the percentage of depression of one of the parents remains stable, regardless of the social class of the family.

#### 1.2.5 Dynamic of variables related to the motives of commitment

Contrary to the time when Al Qaeda was the reference, the contemporary "jihadist" speech spread over a territory that was wished to be populated. To reach a wider audience, they adapted their speeches and offers. As the sample studied in this report indicates, Muslim men were no longer their only target. Women and non-Muslims were also targeted, which required an adjustment of the solicitations. There has been a real individualization of French recruitment. It is for this reason that we speak of "mutation of the jihadist speech": the observation of the journey of the 200 young individuals of the study shows that there is a real adaptation of the "jihadist" speech to the cognitive and emotional aspirations of each one (see report STAGES OF THE RADICALIZATION AND DERADICALIZATION PROCESS). The recruiters propose different motivations depending on the different psycho-social profiles encountered.

Indeed, for each commitment, there is a junction between the unconscious needs of the young individual (to be useful, to flee the real world, to retaliate...), his search for ideal (to change the world, to build a true justice, to save Muslims....) and the recruiter's speech that

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offers him a reason to make the "jihad" – speech that appears coherent according to him (to leave to save children gassed by Bashar Al-Assad, to build a society with Muslim values, to fight against the army of the tyrant...)

After having carried out a thematic analysis of the different motivations of young people to engage in ISIL, we have categorized them to raise all the unconscious reasons (implicit arguments resulting from the thematic analysis) and conscious ones (explicit arguments invoked once the encounter with the "jihadist" speech is made) that push the young person to engage. We must specify that the reason for engagement is not related to the level of danger. It's just a matter of finding out what kind of prime motivation animated the young person in the first "small steps" of his commitment.

All the reasons relate to a better self and / or a better world<sup>71</sup> :

- Promise of a fairer and fraternal world (ISIL-LAND)
- Promise to do humanitarian aid (MOTHER TERESA)
- Promise to save his family from hell (THE SAVIOR)
- Promise to protect the weakest against the strongest with a peer group (LANCELOT)
- Promise of purity and restraint to protect oneself from sexual impulses, especially homosexual ones that are not assumed (THE FORTRESS)
- Promise of a scenario of death (THE LICITE SUICIDE)
- Promise of mighty powers (ZEUS)
- Promise of protection (THE SLEEPING BEAUTY) > rather a feminine motive

Before reading this section, we advise readers to read Part II of the  
STAGES OF THE RADICALIZATION AND DERADICALIZATION PROCESS,  
which explains these reasons for engagement  
in detail from the accounts of the radicalized.

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<sup>71</sup>Before reading this part, we advise readers to refer to the details of the engagement motives in the report THE STAGES OF THE RADICALIZATION AND DERADICALIZATION PROCESS PART II.

**Engagement Motives for any social classes (%) - Table 17a**

Note : Totals exceed 100% because some youth have multiple engagement patterns as shown in the following Table 17b

ENGAGEMENT MOTIVES	TOTAL "JIHADISTS" IN %	"JIHADISTS" BOYS IN %	"JIHADISTS" GIRLS IN %
FORTRESS	3,5	9,0	0,8
ZEUS	10,5	23,9	3,8
LICITE SUICIDE	15,5	9,0	18,8
LANCELOT	23,0	55,2	6,8
THE SAVIOR	11,5	14,9	9,8
ISIL-LAND	36,5	23,9	42,9
MOTHER TERESA	18,5	4,5	25,6
THE SLEEPING BEAUTY	21,0	0	31,6

In our sample, including all sexes and all social classes, the reasons for commitment related to promises of a better world are predominant (ISIL-LAND and LANCELOT: 36.5% and 23%). This means that young people were sensitive to a "jihadist" offer that made them promise to participate in building a better world.

If we look at motives according to gender, boys commit themselves mainly to protect the weakest with a peer group (LANCELOT: 55.2%) and girls mostly to participate in a just and fraternal world (ISIL-LAND). This last outcome joins the results of researches regarding the obstacles for women to be seen as citizenship of their country, and especially those of Muslim beliefs<sup>72</sup>. Muslim women would find it more difficult to participate actively and be perceived as citizens in France (because they are stigmatized as potential "non-republican" since they wear the headscarf), more than in any other European country. The suffering of not being able to participate in the society can be correlated with the success of the promise of a "fairer world" with the divine law promoted by recruiters of "jihad".

This need of altruism is reinforced by the fact that for 65% of young people, a single motive motivated them in their commitment. We should then wonder what our society offers to young people to prove them that they are useful to all humankind (essential step to become an adult formerly incarnated by initiatory rites in traditional societies).

The need of protecting women (THE SLEEPING BEAUTY: 31.6%) is not to be taken lightly, since it is the second reason why women get involved. This is not surprising as 90% of young girls who have committed to a "jihadist" promising them

<sup>72</sup> JOLY D., KHUESHEED W., Muslim Women and Power, Political and Civic Engagement in West European Societies, Gender and Politics, 2017.

eternal protection have been sexually abused / raped before their radicalization. We can also add those who have experienced abandonment by their father from early childhood. These results can be put in perspective with the serious situation of non-spoken and untreated sexual violence, currently denounced by the international wave of protest of women on social networks and in the courts of justice. The societal gap on this issue is profound.

To be complete, let us add that 37% of our young people engaged for this reason are underage girls against 12.5% adult women (see Annex Table C). The search for protection concerns more minors.

**Number of engagement motives for any social classes (%) - Table 17b**

NUMBER OF ENGAGEMENT MOTIVES	TOTAL "JIHADISTS" IN %	"JIHADISTS" BOYS IN %	"JIHADISTS" GIRLS IN %
1 MOTIVE	65	65,7	64,7
2 MOTIVES	31,5	31,3	31,6
3 MOTIVES AND +	3,5	3,0	3,8

Generally, a source of motivation appears more dominant than the others in the process of radicalization (65% of jihadists have a clearly identified motive).

Understanding the dynamics that are being implemented for each motive of engagement is fundamental because the type of promise made by the "jihadist" speech will then influence the change regarding the self-definition of the radicalized individual and his definition of others. Understanding the mechanisms of the motive for commitment is therefore essential to take the young person out of this worldview and to establish a link with him. On the other hand, we need to remember that the levels of dangerousness are the same: these reasons are only the first step of the youth's commitment. Once the process of radicalization is over, the level of dehumanization of oneself and future victims is the same for all radicalized individuals. The degree of "nobility" of the motive of engagement does not protect from dehumanization. **Dangerousness does not rest on the motive of engagement but on the stage of the radicalization process.**

### **Dynamics implemented for each motive**

These 8 motives for engagement were determined by our team, between April 2014 and August 2016. The findings are based on a continuous qualitative approach as part of the care and support of young people through the CPDSI programme, by crossing the promises of the recruiters with the way they manipulated the ideals and characteristics of each young person and then categorized them.



Since April 2017, we have accepted that the statistician from Professor David Cohen's team of the Childhood and Adolescent Child Psychiatry Service at the Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris explores our data, while continuing to guarantee the anonymity of the people concerned, in order to verify if the 8 motor profiles obtained by our qualitative approach could be confirmed by a quantitative approach.<sup>73</sup> It consisted in grouping a number of items to see the dynamic dimensions involved for each engagement pattern. The details of the calculation method<sup>74</sup> and correlated correspondences will appear in an international scientific article.<sup>75</sup> But what interests us here is to note that the quantitative analysis validates the qualitative analysis<sup>76</sup> and makes it possible to specify mechanisms that concern both the radicalized individual and the recruitment process.

### **These dynamics are:**

- (1) Violence and megalomania;
- (2) Depression and abuse;
- (3) Responsibility and guilt;
- (4) Loneliness and misunderstanding;
- (5) Responsibility and sacrifice;
- (6) Violence and uncertainty;
- (7) The content of sexuality;
- (8) Loneliness and sensitivity.

They are listed and mapped in Table 18 below. They show the level of interaction between the individual risk factor (micro and macro) and the promise of "jihadist" rhetoric and help to understand the difficulty of distinguishing the cause and the effects in the process of radicalization.

The methodology of the statistics that led to these dynamics by Professor Cohen's team can be sent on request (Supplement for reasons for commitment).

<sup>73</sup>BOUZAR D., MARTIN M. What motives bring youth to engage in the Jihad? *Neuropsychiatr Enf Adolesc* 2016;64(6):353-59 [French].

<sup>74</sup>A scientific convention has been signed between this team and the CPDSI. Extract of methodology explained by Cohen's team: "we perform two different analyses. First, we aimed to explore whether the 8 motive profiles that were obtained through a qualitative approach [Bouzar and Martin, 2016; Bouzar, 2017], could be confirmed via a quantitative approach. To do so, we conducted a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) using the 104 motive items (see table S1). Each motive item was coded yes (present) or no (absent) in the dataset. The best number of dimensions was determined by inspection of the MCA screen plot. Given MCA requirements, the analysis was performed only on individuals with full data available (N=122). For each individual, a main dimension was attributed from the qualitative and MCA analysis, and they were compared using Chi2 test.

We then performed multivariate models to explore prognosis at follow-up. We created an ordinal prognosis variable with 4 states from best to worst outcome (4=not anymore radicalized > 3=disengaged > 2=still radicalized > 1=reached IS or deceased). Multivariate models were performed using two steps: first, univariate analysis was performed to explore which variables may be influential; second, we performed ordinal logistic regression keeping into the model the significant variables using univariate exploration. The proportionality assumption was tested using Brant method (Brant, 1990). We present 2 models to predict prognosis at follow-up: in the first model, explicative variables are all the variables collected in table 1; in the second model, explicative variables are the dimensions defined through MCA". See more details in the article below.

<sup>75</sup>CAMPELO N., BOUZAR L., OPPETIT A., PELLERIN H., HEFEZ S., BRONSARD G., COHEN D., BOUZAR D., Joining the Islamic State from France between 2014 and 2016: an observational follow-up study, being published *THE LANCET PSYCHIATRIC*.

<sup>76</sup>The results show the dimensional correspondences between our qualitative analyses and the quantitative factorizations that are significantly related (Chi2 = 150.99, p = 0.0005), especially for non-gendered commitment patterns. Professor Cohen's team has not captured the notion of gender and sex in quantitative statistics, which may explain why the dynamic dimensions at stake for the "Sleeping Beauty" engagement pattern appear less stable.



## Part I

## The dimensional correspondences between the qualitative and quantitative analyses of the "grid of the reasons for commitment" - Table 18

THE QUALITATIVE PROPOSITIONS (BY BOUZAR AND MARTIN, 2016) <sup>77</sup>			THE QUANTITATIVE PROPOSITIONS (ACM ANALYSES OF THE COHEN TEAM)		
1	Zeus = Promise of omnipotence	Violence and megalomania	1	Violence and megalomania	Violence, interest in weapons, megalomania, adventure, combat, "masculine / virile value", no lack of self-esteem, no search for tenderness
2	Licit Suicide = Promise of a scenario of death	Depression, suicidal behaviour and risk-taking attitude	2	Abuse and depression	Depressive feelings, risk-taking attitude, suicidal behaviour, a frequently abusive liability
3	Savior = Promise to save his family from hell	Need to save the world, search for a better world	3	Liability and guilt	Feelings of responsibility and guilt towards others and relatives, fear of hell, a liability with loved ones who have suffered
4	ISIL-land = Promise of a fairer and fraternal world	Looking for a better world, feeling of injustice	4	Loneliness and poor insight (i.e. sudden discovery of the solution to a problem without going through a series of progressive trial-errors)	Expression of loneliness and guilt, resignation, loss of interest and loss of hope for the real world
5	Mother Theresa = Promise to make humanitarian aid	Need to save the world, search for a better world	5	Responsibility and sacrifice	Feelings of responsibility and guilt, expression of being bad, fear of sexuality, suicidal behaviour and interest in death, expression of sacrifice
6	Lancelot = Promise of protecting the weakest against the strongest with a peer group	Expression of a need for justice, heroism, interest for the army and for arms	6	Violence and uncertainty	Violence, interest in weapons, combat, the army, homosexual feelings, expression of difficulties when interacting with others, sometimes altruism
7	Fortress = Promise of purity and contention	Intense fantasies and sexual activity, fear of sexuality, violence	7	Sexual restraint	Intense fantasies and sexual activity, feelings of guilt when happy, no search for protection or belonging to a group, past experience of frequent abuse
8	Sleeping beauty = Promise of protection	Woman, Search of a husband, an ideal love, past experience of frequent abuse	8	Loneliness and sensitivity	Expression of loneliness, no territory, feelings of persecution, identification with "oppressed people", suicidal behaviour and interest in death

<sup>77</sup>BOUZAR D, MARTIN M. What motives bring youngsters to engage in the Jihad? *Neuropsychiatr Enf Adolesc* 2016;64(6):353-59 [French]; BOUZAR D. A Novel Motivation-based Conceptual Framework for Disengagement and De-radicalization Programs. *Sociology and Anthropology* 2017; 5(8): 600-614.

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Interestingly, some themes (group of related elements) are present in several dimensions: violence, depression, the experience of violence, problems of sexuality, loneliness, interest in death and responsibility.

The "jihadist" rhetoric proposes an offer adapted to different constructions of the same themes: the one attracted by weapons will rather listen to the propaganda related to the LANCELOT motive if he is altruistic and looks for a group of peers. Whoever is attracted by arms but who does not seek tenderness will rather listen to the propaganda related to the ZEUS motive...

When a young person has two reasons for engagement, which is the case for about 30% of young people (see TABLE 17b), one or more dimensions involved are similar in the two reasons he pursues: depression, violence, loneliness, etc

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The engagement in the "jihadist" ideology is built in resonance with the motives and ideals of each individual, hence the eight motives of engagement. At a given moment, the "jihadist" speech convinces the young person that his ideal, his need, his malaise, if any, will be settled by his adherence to the proposed ideology and project, the only ones capable of satisfying it, to make it reborn and regenerate the world at the same time. Recruiters establish a cognitive link between the individual's past experience and the transcendental dimension, in this case Islam. The young person then evolves towards an ideology related to a collective identity. It is therefore essential to take into account the quest for meaning in the "jihadist" commitment, as well as the deconstructing the interaction between individual risk factors (micro or macro) and the rhetoric of recruitment. **The commitment is linked to both the individual himself and the interaction with the mechanism of regimentation. We will talk from now on about "risk mechanisms" and not "risk factors"**

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To better deconstruct the interaction between the macro factors and the rhetoric of recruitment, we are interested in the different social classes from which young people come (while leaving aside the young person from upper middle social class, whose number is not significant).

**Engagement motives for middle class youngsters (%) - Table 19**

ENGAGEMENT MOTIVES	TOTAL "JIHADISTS"	"JIHADISTS" BOYS	"JIHADISTS" GIRLS
FORTRESS	4	9,1	1,5
ZEUS	12	27,3	4,5
LICITE SUICIDE	13	9,1	14,9
LANCELOT	24	57,6	7,5
THE SAVIOR	18	24,2	14,9
ISIL-LAND	25	15,2	29,9
MOTHER TERESA	25	6,1	34,3
THE SLEEPING BEAUTY	23	0	34,3

**Engagement motives for lower class youngsters (%) - Table 20**

ENGAGEMENT MOTIVES	TOTAL "JIHADISTS"	"JIHADISTS"	"JIHADISTS"
FORTRESS	1,2	3,7	0,0
ZEUS	8,5	22,2	1,8
LICITE SUICIDE	19,5	7,4	25,5
LANCELOT	22,0	51,9	7,3
THE SAVIOR	4,9	3,7	5,5
ISIL-LAND	52,4	40,7	58,2
MOTHER TERESA	9,8	3,7	12,7
THE SLEEPING BEAUTY	19,5	0	29,1

Both Tables 19 and 20 highlight the interaction between social factors and adherence to one or another promise of "jihadist" discourse.

Recall that the variable of social vulnerability is not a condition for radicalization. The high number of radicalized young people in the middle class proves it. But this variable comes into play when it comes to studying the dynamics set up around a commitment motive. But the reason for commitment, that is the type of promise made by the "jihadist" discourse, will then affect the change of definition of oneself and others by the radicalized individual. Understanding the mechanisms of the commitment motive is therefore essential to get the young person out of this world view.

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1) Over 57% of middle-class boys feel a sense of responsibility and guilt, which leads them to be sensitive to the promise of defending the weakest against the strongest (LANCELOT). This motive expresses a search for a "better self" and a better world. The importance of this commitment motive reflects the uneasiness of a generation that needs to be useful at a time when unemployment worries them and where no more rites allow them to show that they have become adults. The search for fraternity is fundamental in this motive as well. We can hypothesize that finding a group of friends in the real world seems more complicated today with the arrival of social networks. Many young men testify that they never really felt like being surrounded by sincere and loyal friends. Peer group research, camaraderie, a bit like the military, is fundamental to the promise of this motive.

2) Lower class boys remain attracted by the promise to retaliate the weakest against the strongest (LANCELOT) but 40.7% of them are sensitive to a promise of a fairer and more fraternal world – ISIL-LAND - (against 15.2% from the middle class). As for girls, they are sensitive to the same promise of a better world (ISIL-LAND) with 58.2% of them (against 29.9% from the middle class). The first reason for engagement for individuals from the lower class (boys and girls included) is therefore ISIL-LAND which reaches 52.4% interest against only 25% for middle-class youngsters.

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In other words, it may be thought that young people of the lower class, particularly disappointed by the gap between the promises of the republican motto and its application, have been sensitive to another promise: regenerating the world with the divine law which according to them can alone fight against human corruption. **For these young individuals from the lower class, there is no search for a "best self" but a "better world", which promises fraternity and solidarity. In this logic, there is, in a way, a search for a political commitment.**

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Our feedback and the percentages in Table 18 show that there is often a strong interaction between the micro (psychological) factor and the engagement pattern. For example, those who commit to being MOTHER TERESA were often young people with an altruistic profile (an issue of giving and debt) who wished to become social workers, educators or nurses. Those who engage in the promise of protection associated with THE SLEEPING BEAUTY have often experienced sexual abuse or rape or untreated abandonment prior to their radicalization.

We found in Table 15 that young individuals from the lower class expressed more violence than middle class youngsters. Yet, in the results of Table 20, we find that the promise of a more fraternal and fairer world (ISIL-LAND) impacted and made sense to different boys and girls at the psychological level but who were bound by the same social condition.

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We can then wonder if in addition to psychological-type micro factors and in the event of a loss of social hope in the broadest sense of the term, , the social-type macro factor does not predominate over personal histories in the majority of cases in order to direct the young person to "believe" in this or that promise made by the "jihadist" speech.

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As if the gaps and personal traumas became less important when you no longer believe in the world in which you live, the priority becomes to find a world where you can live and participate in its creation if necessary.

> The interactions between the micro and macro factors, and the promises made by the "jihadist" speech constitute the very basis of the "jihadist" commitment. But the articulation of these interactions can operate differently from one youth to another and from one social class to another.

These latest developments change the paradigm of the radicalization research: they show that the "etiological" quest, which seeks and characterizes variables (or a combination of variables) that would constitute risk factors for radicalization, is neither fair nor sufficient. No variable in itself explains the entry into process of radicalization. It is rather to study a dynamic that has taken shape around an individual at a given moment (often during his passage from childhood to adulthood). This dynamic is made of a relationship between an individual, his family, the social and political context, his personal history, and the "jihadist" organization. We will now talk about "risk mechanisms".

This complexity explains the difficulty professionals have in agreeing on the definitions, the causes and the effects of radicalization, and consequently on choosing the means to help an individual get out of radicalization. It commits professionals to maintain interdisciplinarity and complement each other. It is not a question of looking for variables that would incite individuals to radicalise and "treat" them, psychologically and / or socially, separately. It is a question of studying the conditions in which these variables have been exploited by "jihadist" rhetoric and the conditions under which "jihadist" rhetoric has been able to make sense and authority based on these variables.

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At the same time we conducted another study based on another sample of 150 young individuals from our population, including 6,7% from the wealthy class, 63,3% from the middle class and 30% from the lower class. These statistics have been carried out by professor cohen's team and have demonstrated results very close to those we shared (see Table Bis study below):

## Characteristics of teenagers and young adults engaged in violent radicalization (N=150) - Table bis study

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS	
AGE AT FIRST CONTACT, MEAN (SD) [RANGE]	19.82 (5.28) [13-40] years
GENDER, N (%)	Female : 101 (67.3%) Male: 49 (32.67%)
DISTRICT, N (%)	Paris area: 65 (43.3%) Other: 85 (56.7%)
SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS, N (%)	High: 10 (6.7%) Middle: 95 (63.3%) Low: 45 (30%)
REASONS FOR POLICE REGISTRATION ON THE RADICALIZATION DATABASE	
POLICE ARREST FOR AN ATTEMPT TO REACH IS, N (%)	101 (68%)
CONNECTION ON THE INTERNET AND ON SOCIAL NETWORKS, N (%)	29 (19%)
POLICE ARREST FOR PREPARATION OF A TERROR ATTACK, N (%)	11 (7%)
POLICE ARREST FOR RETURN FROM SYRIA, N (%)	7 (5%)
BREAK WITH SOCIETY, N (%)	2 (1%)
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS	
STATUS, N (%)	Married: 41 (27.3%) Single: 109 (72.7%)
WITH CHILD, N (%)	32 (21.3%)
FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS	
PARENTAL STATUS	Married: 66 (44%) Divorced: 84 (56%)
RELIGIOUS CONTEXT	No religion: 59 (39%) Muslim context: 56 (37.3%) Christian context: 48 (32%) Other: 10 (6.67%)
PERSONAL HISTORY BEFORE RADICALIZATION	
SUICIDAL BEHAVIOR OR SCARING, N (%)	44 (29.3%)
PSYCHIATRIC CONSULTATION, N (%)	55 (35.3%)
PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALIZATION	19 (12.7%)

MEDICAL CONDITION, N (%)	28 (18.7%)
DEPRESSION AND SUIVI, N (%)	66 (44%)
ADDICTION AND DRUG ABUSE, N (%)	33 (22%)
FUSIONAL RELATION WITH ONE RELATIVE, N (%)	90 (60%)
DOMINATED BY ONE RELATIVE, N (%)	81 (54%)
TRIED TO RADICALIZE OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS OR FRIENDS, N (%)	93 (62%)
ABANDONMENT, N (%)	27 (18%)
PHYSICAL AND/OR SEXUAL ABUSE, N (%)	40 (26.7%)
NEGLECT OR PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE, N (%)	22 (14.7%)
<b>FAMILY HISTORY BEFORE RADICALIZATION</b>	
PREVIOUS RADICALIZATION IN THE FAMILY, N (%)	85 (56.7%)
MEDICAL CONDITION IN A RELATIVE, N (%)	41 (27.3%)
DEPRESSION IN A RELATIVE, N (%)	61 (40.7%)
RAPE OR ABUSE, N (%)	24 (16%)
PHYSICAL ABUSE, N (%)	48 (32%)
ADDICTION AND DRUG ABUSE, N (%)	48 (32%)
DEATH OF A RELATIVE, N (%)	(%)
<b>POLICE HISTORY BEFORE RADICALIZATION</b>	
ÉDUCATIONAL AND SOCIAL MONITORING, N (%)	33 (22%)
IMPRISONMENT (PERSONAL OR RELATIVE), N (%)	24 (16%)
WEB CONTACT WITH RADICALIZED INDIVIDUALS, N (%)	149 (99%)
DIRECT CONTACT WITH RADICALIZED INDIVIDUALS, N (%)	66 (44%)
<b>WHAT HAPPENED AFTER AWARENESS OF RADICALIZATION</b>	
ÂGE AT LAST CONTACT WITH CPDSI, MEAN (SD) [RANGE]	21.8 (5.4) [15-42] years
POLICE SURVEILLANCE	139 (93%)
HOUSE ARREST WITH POINTING	24 (16%)
PROSECUTOR INQUIRY	58 (39%)
IDENTITY DOCUMENTS REMOVED	42 (28%)
JUSTICE EDUCATIONAL AND SOCIAL MONITORING, N (%)	61 (41%)
ÉDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHIATRIC MONITORING	64 (43%)
STILL MUSLIM AT LAST CONTACT	138 (92%)
STATUS AT LAST CONTACT	No more indoctrinated: 95 (63%) Disengaged: 21 (14%) Still radicalized: 19 (13%) Reached IS: 12 (8%) Deceased: 3 (2%)



## I.2.6 Comparison between the variables of "jihadists" and Pietist salafist

To clarify how micro and macro factors may interact with the radical engagement, we compared the variables of a group of "jihadists" and those of a group of Pietist Salafists. Having in common the ideology according to which "only the divine law can manage a society and fight the human corruption", the "jihadists" estimate that they must impose the divine law (including by the violence) whereas the Pietist Salafists consider they must only protect themselves from the human law and all the attacks on the Unity of God that it entails. The ideological difference between them relies on the burden of responsibility: it is up to the Muslims for the first, to God for the second.

We have selected 100 Pietist Salafist and 100 "jihadists", all from the middle class, so that the social parameter does not interfere with the accuracy of the comparison. We also retained the same proportion of men and women. In contrast, Salafists are slightly older. The variables already explained above are here abbreviated in Table 21 (from Table A of Annex).

**Comparison between Pietist Salafists and "jihadists"**  
(Results in Average form, standard deviation) - Table 21

	"JIHADISTS" (N = 100)	SALAFISTS (N = 100)	P-VALUE
AGE_PEC	19.44(4.67)	21.38(4.78)	0.001

STATUS DURING FOLLOW-UP	"JIHADISTS"	SALAFISTS	P
AGE_PEC	19.44(4.67)	21.38(4.78)	0.001
FUSION WITH ONE OF THE PARENTS BEFORE RADICALIZATION (0/1)	34(34%) / 66(66%)	61(61%) / 39(39%)	< 0.001
KNOWN RADICALIZATION OF A CLOSE ONE(0/1)	62(62%) / 38(38%)	74(74%) / 26(26%)	0.069
ATTEMPT TO COMMIT SUICIDE / SCARIFICATION BEFORE RADICALIZATION (0/1)	66(66%) / 34(34%)	77(77%) / 23(23%)	0.085
DEPRESSION OF A CLOSE ONE BEFORE RADICALIZATION(0/1)	55(55%) / 45(45%)	73(73%) / 27(27%)	0.008
DEPRESSION OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEFORE RADICALIZATION (0/1)	51(51%) / 49(49%)	66(66%) / 34(34%)	0.031
ABANDONMENT OF THE YOUNG INDIVIDUAL BEFORE RADICALIZATION (0/1)	25(25%) / 75(75%)	38(38%) / 62(62%)	0.048
ADDITION OF A CLOSE ONE BEFORE RADICALIZATION (0/1)	74(74%) / 26(26%)	85(85%) / 15(15%)	0.054

The comparison in Table 21 does not show a significant difference between the two groups that could explain how some validate the use of violence and the others do not. The few trends that can be observed only show that certain percentages are slightly higher for the "jihadists": the fusion with one of the two parents, the proximity of a radicalized close



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*Part I*

individual, the attempt of suicide / scarification, the feeling of abandonment, the depression of the young person before radicalization, the depression of one of his parents, the addiction of a relative. All these variables impacted more “jihadists” than Salafists, as if they were two mirror groups: one more affected than the other. Some differences in percentages concern the difference between the police and the judicial treatments. Indeed, Salafists have almost never been arrested by the police and have been subject to less educational monitoring under the judge’s decision.

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The results of this comparison prove that both types of engagement (violent and non-violent) are chosen indiscriminately by young people who are alike. The study of the variables characterizing them does not explain their pacifist or violent commitment. These results confirm that we must abandon the posture of looking for predisposing factors (micro or macro) to explain the commitment but to focus on process analysis. We refer to the report STAGES OF THE RADICALIZATION AND DERADICALIZATION PROCESS to understand what underpins the choice of violence.

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## II. THE CROSSED VARIABLES OF BECOMING

The aim is here to step into the delicate exercise of prediction. We searched<sup>78</sup> what were the social, psychological and medical characteristics present in the deradicalized group. This analysis starts from the statement that such features may have had a positive impact as the individuals succeeded in grieving the group and the “jihadist” ideology in the same national and international political context they radicalized. We then applied the same exercise for group of youngsters who did not disengage.

In other words, the hypothesis we make is based on the idea that if strong characteristics of deradicalized individuals are found in great proportions, those features can help us ponder on the prevention axes to be implemented. The difficulty remains on the restitution of those characteristics in the context and the career<sup>79</sup> of the radicalized person and not to consider him as a causal factor of (de)radicalization. To do so, we will cross the anthropological approach and the feedback that we acquired by accompanying those young people for 2 years from which results the present quantitative study.

*Remark :* \_\_\_\_\_

The variables of becoming do not include those presenting a significant difference between the young people that are a part of “our successes” and those that are part of our “failures”. They do not include the recurring characteristics of all radicalized individuals widely evoked in Part I. As example: the use of the Internet is not included because it does not discriminate the “deradicalized” and “still radicalized” individuals (as it concerns 100% of all the young people of our sample).

This table summarizes the significant variables of the becoming, from the Table B of the annex.

<sup>78</sup>The exact method of those statistics is available in CAMPELO N., BOUZAR L., OPPETIT A., PELLERIN H., HEFEZ S., BRONSARD G., COHEN D., BOUZAR D., *Joining the Islamic State from France between 2014 and 2016: an observational follow-up study*, in *The Lancet psychiatric*, to be published.

<sup>79</sup>COLLOVALD A. AND B. GAÏTI, « Questions about a political radicalization », in A. COLLOVALD and B. GAÏTI (dir.), *Democracy to the extremes*, Paris, La Dispute, 2006, p. 19-45.

## Summary of the significant variables of becoming in the exit of radicalization

- Table 22

VARIABLES SIGNIFICANTLY ASSOCIATED WITH STATUS AT FOLLOW-UP: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS					
STATUS AT FOLLOW-UP	REACHED IS (OR DECEASED) (N=15)	STILL RADICALIZED (N=19)	DISENGAGED (N=21)	DERADICALIZED (N=19)	P
<b>GENDER</b> (F/M)	9 (60%) / 6 (40%)	9 (47.4%) / 10 (52.6%)	12 (57.1%) / 9 (42.9%)	<b>71 (74.7%)</b> / 24 (25.3%)	0.016
<b>PERSONAL STATUS</b> (Alone/Married)	7 (46.7%) / 8 (53.3%)	10 (52.6%) / 9 (47.4%)	6 (28.6%) / 15 (71.4%)	<b>61 (64.2%)</b> / 34 (35.8%)	0.024
<b>PARENTS' DIVORCED OR DIED</b> (No/Yes)	7 (46.7%) / 8 (53.3%)	10 (52.6%) / 9 (47.4%)	15 (71.46%) / 6 (28.6%)	35 (36.8%) / 60 ( <b>63.2%</b> )	0.039
<b>TRIED TO RADICALIZE OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS OR FRIENDS</b> (No/Yes)	4 (26.7%) / 11 ( <b>73.3%</b> )	8 (42.1%) / 11 (57.9%)	11 (52.4%) / 10 (47.6%)	70 (73.7%) / 25 (26.3%)	<.001
<b>SUICIDAL BEHAVIOR BEFORE RADICALIZATION</b> (No/Yes)	14 (93.3%) / 1 (6.7%)	15 (78.9%) / 4 (21.1%)	16 (76.2%) / 5 (23.8%)	61 (64.2%) / 34 ( <b>35.8%</b> )	0.016
<b>PSYCHIATRIC CONSULTATION BEFORE RADICALIZATION</b> (No/Yes)	12 (80%) / 3 (20%)	14 (73.7%) / 5 (26.3%)	15 (71.46%) / 6 (28.6%)	56 (58.9%) / 39 ( <b>41.1%</b> )	0.048
<b>RAD_CONNUE_PROCHE</b> (No/Yes)	6(40%) / 9( <b>60%</b> )	8(42.1%) / 11(57.9%)	14(66.7%) / 7(33.3%)	57(60%) / 38(40%)	0.141
<b>IMPRISONMENT (PERSONAL OR RELATIVE) BEFORE RADICALIZATION</b> (No/Yes)	10 (66.6%) / 5 ( <b>33.3%</b> )	15 (78.9%) / 4 (21.1%)	17 (81%) / 4 (19%)	84 (88.6%) / 11 (11.6%)	0.032
<b>EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHIATRIC MONITORING AFTER RADICALIZATION</b> (No/Yes)	15 (100%) / 0 (0%)	11 (57.9%) / 8 (42.1%)	9 (42.9%) / 12 (57.1%)	51 (57.1%) / 44 ( <b>42.9%</b> )	0.05
<b>MUSLIM FAMILIES</b> (No/Yes)	8 (53.3%) / 7 ( <b>46.7%</b> )	13 (68.4%) / 6 (31.6%)	8 (38.1%) / 13 (61.9%)	71 (74.7%) / 24 (25.3%)	0.02
<b>ARAB-MUSLIM CULTURE FAMILIES</b> (No/Yes)	6(40%) / 9( <b>60%</b> )	12(63.2%) / 7(36.8%)	6(28.6%) / 15(71.4%)	70(73.7%) / 25(26.3%)	0.001
<b>REASON FOR ENGAGEMENT « ZEUS »</b> (No/Yes)	15( <b>100%</b> ) / 0(0%)	12(63.2%) / 7(36.8%)	16(76.2%) / 5(23.8%)	92( <b>96.8%</b> ) / 3(3.2%)	0.006

## II.1 THE VARIABLES THAT WOULD HAVE A POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE EXIT OF RADICALIZATION

Those variables are found in the proportion of young people who are monitored and could exit radicalization.

### II.1.1 Relation between gender and exit of radicalization

The category 'Gender (F/M)' points out that the girls we followed proportionally better grieved the ideology and the "jihadist" group. This does not mean that they were less dangerous than boys. The level of dangerousness does not depend on the gender of the radicalized individual but rather on the progress of the process stage. However, many interactive factors can explain the strong proportion of girls in the deradicalized group:

- Girls are often faster reported by their parents than boys: as we already pointed out, families have a tendency to notice more the rupture signs of their daughters since they further watch their everyday life. In addition, the visibility of clothing changes draws their attention on her.

- The representations and stereotypes related to gender from some institutional actors encourage them to better take into account the complexity of the engagement of girls and to mandate an almost systematic psycho-educative follow-up (that appears itself as a guaranty of the exit of radicalization as the following paragraph indicates).

- Girls involves for motives that do not correspond to the reality of the "jihadist" project. It is possible to give them new information helping them to realize progressively that there is a difference between the promises they believed in and the reality of the "jihadists" identity and action. When the radicalized faces information that does not coincide to the idea he had of the action and objective of the "jihadists", he can start withdrawing and expressing his first doubts. Considering that the narrative has a certain authority on him because he seeks an answer to his existential question, and that he feels sunk into a sort of coherency between his ideal, his needs and his involvement in "jihadism", the cognitive accompaniment consists in helping him to realize that there is a difference between the promise presented by recruiters (as an example: participating in the construction of a fraternal and solidary society), his personal motive (being finally useful) and the real declination of the ideology (heating and cares are only free for those who pledge allegiance to ISIL).

The difficulty to support a young person depends on his progress in his radicalization process. The less rooted the cognitive change is, the more possible it will be to deconstruct it.

The gender does not constitute itself a "positive" variable in the becoming of the radicalized individual.

However, the fact of being reported fast(er), being involved in ISIL with a motive that does not correspond to the reality<sup>80</sup> and benefiting from an almost systematic psycho-educative follow-up are relevant factors.

> Recommendations must be made so that the report intervenes ahead, including for boys, in a way that a prevention programme could be implemented much sooner. Let's not forget that when intelligence services detect a youngster, they demand to the prefectural authorities not to have the individual followed by specialized educative teams, scaring that this educative follow-up would interfere with their surveillance and network tracking. Numerous boys, especially minors, got into radicalization and then were incarcerated, while they could have been treated when exiting radicalization if they were supported as soon as the beginning of their radicalization process. The lack of treatment revealed itself as counterproductive on the long haul. For all of those who are not too far in the radicalization process, pondering on a better dialogue and coherency between the police and educative services, so both follow-ups of surveillance and exiting of radicalization would get themselves organized, seems necessary.

### II.1.2 Three variables related to the position of the psychologist impacting positively the becoming of the youngster

- **Past experience of depression**
- **Being monitored by a psychologist before the radicalization**
- **Being supported by a psycho-educative team alongside the deradicalization process**

See the three categories 'Psychiatric consultation before radicalization', 'Suicidal behaviour before radicalization', and 'Educational and psychiatric monitoring after radicalization' from Table n°22.

Most of the deradicalized youths were psychologically monitored (1st variable), mainly for depression (2nd variable) before their radicalization, and were also supported psychologically during their deradicalization (3rd variable). It should be noted that, at this stage, the CPDSI team considered that its role was to offer what we could call a "transitional space" between ISIL and the institutions, and its goal was based on connecting the radicalized individual who was followed by "usual" specialized interlocutors: psychologist, educators, professors, imams, etc. It required some time due to the "paranoid perspective"<sup>81</sup> transmitted to the radicalized individual by the "jihadist" narrative. The table n°22 indicates there is a relation between the success of that multidisciplinary care and the becoming of the young person. Generally, it also points out the importance of the psychological factor in the exit of radicalization, no matter if any debate exists regarding the psychological vulnerabilities of the radicalized one.

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<sup>80</sup>Only the engagement motive called ZEUS, in which the "jihad" narrative gives the illusion of almightiness, exactly corresponds to the reality of the action of "jihadist" groups. We will see later that, logically, the young people involved under this motive represent a strong part of our failures.

<sup>81</sup>Hofstadter R., *The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays* (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), Robins and Post, Political Paranoia.

Concerning these results, some remarks must be noted.

People could believe that the concerned radicalized individual kept in mind the vestiges of the trust bond he established in his former life with a psychologist, facilitating the resumption with a helpful professional, even though they now perceive the latter as an Enemy. The fact that they were monitored for depression lead them to apprehend both the human system complexities and the importance of a third-party professional to further support them. The shared intellectual exercise (during the therapy) with a third-party constituted a proof (probably unconscious), carved in their history, that a professional can be trusted. Even though radicalization changed the definition of any person who is not a part of the radical group and by consequence, who must not be trusted as they are likely to be accomplices to plot against the “real Islam”, the previous “shared background” with a professional would leave a sort of “cognitive opening” on the possibility to trust humans.

People could also believe that the concerned youths kept in mind the traces of the human psychic reasoning, elaborated during their former psychotherapy. When someone experiences the deconstruction of his depression, he realizes the links between what he lives and/or lived, human subjectivity (how we live events) and the manner to decipher events and “to interpret the world”. In a way, he recorded (consciously or unconsciously) the importance of the human factor. But the “jihadist” narrative attempts to destroy this aspect.

*Remark :* \_\_\_\_\_

We observed that French recruiters tend to adapt the dissimulation arguments to the interpretative framework of different professional bodies mandated to take care of the radicalized individual. They advise youths to use psycho-analytical arguments when prefects mandated psychologists and to apply to “rap” workshops when educators are appointed. This will to dissimulate has repercussions on the evaluation but not on the support: even though the young person may evoke some arguments “to alter the professional’s diagnosis” and to lead him in focusing only on his familial problematic, omitting the existence of his relationship with the “jihadist” group, the establishing link with the radicalized one still produces positive effects. Indeed, every communication that could allow him to realize that there is a relation between his ideal, his needs and his involvement in “jihadism”, reintroduces complexity in his way of seeing the world. But, the simple fact of reintroducing complexity and human factors in his mind will contribute in fighting against the cognitive change that occurred due to radicalization. **The advice that recruiters gave to the young person to fool professionals does not matter: what is fundamental is that a relation has to be set up.** \_\_\_\_\_

In so far as the role of the psychologist appears as a “positive” variable of becoming in the exit from radicalization (Table 22), we propose to focus on the use of psychology and to present tools that educators or psychologists could use in the prevention of radicalization, thanks to the contribution of the psychoanalyst Alain Ruffion. These tools consider the relation between “needs and risks” in paragraph III.2 of this report (see Annex FOCUS PARTICULAR ON THE ROLE OF THE PSYCHOLOGIST BY ALAIN RUFFION).

### II.1.3 Relation between the loss of one of the parents and the exit of radicalization of a young person

The category “dead or divorced parents” from table n°22 illustrates that, unlike any expectancy, the youths that got out of radicalization suffered the sudden loss of a member of their family. We were first unsettled by this first result because single-parent families are usually depicted as a risk factor.

By overlapping those results with our qualitative analysis, we can wonder if those young individuals have already been through a brutal separation or grief experience that reinforced their resilience capacity. Indeed, having overcome a previous difficult hardship helped them to develop resources in themselves that would have stayed deep inside them underlying as if they would have had no adversity to face. Their resiliency capital built and reinforced itself from psychological resources they had to rally in order to overcome the separation or the death of one of their parents. This negative human experience reinforced their resiliency capital. It then became a “positive variable” in the becoming of the radicalized one as it helps them in anticipating the possible future “after radicalization”, in spite of these difficulties (to detach from the radical group, overcome the complexity of reinsertion with an S folder – ‘Fiche S’, and regain faith in social and familial interlocutors, etc.)



## II.2 VARIABLES THAT WOULD SLOW DOWN THE EXIT OF RADICALIZATION

Five variables would constitute a sort of a disadvantage to exit radicalization.

### II.2.1 Relation between an incarcerated relative and the upholding of radicalization

We can notice by reading the category ‘Imprisonment of a relative before radicalization (No/Yes)’ from table n°22 that a relation can be established between the fact of having an incarcerated relative and the becoming of the radicalized individual. Considering it can make a child feel insecurity, the incarceration would have a peculiar impact, probably because of the privation of the relative coming from society. Many researches<sup>82</sup> were published about this subject, illustrating that children can assume new roles, subsequent to the imprisonment of a parent, in order to provide a familial support to other members of the family, as their relationship with the imprisoned parent is impacted, and a relocation (with a new school) is often necessary. Studies underline that such impacts on children do not hold the penal detention services’ attention.

Other researches highlight the fact that numerous prisoners had delinquent parents: those whose childhood was affected by the detention of a parent are more disposed to behave later as an asocial individual. This exact study, through its long-term objective (forty years), notices that “the imprisonment of a parent is not only an indicator of parental delinquency, but also exposes their children to specific risks”<sup>83</sup> (having a parent in prison likely drives children to manifest an asocial behaviour over the course of their existence). Children separated from their parents for other reasons do not present as many asocial tendencies. The imprisonment of a parent appears to constitute a risk factor to a future criminal behaviour for children, whatever the duration of the proposed sentence<sup>84</sup>. Other studies pointed out that there is a “proportional relation between the reaction each time their parents were incarcerated and the times their children committed crimes once they became adults”<sup>85</sup>. This means that professionals of child protection must remain attentive to the impact provoked by the incarceration of a relative in a child’s world view.

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<sup>82</sup>We can quote the report of Oliver Robertson, from the Quaker United Nation Office, April 2007, Parents in prison: the effect on their children, women in prison and children of imprisoned mothers: [http://www.quno.org/sites/default/files/resources/FRANCAIS\\_The%20impact%20of%20parental%20imprisonment%20on%20children.pdf](http://www.quno.org/sites/default/files/resources/FRANCAIS_The%20impact%20of%20parental%20imprisonment%20on%20children.pdf)

<sup>83</sup>MURRAY Joseph and FARRINGTON David P. (2005) “Parental imprisonment: effects on boys’ antisocial behaviour and delinquency through the life-course” in *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry* Vol. 46, No. 12, pp.6-7, cited by Olivier Robertson’s report.

<sup>84</sup>MURRAY Joseph (2005) “The effects of imprisonment on families and children of prisoners” dans A. LIEBLING & S. Maruna (rédacteurs) *The effects of imprisonment*, p.449, cited Olivier Robertson’s report..

<sup>85</sup>WEAR SIMMONS Charlene (2000) *Children of Incarcerated Parents* (California State Library), p.10.



### II.2.2 Relation between “trying to indoctrinate a relative” and the upholding of radicalization

The results of the category ‘Attempt to radicalize other family members or friends (No/Yes)’ corroborate our qualitative approach, which allowed us to remark that the transmission of the “jihadist” ideology to another person is an obstacle to the exiting of radicalization for two main reasons:

- The “jihadist” cannot doubt on arguments that serve him to convince another person. Indeed, youngsters clearly express the negative interaction in which they find themselves: the fact of convincing someone that the “jihadist” project is “the solution” to regenerate himself and also the world reinforces them in their own certitudes. How can they doubt while their arguments make sense to other people? The success of indoctrination of others becomes the proof for the indoctrinator that he is guided by God to transmit this “Truth”. Consequently, it is even harder for him to question himself. It seems that giving an authority speech to someone else would prevent the first concerned to doubt his own arguments.

- The “jihadist” feels guilty grieving an ideology and a project he transmitted to others, who will then die and kill to this end. The process of exiting radicalization is based on the realization of the difference between the promise of the “jihadist” group (better world, etc.) and the reality of their actions (internal purification and external extermination projects). The fact of engaging other people multiplies the complexity of getting out of the denial of the false “jihadist” propaganda. Indoctrinating a relative, and not an unknown person on the internet, multiplies this guilt feeling.

This negative variable of the becoming must be considered in the professional support, which must each time help the radicalized one to realize his part of guilt and his part as a victim.

### II.2.3 Relation between the marital status and the exit of radicalization

The category ‘Personal status (Single/Married)’ from table n°22 points out that the youngster that got out of radicalized were almost, for 2/3 of them, unmarried. This statement joins our feedback: a radicalized couple reinforces itself. The couple is then a radical group inside of a radical group. The relationships throughout the couple constitute a sort of a pressure that amplifies the whole process which leads to increase:

- The ruptures with the external traditional referents (easier without them);
- The fusion and the feeling of protection inside the group;
- The concordance of their new interpretative system;
- The reinforcement of their biased treatment of information and polarization;
- The banalization of behaviour changes.

Then, the spouse expresses affective considerations that are part of the interaction legitimizing the narrative by promoting the radicalized loved one.

“The subject is not only reinforced by his own representations of himself or by the impact he believes he has on his environment but by the positive look of external observers, whose adherence to the cause offers a regain of value to the reinforcement”<sup>86</sup>. If he wants to express doubts<sup>87</sup>, he “questioning of the ensemble of the developed cognitions during the radicalization process would generate an unbearable cognitive dissonance and an extreme existential crisis because there is a lack of differentiation between personal and collective goals”<sup>88</sup>.

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This variable joins other variables of “the negative becoming” in a way that it is part of what we can call “proximity” variables. It concerns the frequentation of the radicalized individual.

This variable of becoming illustrates the **special feature of radicalization. For the delinquency process, the marriage appears as a protection and a pull-out factor**<sup>89</sup>, insofar as it constitutes a positive event of life.

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#### II.2.4 Relation between being from an Arab-Muslim family and the upholding of radicalization

The categories ‘Muslim families’ and ‘Arab-Muslim culture families’ illustrate that, globally, the youths from Arab-Muslim culture quit radicalization less easily than others, if we look at those who grieved the utopia of Divine law (named ‘deradicalized’ in table n°22).

According to this result, the one of table n°10 adds that: the knowledge of elements of Arab-Muslim culture is a protection factor, insofar as there are 61% of “jihadists” from Maghreb, popular class, against 29% from the middle class. The social factor only intervenes for youngsters of Maghreb origins. For those who are not of this origin, “jihadists” from the middle class are of 81%. We supposed that middle class families of Maghreb origins had transmitted elements of Arab-Muslim culture that protected their children (non-possible transmission for other families due to the fact that it is not a part of French common culture).

About the difficulty to grieve the utopian of Divine law, it must be recalled that families of Arab-Muslim culture take more time to alert authorities, for multiple reasons previously explained (fear of stigmatization of relatives, etc.). The young people of those families are supported later than others, which means that their radicalization process is older and more advanced. We crossed this part of the sample with other variables in order not to proceed to simplifying interpretations and we noticed that, out of 46,7% of youngsters, 67% were linked

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<sup>86</sup>M. CLARKE, *The role of social cognition in the development of the criminal career*, Internet Journal of Criminology, 2011, ISSN 2045-6743 (online).

<sup>87</sup>See the work of LAMINE A-S on the question on doubt (2014) “ ‘I doubt; Therefore, I Believe.’ Three Modalities of “Belief in the Making”” In *Religion in Times of Crisis*, edited by Gladys Ganiel, Christophe Monnot and Heidemarie Winkel. Leiden: Brill, 72-90.

<sup>88</sup>S. GARCET, “A Psycho-Criminological Approach to Radicalization: The Model of ‘Cognitive Self-Transformation and Meaning-Building in Violent Radical Engagement’”, *Liege Law School*, 2016.

<sup>89</sup>MARUNA, S. AND KING, A. (2008) “Selling the Public on Probation: Beyond the Bib” *Probation Journal* 55(4): 337-351.

to a physical network and 53% of them had a radicalized relative. The infamous “proximity” variables previously evoked as “negative in the becoming” mainly concern the youngster that come from families of Arab-Muslim culture.

There is a comparison to make between these figures and other studies that pointed out that members of a stigmatized group have a tendency to get closer to other members of the endogroup to restore and protect the esteem they have of themselves with individuals that look just like them<sup>90</sup>. The psychologist Abdessalem Yahyaoui reminds that, on the long term, “the upholding of self-esteem can have an important cost in the self-regulation area”<sup>91</sup>. In concrete terms, the stigmatized individuals would have more difficulties to regulate their behaviour towards threat conditions of the stereotype<sup>92</sup>. If we add to these researches the ones that demonstrate that the belief diminishes the affected stress when the individual feels like he loses control of his life and does not want to identify the threat that weighs on him<sup>93</sup>, we can better understand the reason why youngsters with “north-African features presumed as Muslim” have more difficulties to extract themselves from the utopia of the radical project. The over-investment of religious beliefs could “signify the acceptance of the lack of individual control on events and situations, then allowing to believers to dispose of a cultural (and cult) answer to their existential worries”<sup>94</sup>. In general terms, rituals could provide a practical answer and also an illusion of control, then permitting to regulate his daily anxiety<sup>95</sup>.

In a context where Islam is dominated by Wahhabi interpretations that also promote the superiority of divine law towards human law, it is not uncommon that the utopia according to « only divine law can fight the corrupted world » has an authority on an increasing number of young people. Over-investing beliefs to reassure works for each radicalized young person when considering the anxiety resulting from the anxiogenic approach that the “jihadist” narrative implemented with conspiracy theories. But leaving the utopia of a perfect world ruled by Divine law has a superior symbolic cost when the young person has Arab-Muslim origins.

<sup>90</sup>WILLS TA. (1981), Downward comparison principles in social psychology, *Psychological Bulletin*, 90,245-271; CROIZET JC & LEYENS JP., (2003), *Bad reputations, realities and goals of the social*, Armand colin, Paris; TAJFEL H. & TURNER JC., (1986), The social identity theory of intergroup behaviour, in AUSTIN WG. & WORCHEL S., *Psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 33-48), Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall; KAYA A. & KENTEL F., (2008), *Euro-Turks: a bridge or a breach between Turkey and the European Union?* Centre for European for Policy Study.

<sup>91</sup>YAHYAOUI Abdessalem, “Adolescence facing stigmatization, The origins of radicalization” Editions in press, Collection Psychological overtures, 2017, p.87.

<sup>92</sup>INZLICHT M., MCKAY L. and ARONSON J., (2006), Stigma as ego depletion: how being the target of prejudice affects self-control, *Psychological Science*, 17 (3), 262-269, quoted by Yahyaoui.

<sup>93</sup>CASE TI, FITNESS J., CAIRNS DR., STEVENS RJ., (2004), Coping with uncertainty: Supers-titious strategies and secondary control, *Journal of applied social psychology*, 34, 4, 2004, pp 848-871; HERGOVICH A., (2001), Field dependence, suggestibility and belief in paranormal phenomena, *Personality and individual differences*, 34, pp 195-209; IWIN HJ., (2000), Belief in the paranormal and a sense of control over life, *European journal of parapsychology*, 15, pp 68-78; JAHODA G., (1969), *The psychology of superstition*, Penguin, Londres; KEINAN G., (2002), The effect of stress and desire for control on superstitious behaviour, *Personality and social psychology bulletin*, 28, pp 102-108; SHAPIRO DH., SHWXARTZ CE., ASTIN JA., (1996), Controlling ourselves, controlling our world, *American psychologist*, 51, pp 1213-1230.

<sup>94</sup>YAHYAOUI Abdessalem, “Adolescence facing stigmatization, The origins of radicalization”, Editions in press, Collection Ouvertures psy, 2017, that quotes the studies of GREENBERG and all, (2001), Clarify the function of salience-induced worldview defence: renewed suppression or reduced accessibility of death related thoughts, *Journal of experimental social psychology*, 37, pp 70-76.

<sup>95</sup>KEINAN G., (2002), *Ibid*. We developed this aspect, especially for those who involve in jihadism after a content and a purification promise (see details in report STAGES OF THE RADICALIZATION AND DERADICALIZATION PROCESS).

### II.2.5 Relation between the engagement motive “Zeus” (promise of almightiness) and the upholding of radicalization

The category ‘Reason for engagement – Zeus’ illustrates that youths that engaged for the almightiness promise of the “jihadist” narrative that filled their ideal had more difficulties getting out of radicalization than those who engaged for another engagement motive. This quantitative result crosses the one of our qualitative feedback and does not surprise us. Indeed, we recall that the engagement motive does not determine the rate of dangerousness of the radicalized individual: all become dangerous at the end of the radicalization process if no follow-up was implemented. But taking a step back from the ideology and the “jihadist” group only happens when the radicalized individual faces information that do not coincide with the idea he had of the action and the goals of the “jihadists”. In order to exit radicalization, the individual must realize that a discrepancy exists between the promise of the “jihadist” narrative (echoing to his need) and the reality of the “jihadist” group’s action (extermination project). The cognitive remobilization then better operates if the perceived incoherency only concerns a personal motivation of the radicalized one<sup>96</sup>. However, the engagement motive name ZEUS is the only one to correspond exactly to the “jihadist” propaganda: there is no discrepancy between the almightiness promise and the reality of actions. Once on the field, the group sets up an extermination project of a totalitarian sort. This is not the case for the other engagement motives, for which the propaganda puts forward promises (humanitarian, justice, retaliation, etc.) that do not correspond to the reality of actions. Our team encountered a second difficulty for the ones that engaged with ZEUS: proposing to the radicalized one an alternative project that corresponded to his first need of almightiness was impossible as a former “jihadist” could not be oriented to professions in which they had to hold guns, such as the army or the police...

> When a young person engaged because of the search for almightiness, we could not apply the bases of our method that consisted to lead him to redefine the “jihadist” group (by the realization of the misleading characteristic of the propaganda) and to redefine himself by imagining an alternative non-violent engagement corresponding to his needs. This double stage that helped us bringing them to other interlocutors (psychologist, psychiatrist, educators, imam, community aid project for young people, etc) operated with more difficulty for the ZEUS individuals, which explains their slower exit of the radicalization process.

### II.2.6 Comparison of these variables of the becoming with the age factor

We finally established a comparison between minors and adults in order to complete precisely the elements that appear to facilitate the exit of radicalization, as we noticed that our failures were constituted of 64% of adults and 35% of minors<sup>97</sup>.

We then crossed those quantitative results with our qualitative approach, and came to the conclusion that the age of the individual is not a positive variable of “the becoming” but the

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<sup>96</sup>See Part III of the report STAGES OF THE RADICALIZATION AND DERADICALIZATION PROCESS.

<sup>97</sup>Age-failures/successes cat (<18+18 years and +. Failures: 12(35,3%)/22(64,7%) Successes: 58(50%)/58(50%)

change of status that the age provokes is. Indeed, the negative variables of “the becoming” are mostly found in adults insofar as they do not live at their parents’ house and they are less reported by their relatives than minors (56% against 70% for minors) and are less supported by an educative service (28% against 58%). Logically, they are also more frequently married than minors (41% against 11%). Being more independent than minors, they maintain stronger physical bonds with a radical group (65% against 45% for minors), know significantly a radicalized relative (52% against 32%) and tried more often to indoctrinate a relative (50% against 24%) (See table C of the annex).

Thus, minors exit more easily radicalization, not because of their age but because they have life conditions that favour them. They capitalize positive variables of “the becoming” and are more protected against the negative variables of “the becoming” than adults.

### **The positive and negative variables of becoming**

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#### **The positive variables of becoming are related to the resilience ability:**

- Experienced depression before radicalization;
- Experienced the loss of one of the parents before radicalization (separation or death);
- Supported by a psychologist before radicalization;
- Having access to elements of Arab-Muslim culture;
- Treated by a psycho-educative team quickly after the exit of radicalization;
- Detected at an early stage (and having had an emotional reassuring approach from the relatives (often for girls and minors).

#### **The negative variables of becoming are mostly proximity variables:**

- Being married (to a radicalized person);
- Having indoctrinated a relative and to know a radicalized relative ;
- Having an incarcerated parent or relative.

#### **The variable "belonging to an Arab-Muslim family" appears in a contrasted way:**

- **Positive for grieving violence**
- **Negative for grieving the ideology (the Divine law regenerating the world).**

A negative variable of “the becoming” is clearly separated but must be highlighted: **being lured into the almightiness promise (ZEUS) slows down the exit of radicalization as the radicalized person will never be able to grieve a non-kept promise of the “jihadist” group whilst redefining his own involvement.**

**The hypothesis that physical proximity radicalizes more than simple “virtual” relationships established by social networks and the internet (99% from our youngsters) can be confirmed.**

Finally, within the negative variables of “the becoming”, we can add that the virtual recruiting setting (social networks and the Internet) could be considered, according to our



results, as a **contextual opportunity variable**: it offers a meeting and a recruiting opportunity, explaining the extension of the contemporary "jihadist" narrative compared to Al Qaeda's traditional one, that did not use communication through the Internet yet<sup>98</sup>.

All "jihadist" organizations that promote the "jihadist" ideology are also important opportunity variables, "founders," as far as they are concerned with the promotion of the "Jihadist" ideology and provide a moral and political reference for acting out<sup>99</sup>.

Other opportunity variables that have a negative impact on the becoming do not stand out in the statistics of our study resulting from the radicalized individuals the CPDSI monitored. However, they do in verbatim of this same sample of youngsters<sup>100</sup>.

We can also quote, for instance, the question of the impact of colonial memory in representations of Islam, the political management of the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict<sup>101</sup>, the intervention of western countries in Muslim countries<sup>102</sup> and more generally, the "informal procedures and dominant strategies of political authorities towards opponents"<sup>103</sup>. Researches pointed out that "military intervention and counter-terrorism following the terrorist attacks in the Occident may lead to paradoxical consequences when fighting against terrorism"<sup>104</sup>. Attacks provoke waves of discrimination and Islamophobia in European countries, increasing themselves the feeling of stigmatization and insecurity of Muslims, and then fostering recruitment<sup>105</sup>.

<sup>98</sup>There is a consensus in literature considering Internet as a tool and facilitating the radicalization process: BOUZAR D., The mutation of the jihadist narrative: the new forms of Muslim radicalism, *Cahiers de la Sécurité* n°30, 88-93; DUCOL B., *Becoming jihadist in the numeric era, A processual and situational approach of the jihadist involvement in the light of the Web* Université de Laval; PAUWEL L. and all, (2014), *To understand and to explain the roles of the new social medias in the formation of violent extremism: a qualitative and quantitative study*, Bruxelles; HUSSEIN H., *The online recruitment of teenagers by ISIL : the anasheed jihadist songs*, in *Mediadoc* n°18, 2017; ALAVA S. and all, (2017), *Social networks and the youths' radicalization in the numeric; UNESCO Report, Direction of Information and communication; Report* (dir. P.CONESA and all): *The french propaganda of ISIL: the mythology of the happy fighter*, FMSH.

<sup>99</sup>"In this logic, it would be unreasonable to consider that the organization is the driving force of the acting out. It functions more as a moral and political reference for their claim. This dimension is not unique to ISIL. It also concerns competing structures such as Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQPA). As several judicial inquiries have shown, with the exception of certain operations, like those of September 11, 2001, it is above all a deposit, given a posteriori, to local dynamics. As Andrew Silke writes in « Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadist Radicalisation », *European Journal of Criminology*, 5(1), 2008, pp. 99-123) after the attacks of 7 July 2005 in London: "In-dividuals do not become radical because of the efforts of an Al- Qaeda recruiter, the process is almost independent of es-tablished jihadists." It is for the organization of a label which accredits its all power and for the authors of a legitimization for the action. We can also note that the authors of the attacks of January 2015, however coordinated, were not granted on their claim, Amédy Coulibaly claiming ISIL, the brothers Kouachi of AQPA.", in BONELLI I. & CARRIÉ F., *Radicalism committed, revolts revolted, Survey of youth followed by the Judicial Protection of Youth*, Université Paris Nanterre, ISP – Institut des Sciences sociales du Politique, 2018.

<sup>100</sup>See report STAGES OF THE RADICALIZATION AND DERADICALIZATION PROCESS.

<sup>101</sup>See the works of BURGAT F., especially the roots of jihadism: Salafism or nihilism of others or... egoism of some? *Medi-terranean confluences*, l'Harmattan, 2017/3 N° 102.

<sup>102</sup>SIRSELOUDI M., (2012), *The meaning of religion and identity for the violent radicalisation of the Turking diaspora in Germany. Terrorism and Political Violence*, 24(5), 807-824.

<sup>103</sup>KRIESI H., (1995), *New social movements in western Europe : a comparative analysis* (Vol 5), Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press.

<sup>104</sup>HAIDER H., (2015), *Radicalisation of diaspora communities*. Birmingham ; SCHMID A., (2013), *Radicalisation, de-radicalisation, counter-radicalisation : a conceptual discussion and literature review*. ICCT Research Paper, 97.

<sup>105</sup>SCHMID Ibid, SKOCZYLIS J., (2013), *The local prevention of terrorism in strategy and practice : 'CONTEST', a new era in the flight against terrorism*. The University of Leeds.

Without evidence in the present study, we can hypothesize the peculiar relation that French society has with the religious fact, and the use of the “laïcité” (secularism) concept by many politicians, especially by far-right groups, may have created an opportunity variable for “jihadist” groups who took advantage of the present context<sup>106</sup>.

**> In a transversal way, at the individual level, it is necessary to point out that the existence of an early diagnosis multiplies the probability of disengaging (see the results for girls and minors).**

**Those figures point out the efficacy of the reassuring emotional approach (preliminary stage of the cognitive remobilization) implemented by the families<sup>107</sup> we followed.**

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<sup>106</sup>See the researches of IKIOPOULOU & VASILOPOULOU that illustrate on how right-wing extremist groups in Europe took advantage of political and cultural opportunities, and the rise of nationalism (2015), *Does crisis produce right-wing extremism? Nationalism, Cultural opportunities and varieties of support*.

<sup>107</sup>This method was named the “Madeleine de Proust” (Proust’s madeleine) by families. See BOUZAR D., *How to exit from “jihadist” grip?* Editions de l’Atelier, 2015. See Part III STAGES OF THE RADICALIZATION AND DERADICALIZATION PROCESS.

### III – HOW TO EVALUATE RISK AND PROTECTION FACTORS FOR “JIHADISTS”?

The measure of risk and protection factors is a crucial issue that crosses human sciences for many decades and causes ethical, safety and methodological arduous problems<sup>108</sup>. Those issues were problematic for delinquency and the prevention of recidivism.

The lack of direct data concerning people involved in radicalization processes did neither facilitate the reflection on the measure of implication risks in these processes, nor the understanding of protection factors that are far more difficult to apprehend afterwards, assuming a retroactive reconstitution of factors that contributed to the disengagement<sup>109</sup>. Nowadays, there is a consensus on the fact that not one factor only could explain the radicalization process. In addition, radicalization can also explain with local contexts, the process being different in Canada, France or Niger<sup>110</sup>.

Starting from the principle that the radicalization process results from a combination and an interaction of individual, factors<sup>111</sup>, and political factors, and the junction with the “jihadist” offer, we need to rely on the knowledge we have regarding the radicalized individuals prior to their radicalization, the study of their motivations and the propaganda that had an impact on them and their evolution during and after the radicalization, in order to catalogue the data collected during this long period of about two years and categorize them. Since we considered the individual variables in order “to reevaluate them in the light of this interactionism”<sup>112</sup>, the goal will now be to pinpoint if some common risk factors could be determined.

First, we will briefly resume the general state of reflections with regard to risk factors. Our objective is to verify if we can rely on established risk factors for delinquency to prevent radicalization or if another specific approach needs to be developed. Then we will present what we called “*risk mechanisms*” of radicalization before reflecting on pull-out factors.

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<sup>108</sup> [www.safire-project-results.eu/documents/focus/8.pdf](http://www.safire-project-results.eu/documents/focus/8.pdf)

<sup>109</sup> An international study on the issues of the intervention of participant, *International centre for the prevention of criminality (CIPC/ICPC)*, 2017, that quotes on this subject the researches of VELDUIS AND STAUN (2009), KUNDNANI (2015).

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>111</sup> The approaches of HORGAN, DELLA PORTA, MC CAULEY and MOSKALENKO OU DE MELLIS that will be evoked later.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid*



## III.1 THE COMPREHENSION OF “RISK MECHANISMS” RATHER THAN RISK FACTORS

### III.1.1 The condition of the researches on risk factors of delinquency<sup>113</sup>

So far, the researches that aimed to build the concept of “risk factors” relied on inmates who committed delinquency actions. In these studies, risk factors define themselves as pre-existing factors that increase the probability of adopting a delinquent behaviour, and also its frequency, persistency or duration.<sup>114</sup> As it pre-exists to the result, the relation between this risk factor and the result is of a probabilistic nature, and not of a determinist one. These factors can be distinguished under different categories.<sup>115</sup>

The *static* factors refer to pre-existing factors. It can be, for instance, the criminal history or family situation during the childhood. Those factors are taken into account because it has been statistically pointed out how often they are associated to repeated offences and could specify the risk assessment on the long-term. Although the treatment cannot modify the background and past of people, it can however modify its effects. The dynamic factors are sensitive to change (e.g. the professional or marital situation, or addictions). Some risk factors manifested shortly after the occurrence of an event or the behaviour appearance. These are called trigger factors. Other factors called predisposing risk factors happened longer ago.

The factors related to delinquency can be regrouped in six main areas<sup>116</sup> :

- 1) Personal features,
- 2) Family features,
- 3) Peers and spouses,
- 4) Education and profession,
- 5) Hobbies,
- 6) Collectivity or neighbourhood

About recidivism, eight principal risk factors were identified<sup>117</sup>, including the four that contribute the most to the probability of recidivism:

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<sup>113</sup>For completed and analysed data on this matter, RUFFION Alain, Method of intervention in order to prevent radicalization, April 2018, La Boite à Pandore.

<sup>114</sup> FARRINGTON, D.P. (2007) 'Childhood risk factors and risk-focused prevention', in M. Maguire,... Online at: <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/r281.pdf>.

PROULX J., LUSSIER P., 2001, The prediction of recidivism for sexual offenders, *Criminologie*, 34, 1, 9-29. VOIR

<sup>115</sup>VACHERET Marion, COUSINEAU Marie-Marthe, “The evaluation of the risk of recidivism inside the Canadian correctional system: sights on the limits of a system”, *Deviance and Society* 4/2005 (Vol. 29) p. 379-397.

<sup>116</sup>VACHERET Marion, Cousineau Marie-Marthe, “The evaluation of the risk of recidivism inside the Canadian correctional system: sights on the limits of a system”, *Deviance and Society* 4/2005 (Vol. 29) p. 379-397

<sup>117</sup>ANDREWS D. A. and BONTA J. (2007): “Model of evaluation and readaptation of delinquents based on the principles of risk, needs and receptiveness 2007-06”, publication © Her Majesty the Queen, chief of Canada; BONTA, J., & WORMITH, S. J. (2007). Risk and need assessment. In G. MCIVOR & P. RAYNOR (Eds.), *Developments in social work with offenders* (pp. 131-152). Philadelphia, PA: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.

- 1) A criminal past,
- 2) The frequentation of peers having delinquent activities,
- 3) A behaviour fostering some delinquent activities,
- 4) “Antisocial” personality disorders (according to the DSM IV requirements)

Other factors significantly participating in the risk concern:

- 1) Education and profession,
- 2) Conjugal and familial relationships,
- 3) Hobbies and spare time,
- 4) Use of alcohol and drugs.

Several debates animate researchers on these factors assessment. The ability of associating static and dynamic factors progressively appeared fundamental. Some researchers evoke attraction and incitation factors (‘Push and Pull’).<sup>118</sup> ‘Attraction factors’ are related to the individual himself. It is, among other things, his personality traits, notably his impulsivity, his need of self-assertion, or living a thrilling adventure to give a sense to his life. It also includes socio-psychological mechanisms concerning specifically the perceived or lived injustice within the community, insecurity, or social exclusion due to the individual’s origins. The ‘pull factors’ are incentive catalysts which are effective on vulnerable individuals and draw them towards the grip of extremist organizations.

Other approaches are based on the needs, sensitivities, motivations and contextual influences mapping towards the path of terrorism. It can also be the English CHANNEL program<sup>119</sup>, that mentions “psychological hooks”: feelings of grief and injustice, feeling threatened, need of identity, meaning and belonging, desire of a status, desire of excitement and adventure, need to dominate and control others, vulnerability to indoctrination, desire of political or moral change, opportunist participation, participation of family or friends in extremism, being in a transitional period, influenced or controlled by a group, relevant mental health issues.

Considering that every individual engaged in a group, a cause or an ideology, do not develop an intention to cause a prejudice, this approach analyses this dimension separately. The ‘intention factors’ describe the mentality related to a will of using violence, and tackle the actions of the individual and its extent. They can include: an over-identification to a group or an ideology, the thought “Them and Us”, the dehumanization of the enemy, the behaviours that justify an infraction, the damaging means and goals.

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<sup>118</sup>Institute for Strategic Dialogue,(8-9 May 2012) « *Tackling Extremism: De-Radicalisation and Disengagement* » (Copenhagen: Conference Report,), p. 10

<sup>119</sup>It is a multilateral approach in order to protect people against radicalization. Channel uses the existing collaboration between local authorities, statutory partners (such as the sectors of education, health, social services, child and youth services, the administration of delinquents, the police and the local community).

Considering that all those who desire to cause a prejudice in the name of a group, a cause or an ideology, are not necessarily able to take action. This program also aims in targeting “a high level of personal ability, resources and networking” in order to be successful. What the individual is able to do is then taken into account.

The factors can include the presence of individual knowledge and abilities, the access to networks, to funding or equipment, as well as the individual’s criminal capacity.

Other approaches emanate from psycho-criminology and integrate a structured professional judgment, such as the tool VERA 2, conceived from data concerning people who generally acted out violently. VERA 2 uses factors known as permanent in the process leading to violent extremism. It is presented as a table divided into 5 themes:

**Beliefs - Behaviour – Ideology** (seven indicators)

- Attachment to an ideology justifying violence
- Perceptions of injustice and complaints
- Rejection of the society and its values / Alienation

**Context and intents** (seven indicators)

- The intention of organizing a violent action
- The use of extremist websites
- Anger towards political decisions and actions of the country

**History and abilities** (six indicators)

- Paramilitary experience or use of an explosive
- Social network (family involved in violence)

**Motivation and outcome** (5+3 in the revised version)

- Glorification of violence
- Motivation for adventure and action
- Coercion
- Acquiring a status
- Quest of meaning/identity quest

**Protection factors** (six indicators)

- Rejection of violence to attain their goals
- Family against violence
- Perception less negative of the enemy

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<sup>120</sup>See the researches of Erwan DIEU and notably, on this matter, “What is the prevention of recidivism? From risk factors to protection factors”, in *Criminological innovations*, under the supervision of Erwan DIEU, L’Harmattan, 2017.

<sup>121</sup>The grand family of reattachment of this approach is actually called RNR: an intervention based on the principles of risk, needs and receptivity.

Therefore, the key role played by psycho-criminology<sup>120</sup> enabled to correlate risk factors to the needs and receptivity of the individuals.<sup>121</sup> The model “Risk-Need-Responsiveness” consists in a precise technique supporting a structured assessment and a rehabilitative cognitive-behavioural and emotional intervention of perpetrators<sup>122</sup>. This requires to acknowledge the interaction of micro and macro factors and to put down an individualization of the treatment. Indeed, the principle of the individual’s responsiveness points out that adapting the intervention to the subject’s abilities optimizes the results with regard to recidivism prevention. It leads to the adaptation of the therapy to the individual, and his resources, intellectual abilities, learning process, motivation, etc. By incorporating into the assessment and intervention personal and interpersonal factors, this model offers to the individual the ability to give meaning to it and then to involve fully in it.

This approach is related to the contribution of the ‘Psychology of Criminal Conduct (PCC)’<sup>123</sup> authors who notice that anyone can enter differently into a criminal career, whose intensity varies in time (from the lack of a criminal behaviour to daily criminality) depending on circumstances<sup>124</sup>. According to Andrews and Bonta<sup>125</sup>, researches previously conducted about the origins of crime would only be based on gender, race or social-economic environment of the culprit. Yet, these elements do not considerate the individual data and its interaction with external factors. According to them, data that need to be worked on remain individual in the predisposition to act out. The PCC<sup>126</sup> (Psychology of Criminal Conduct) offers an approach that explains the individual differences regarding the predisposition to commit a crime. This approach then uses psychological, criminological and sociological references to analyse empirically a variety of risk factors. It considers the personal features, the learning process, the personality, the motivation and the individual’s bio-social features.<sup>127</sup> The assessment strategies must respect a relational principle (the union of work, motivational momentum, empathy sharing...) and a structural principle (guidance in the acquisition of pro-social behaviours, reinforcement and support in the resolution of issues and a feeling of self-efficiency...).

A tool that could scientifically investigate criminal conducts whilst disregarding any ideology and social and political reference potentially biased was elaborated from the ethical frame of the PCC: the ‘General Personality and Social Psychological Perspective on Criminal Conduct’<sup>128</sup> GPSPP). The latter elaborates an etiologic theory on acting out from elements the most related to recidivism. It places the author in the centre of an inter-individual analysis based on the risk, the needs and the responsiveness, and composed of:

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<sup>122</sup>ANDREWS D. A. and BONTA J. (2010).

<sup>123</sup>ANDREWS, D. A. (1980). Experimental investigations of the principles of differential association through deliberate manipulation of the structure of service systems. *American Sociological Review*, 45, 448-462.

<sup>124</sup>ANDREWS, D. A., & BONTA, J. (2006). *The psychology of criminal conduct* (4th Edition). Newark, NJ: LexisNexis.

<sup>125</sup>ANDREWS, D. A., BONTA, J., & WORMITH, S. J. (2004). *The Level of Service / Case Management Inventory (LS/CMI)*. Toronto: Multi-Health Systems.

<sup>126</sup>ANDREWS, D. A., & BONTA, J. (1995). *The Level of Service Inventory-Revised*. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Multi-Health Systems.

<sup>127</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>128</sup>ANDREWS, D. A., & BONTA, J. (2006). *The psychology of criminal conduct* (4th Edition). Newark, NJ: LexisNexis.

- The risky situation of the individual calculated with a cost-benefit balance fostering the appearance of a behaviour,
- The risks constituted by his group of peers who tolerate and/or encourage delinquent activities,
- His behaviours and cognitions that encourage a criminal conduct (dysfunctional patterns).

### III.1.2. “Risk mechanisms” of radicalization illustrated by interactions that supplied those involvements

With the use of the PCC’s ethical and complex frame, we managed to assess empirically the risk factors of the young people of our sample.

We came to the conclusion that the risk assessment is not only built from individuals’ personal features: not only there is no “jihadist personality”, but no micro or macro factor appears to be significant. The conjunction of several different factors brought the youngsters to involve. By studying the latter, we can analyse their radicalization process. The trajectory of the individual must be studied but not himself. In other words, the study should focus on the way “an individual gradually evolves towards radicalized beliefs in a flowing social environment in constant evolution”<sup>129</sup>. The study of this trajectory allows to better understand “why a person involves and quits, as well as the factors that explain the course of these events”<sup>130</sup>. We must take into account the individual’s history, his subjectivity, the influence of his context and environment (personal and geopolitical), his motivations of adherence, and the junction with rhetoric and the proposition of the “jihadist” group.<sup>131</sup> The recent work of the psychiatrists Vandevoorde, Estano and Painset<sup>132</sup> proposes a continuation of our work on the individualization of involvement by analysing clinically the function of the “religious conversion with a strong violent potential” of the different engagement motives that we established<sup>133</sup> : an identity function, a frame function (contention), an anti-depressive function, a protection function, an anti-enigma function, a human link function and a sensational experience function.

But unlike numerous researches that neglect the process of withdrawal of radicalism and remain on the engagement process only<sup>134</sup>, we relied on the study of arguments that provoked doubts and allowed to initiate the disengagement of the young individuals we monitored.<sup>135</sup>

<sup>129</sup>COSTANZA W., (2012), *An interdisciplinary framework to assess the radicalization of youth towards violent extremism across cultures*. Georgetown University, p. 26.

<sup>130</sup>HORGAN, *Ibid*.

<sup>131</sup>This postulate and this objective are also pursued by BONELLI I. & CARRIÉ F., although the sample is made up of young people followed by social services, in *Radicalism committed, revolts revolted, Survey of youth followed by the Judicial Protection of Youth*, Université Paris Nanterre, ISP – Institut des Sciences sociales du Politique, 2018.

<sup>132</sup>VANDEVOORDE J, and AL. The psychopathological functions of ideological or religious conversion and their relation to terrorism, *Neuropsychiatry, Childhood, Adolescence* (2017), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neurenf.2018.02.004>

<sup>133</sup>BOUZAR & MARTIN, *Ibid*.

<sup>134</sup>*An international study on the objectives of the intervention of the contributors*, ICPC, 2017.

<sup>135</sup>See report STAGES OF THE RADICALIZATION AND DERADICALIZATION PROCESS.

We then considered the dysfunctional patterns of reality interpretation that lead to violence, and the way youngsters realized their dysfunctional feature<sup>136</sup>.

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“Considering radicalization as a process with epistemological, but also methodological consequences”<sup>137</sup>

For “jihadist” radicalization, the risk factor is not caused by one or several personal features (as the FSPRT files conceive it) but the mechanism that supplies each radicalization motive: that is the reason why we propose the term **“risk mechanisms”**. It allows identifying each stage of cognitive change for each specific engagement motive. **The measurement of risk must reflect on a succession of behaviours and beliefs potentially dysfunctional leading to take action.** By deconstructing the processes stages, we managed to isolate the needs that the “jihadist” narrative filled. **In other words, we identified the (pre)disposition of the young person that allowed the “jihadist” narrative to make sense, exercise its authority, provoke his change, and then his engagement. In each evolution stage of the young individual, the promise made by the “jihadist” narrative provokes a cognitive and behavioural change.**

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“Considering a social-cognitive comprehension of radicalization implies to wonder on the impact of information treatment operated by the person on his own cognitions”<sup>138</sup>.

We refer to the report STAGES OF THE RADICALIZATION AND DERADICALIZATION PROCESS for a detailed analysis on the relational, emotional and ideological dimension of the relation with the “jihadist” group, and the cognitive transformation that this triple approach provokes, stage by stage.

**We roughly schematized below the modes of functioning of each engagement motive, by emphasizing their specific attractive force and the change of definition of oneself, others and the world this force provoked. The risk can be assessed through the analysis of the individuals’ needs the “jihadist” narrative filled and then transformed by engendering new needs. This process leads to a new world view provoking a new behaviour. We illustrated concretely the risk factors, not with generalities but with interactions that allowed developing the main identified sorts of engagement.**

It is a multifactorial model, ie it is the result of a whole lot of small factors that taken individually are not statistically powerful, but once they are associated, we can see that the whole is decisive.

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<sup>136</sup>“The notion of career introduces, in the analyses, a temporal dimension but also relational, more precisely interactionist. (...) With the notion of career, the engagement is no longer only an act, an action, nor a moment. It is a progressive path marked and determined by a succession of choices, as faint as they could be” in G. BRIE and C. RAMBOURG, “Radicalisation: Scientific analysis versus Political use” Analytical synthesis, ENAP, 2015.


<sup>137</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>138</sup>S. GARCET, «A Psycho-Criminological Approach to Radicalization: The Model of ‘Cognitive Self- Transformation and Meaning-Building in Violent Radical Engagement’», Liege Law School, 2016.






DETAILS OF THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS OF A YOUNG PERSON INVOLVED FOR ISIL-LAND (PROMISE OF AN EQUAL AND FRATERNAL WORLD).



**National and international political social dysfunctions**



## Part III


## MOTHER TERESA

National and international political social dysfunctions



## FORTRESS

National and international political social dysfunctions






## Part III


## SAVIOR

National and international political social dysfunctions



## LICIT SUICIDE

National and international political social dysfunctions




## Part III

## ZEUS



National and international political social dysfunctions




THE ONLY NON-MIXED ENGAGEMENT MOTIVE :

## SLEEPING BEAUTY



National and international political social dysfunctions



## III.2 SEEKING PROTECTION FACTORS FROM “RISK MECHANISMS”

The traditional approach on risk mechanisms does not seem fitted to us, regarding our results: we demonstrated there was a dynamic interaction between internal factors related to the history of the young person, the manner he built himself and the external factors that include the encounter with the “jihadist” rhetoric, without leaving unnoticed the opportunity factors. Considering those factors are equivocally influenced differently depending on individuals, locations, encounters with the radical narratives, geopolitical context of the country, correlated and non-causal, it seems unappropriated to base the deradicalization or prevention approaches on the above-mentioned traditional approach.

Concerning the general and primary criminality prevention, many researches emphasize on the reinforcement of protection factors related to criminality.<sup>139</sup> Some precocious intervention programs are named “developmental crime prevention” as they try to intervene in order to develop resiliency and social competence.<sup>140</sup> We can also ponder a “developmental radicalization prevention” by helping, for example, children and their closest interlocutors to protect themselves from the use of Internet, by learning from studies such as the “Good Live Model”.<sup>141</sup>

Beyond the developmental radicalization prevention and other forms of primary and secondary preventive measures, we must identify the protection factors that can help professional teams to better adapt their support to the specificity of the radicalization process.

By deconstructing the “risk mechanisms”, we managed to isolate the radicalized features and processes in which those features were at stake. We then considered each young person in their own social context and in interaction with the promise of the “jihadist” discourse that got his attention. Presented as trajectories, the “risk mechanisms” appeared as interactions between individual variables, individual needs<sup>142</sup>, and situational variables (that include the encounter with the promise of the “jihadist” narrative).

**Building protection factors from spotted and identified needs in each risk mechanism is crucial to propose to the concerned radicalized individuals another sort of engagement. To be able to propose them “alternative engagements”, we must identify what underlies the engagement of each individual.**

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<sup>139</sup>ICPC, *International report on the prevention of crime and the safety of the community*, 2010, p2.; BJORGO T., (2013), *Strategies for Preventing Terrorism*, New York: Palgrave.

<sup>140</sup>ICPC, 2017, *Ibid*.

<sup>141</sup>PRESCOTT David S.: “The good live model (GLMC) in theory and practice is a rehabilitation theory based on the forces that increase the risk principles, the need and the responsiveness for efficient interventions in prisons by emphasizing on helping customers to develop and implement important life projects that are not compatible with the future delinquency (...)”, p. 80 to 85.

<sup>142</sup>There are two levels of needs for youths: their own needs consecutive to his history and the induced needs after an encounter with the promise of the “jihadist” group.

We suppose that the desistance factors cannot be general to every youth. **Since the radicalization process individualized itself, the exit of radicalization can only be individualized**<sup>143</sup>. It will be the same for the release of radicalization. Identifying the youngsters' needs filled (and sometimes transformed) by the different promises of the "jihadist" narrative must allow us to picture desistance factors adapted to the commitment individualization.

**Two elements need to be conciliated in order to do so: the identification of the youngster's needs and his goal in the strategy of the radicalization protection. The same logic will be applied for de-radicalization / desistance : the desistance factor can only encourage efficiently an individual to leave a terrorist group if it considers the attraction of this individual for the terrorist group, in other words the search of meaning of the "jihadist" involvement and the promise of the "jihadist" group.**

**In terms of protection and in terms of deradicalisation / desistance, this means that the initial desire of change for the young individual (for a better self or a better world) must not be countered but we must propose them an engagement that does not use violence and does not violate the basis of the social contract**<sup>144</sup>.

To help professionals, we propose a grid that can investigate the underpinned needs of young individuals in each risk mechanism. **Instead of letting the "jihadist" discourse fill (and transform) those needs, the goal is to help professional by proposing other forms of engagement, combined with adapted resiliency processes, that address those specific needs. It is therefore "protection mechanisms" individualized.**

If we recap succinctly the clinical denominations coming from the quantitative study elaborated with Professor Cohen's team<sup>145</sup> and the list of identified needs that must be targeted in the proposition of treatment, some very general recommendations could be made that consider the responsiveness of the radicalized one despite his "paranoid perspective"<sup>146</sup>. We refer to Alain Ruffion's appendix for the details of approaches in terms of protection.

Rather than "alternative narratives", society must offer **alternative engagements** to those from ISIL. Upstream, it is a matter of deconstructing and working on the defense mechanisms proposed by the "jihadist" discourse (See STAGES OF THE RADICALISATION and DERADICALIZATION PROCESS Part III).

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<sup>143</sup>The ICPC, 2017, *Ibid*, points out that author authors BIORGO (2013), RAMALINGAM (2014), share our position on the fact that "since the radicalization is an individualized process, the prevention and rehabilitation approaches must also be individualized».

<sup>144</sup>KUNDNANI (2009) shares this opinion and suggests that safe places must be created so that youths commit into an honest debate on complex political matters – in other words, in spaces such as those created in the project STREET in the United-Kingdom, quoted by the ICPC, 2017, *Ibid*.

<sup>145</sup>CAMPELO N., BOUZAR L., OPPETIT A., PELLERIN H., HEFEZ S., BRONSARD G., COHEN D., BOUZAR D., *Joining the Islamic State from France between 2014 and 2016: an observational follow-up study, about to be published in The Lancet psychiatric*.

<sup>146</sup>See STAGES OF THE RADICALISATION and DERADICALIZATION PROCESS; HOFSTADTER R., *The Paranoid Style* in *American Politics and Other Essays* (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), Robins and Post, *Political Paranoia*.

## Part III

Table 23

CLINICAL DENOMINATION COMING FROM THE QUANTITATIVE STUDY ELABORATED WITH PROFESSOR COHEN'S TEAM	ANALYSIS OF THE ACTUAL NEEDS OF THE RADICALIZED PERSON, SOMETIMES TRANSFORMED BY THE "RADICAL" NARRATIVE, ACCORDING TO HIS ENGAGEMENT MOTIVE	REMINDER OF SPECIFIC AREAS OF WORK (OR ALTERNATIVE ENGAGEMENTS) TO PROPOSE AN ALTERNATIVE WAY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE NEEDS OF THE RADICALIZED INDIVIDUAL
<b>LANCELOT</b>		
Violence, Expression of a need for justice, heroism, interest for guns, fight, army, homosexual feelings, expression of difficulties to interact with others, however altruism.	Needs to build a world of solidarity, brotherhood and justice for oppressed people, to find a group of peers, to confront dangerous situations, for valorisation, for recognition, to prove that he is a man	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Deconstructing his rationalization of violence by making the individual fully aware of his actual motivations ;</li> <li>- Making him ponder his tendency to look towards others in order to seek for support (affiliation defence mechanism) ;</li> <li>- Working on his need of altruism and his devoting mechanism to others' needs ;</li> <li>- Deconstructing the transfer of the aggressive urges he engaged in his commitment ;</li> <li>- Making him ponder the relational aspect by proposing him collective groups so that he can bound again and feels like he belongs to something: group therapy; collective sport; roams with a support group, etc. ;</li> <li>- Making him ponder his self-esteem (also with his family).</li> </ul>
<b>ZEUS</b>		
Violence, interest for guns, megalomania, adventure, fight "manly value", no lack of self-esteem, no search for tenderness	Need for power, to get the upper hand on authority figures, to defy death, for self-confidence, for valorisation, for equal treatment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Deconstructing the transfer of the aggressive urges he engaged in his commitment and his omnipotence mechanism ;</li> <li>- Working on his need of altruism and his devoting mechanism to others' needs ;</li> <li>- Enrolling him in a risky sport that works on the matter of boundaries in order to help him find a compensatory activity to restore his self-esteem ;</li> <li>- Pondering rupture camps involving a difficult mission, such as a rite of passage trial to revalorize him ;</li> <li>- Working on the relation to the father and the father's figure ;</li> <li>- Working on the symbolic relation of law and the integration of limits/ boundaries.</li> </ul>

## Part III

THE SAVIOR		
Feelings of responsibility and guilt towards others and his relatives, fear of hell, history with relatives that suffered	Need to free from his responsibilities, to be a saving hero for the one he loves, to refocus and listen to himself, to be reassured on the future of the people he loves close to death, to be reassured on the end of the world, to be reassured on the other side	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Deconstructing his rationalization of violence by making the individual fully aware of his actual motivations;</li> <li>- Making him ponder his tendency to look towards others in order to seek for support (affiliation defence mechanism) ;</li> <li>- Working on his anxious anticipating (and guilt-provoking) mechanism ;</li> <li>- Working on his familial relationships so that he could take back his place as a child ;</li> <li>- Making him ponder the needs of his family to relieve him from his responsibility (with an institutional or associative support).</li> </ul>
ISIL-LAND		
Expression of loneliness and guilt, resignation, loss of interest and hope for the real world	Need for a world more egalitarian, of justice, for a brotherhood world, to be active, for spirituality and religious belief, to fight against evil forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Deconstructing his rationalization of violence by making the individual fully aware of his actual motivations;</li> <li>- Making him ponder his tendency to look towards others in order to seek for support (affiliation defence mechanism) ;</li> <li>- Make him fully aware of his repression and his totally contrary choice ("reactional formation" defensive mechanism) ;</li> <li>- Orientating him towards NGO/ Political parties/Reflection or citizenship movement;</li> <li>- Working with him the juridical notion of secularism (laïcité) so that he could appropriate the notions of legality and duty and could be armed towards an interlocutor that would reproach him of being "too believing" or "ostentatious" ;</li> <li>- Making him ponder the notion of utopia and the idealization mechanism ;</li> <li>- Pushing him towards the study of political sciences and religious sciences.</li> </ul>

## Part III

FORTRESS		
Intense sexual fantasies and activity, feeling of guilt when happy, fear of sexuality, excess of violence, no search for protection or in group belonging, frequent history of abuse	Need for content, for purification, to be free from the part of evil inside him, to stop feeling guilty and being free from his own obsessions, for redemption, for liberation/rest	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Deconstructing his rationalization of violence by making the individual fully aware of his actual motivations;</li> <li>- Making him ponder his tendency to look towards others in order to seek for support (affiliation defence mechanism) ;</li> <li>- Working on his anxious anticipating (and guilt-provoking) mechanism ;</li> <li>- Trying to lead him to consult a psychiatrist as soon as possible ;</li> <li>- Ponder the help of an association specialized in addiction.</li> </ul>
LICIT SUICIDE		
Depressive feelings, risk taking behaviours, suicidal behaviour, frequent history of abuse	Need to be free from his existential suffering, to find a sense to his life, to find/build a self-esteem, to find a legitimacy to his death, to find a place, to be useful	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Deconstructing his rationalization of violence by making the individual fully aware of his actual motivations;</li> <li>- Making him ponder his tendency to look towards others in order to seek for support (affiliation defence mechanism) ;</li> <li>- Working on his anxious anticipating (and guilt-provoking) mechanism ;</li> <li>- Leading him to consult a doctor for an antidepressant treatment ;</li> <li>- Helping him live a project in which he has his own place and a where he is useful (essential).</li> </ul>



## Part III

MOTHER TERESA		
Feelings of responsibility and guilt, feeling of being evil, fear of sexuality, suicidal behaviour and interest for death, expression of sacrifice	Need to be useful, for valorisation, to find a sense to his life, to participate to a fairer world, to be free from his guilt, to modulate his empathy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Deconstructing his rationalization of violence by making the individual fully aware of his actual motivations;</li> <li>- Making him ponder his tendency to look towards others in order to seek for support (affiliation defence mechanism) ;</li> <li>- Working on his need of altruism and his devoting mechanism to others' needs ;</li> <li>- Enrolling him in a humanitarian activity ;</li> <li>- Pondering humanitarian rupture camps ;</li> <li>- Pondering trainings on "humanitarian/donation professions", etc. ;</li> <li>- Working on empathy regulation.</li> </ul>
SLEEPING BEAUTY (FEMALES ONLY)		
Expression of loneliness, search of an ideal love, no territory, feelings of persecution, identification to an "oppressed people", suicidal behaviour and interest for death, frequent history of abuse	Need for protection, for eternal love (by God), for respect of herself, to fill her abandon feeling, for self-esteem, for independence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Deconstructing her rationalization of violence by making the individual fully aware of her actual motivations;</li> <li>- Making her ponder her tendency to look towards others in order to seek for support (affiliation defence mechanism) ;</li> <li>- Working on her anxious anticipating (and guilt-provoking) mechanism ;</li> <li>- Making her fully aware of her repression and totally contrary choice ("reactional formation" defensive mechanism) ;</li> <li>- Working on her depreciation mechanism (of herself and men) and the eventually suffered sexual abuses ;</li> <li>- Pondering a specialized association on domestic violence (to work on the matter of romantic hold) ;</li> <li>- Working on her relation to the father and the father's figure.</li> </ul>

### III.3 THE DESISTANCE-PRO TOOL

We then conceived a tool that allows professionals to follow the evolution of the radicalized one they treated, in collaboration with the psychoanalyst Alain Ruffion<sup>147</sup>. **The BOUZAR- RUFFION DESISTANCE-PRO tool is a hetero-evaluated grid that it takes the protection factors and turns them into factors of desistance.** It can identify the needs of the youths the “jihadist” discourse offered to fill (and sometimes transformed it). We start from the principle that, in order to neutralize the frustration of an unsatisfied need, the latter must find respectful satisfaction means of the individual and others that could satisfy, at least partially. **The desistance factor is here elaborated to intervene in the end of the terrorist involvement, insofar as it refers to positive elements heading in the right direction that will influence on the need that underpinned the engagement. The identification of those needs allows to objectify the follow-up of radicalization that must be established for this young person, from elements deriving from his own trajectory of radicalization.** On the basis of observations of the young person during his follow-up after radicalization, this grid helps to verify if he moved or not forward in his resiliency.

The DESISTANCE-PRO grid also permits to verify and measure the level of resiliency of the followed radicalized person, from common elements appearing in the processes of exiting radicalization. It is then built on established items from the identified needs in the patterns of the eight “risk mechanisms” and transversal items to every young individual.

If the answers are multiplied in the left column, professionals will know if he moved forwards within his resiliency. They are in a stage in which they can encourage the resiliency capital of the youngster and benefit from his mobilized resources to consolidate his reinsertion.

If the answers are multiplied in the right column, professionals will know that the youngster did not move forward in comparison to the satisfaction of his needs that were filled by the “jihadist” promise. This illustrates his (temporary) incapacity to find internal and external resources to satisfy his fundamental needs necessary to his internal balance and social reinsertion.

Between these columns, in a transitional level, the professional can then base his actions on the reinforcement of the abilities of the young person to work on the satisfaction of his own needs with regard to his engagement motive, by remaining vigilant on a possible regression.

In reality, the DESISTANCE-PRO grid will try to characterize behaviours that head in the right direction to evaluate the resiliency and to accompany it. **Beyond the objective of finding alternatives to terrorism, we must re-register the youths in a psychical, social and cultural task (based on their own reflexion), so that they could build themselves new integrations and not seek for destructives and illusory dysfunctional compensatory solutions. Professionals must bring the youngsters to develop resources that are inside them, so that they become actors again of their stories. We encourage a substantive work that overtakes the simple societal injunction to exit violence.**

<sup>147</sup>The psychoanalyst Alain Ruffion has the characteristic of having applied to the tender of the Ministry of the Interior when we refused its renewal and also having followed the radicalized youths reported by the prefectures on the French territory.

## Part III

**DESISTANCE-PRO GRID BOUZAR-RUFFION TRANSFORMED IN A COMPUTER SOFTWARE  
FOR FIELD PROFESSIONALS**

(complementary to other anterior detection and measurement tools of radicalization realized by our team, used by several open or closed institutions : **DIAGNOSTIC, INTENSE AND ENGAGEMENT MOTIVES**)

Items n°	ELEMENT	NON-SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS OF RADICALISM (COMING FROM THE PERSONAL LIBERTY AND/OR OF CULT), SCORE 0	IS ACCEPTING ALTERNATIVE INVOLVEMENTS	FAVORABLE GROUND: IN PREVENTION SCORE 1	I DON'T KNOW	HIGH RISK: NECESSITY OF A FOLLOW-UP IN RADICALITY AND MOVE TO THE "INTENSE" GRID TO MEASURE THE INTENSITY OF RADICALITY, SCORE 2
1	LANCELOT/NEED TO BUILD A SOLIDARIAN AND FRATERNAL WORLD/ QUEST FOR JUSTICE FOR THE OPPRESSED PEOPLE	Involved in an association or a humanitarian project corresponding to him	Wants to be involved in a humanitarian project without any success (because of his legal case, his environment, etc.)	Questions himself on the possibility to trust a traditional organization to build a fairer world		Believes that no traditional path of engagement is valid to build a fairer world
2	LANCELOT/NEED TO FIND A GROUP OF PEERS	Found a group of "peers" that gives him the feeling of being accepted, understood and fulfilled	Searches for a new belonging group and registers in a suitable context to meet new people (collective sports, clubs, political party, etc.) yet without feeling totally integrated and/or created special bounds with his relatives	Is aware that he must find a group to replace the one he had with his brothers but does not know if he will succeed in doing so		Considers that nothing could ever replace what he lived with his brothers Considers that he will never find a group of "peers" that will give him the feeling of being loved, accepted and understood just like with his brothers
3	LANCELOT/NEED TO FACE DANGEROUS SITUATIONS	Is aware that his need to face a dangerous situation comes under a problematic he has to work on differently and does not feel the usefulness anymore	Registers and invests in a risky sport and found a substitute to his former source of adrenaline	Adheres to the idea of practicing a risky sport but does not accomplish any move to register concretely		Considers that nothing could ever replace the adrenaline he felt when he engaged with "his brothers"
4	LANCELOT/NEED OF VALORIZATION	Is feeling valorized for his actions and personal qualities in his daily life	Is not yet feeling valorized enough by his relatives	Is feeling devalorized by all: his relatives and his former radical group		Is still feeling revalorized by his relatives and a <i>contrario</i> extremely valorized by his former group
5	LANCELOT/NEED OF RECOGNITION	Is feeling recognized by his close relations, by his institutional interlocutors and by the society in general	Is feeling recognized in the eyes of someone of his circle (a relative, an institutional interlocutor, etc.)	Is not feeling recognized enough by his institutional environment and/or his close relatives		Is still not feeling recognized by the society, nor anyone except from his former group
6	LANCELOT/NEED TO PROVE HE IS A MAN	Is confident of himself and of his manhood and does not feel anymore the need of proving « that he is a man »	Have the opportunity to dare to accomplish brave acts to the advantage of his relatives	Is feeling crushed, rejected, humiliated on a daily basis		The possibility of accomplishing bravery acts is still offered to him by his former radical group

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Items n°	ELEMENT	NON-SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS OF RADICALISM (COMING FROM THE PERSONAL LIBERTY AND/OR OF CULT), SCORE 0	IS ACCEPTING ALTERNATIVE INVOLVEMENTS	FAVORABLE GROUND: IN PREVENTION SCORE 1	I DON'T KNOW	HIGH RISK: NECESSITY OF A FOLLOW-UP IN RADICALITY AND MOVE TO THE "INTENSE" GRID TO MEASURE THE INTENSITY OF RADICALITY, SCORE 2
7	DAESH/NEED OF AN EGALITARIAN WORLD	Involved in a political party/movement of ideas/a NGO to favorite and to establish more justice	Wants to be involved in a political party/movement of ideas/a NGO but cannot do so for different reasons	Does not trust any political party/ movement of ideas/a NGO because he does not believe in the possibility to really change things		Has still doubts on the fact that an organization that uses human law could really build a fairer world
8	DAESH/NEED OF A FRATERNAL WORLD	Invests in proximity or abroad actions of solidarity	Wants to participate to proximity or abroad actions of solidarity but cannot do so for different reasons	Does not trust any organization to elaborate any actions of solidarity		Has still doubts on the fact that an organization that uses human law could really build a more fraternal world
9	DAESH/NEED TO BE ACTIVE	Is satisfied of his actions. Thinks that he contributes in building a better and solidary world	Is frustrated by his actions of solidarity and believes that they are not enough to contribute in building a better and solidary world	Has doubts on the possibility to contribute, within his capacities, to anything: is defeatist at the beginning, feeling that no action could ever change the world		Believes that it is useful to act on what French society proposes and only the radical group leads real actions to change the world and to build a fairer, fraternal and solidary world
10	DAESH/NEED OF SPIRITUALITY AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF	Found himself a spirituality and/or a respectful belief of other traditions that fills him and answers to his aspirations	Searches for a spirituality and/or a belief in a respectful form of other traditions to answer to his aspirations without succeeding fully without feeling any frustration	Is feeling frustrated by the feeling of being restrained in his belief and/or peaceful religious practice (for example: to answer to societal norms, to a will expressed by institutions/ relatives, to be "less religious" to fit in, etc.)		Rejects any forms of religious other than the ones of his former group and/or still adheres to his original ideology
11	DAESH/NEED TO FIGHT AGAINST EVIL FORCES	Believes that evil, bad actions or decisions that we do are not only produced by satanic and/or plotting forces but by different interactions (life history, historic context, etc.)	Believes that the society is ruled by the evil but still trusts human kindness	Believes that evil is inside of each one of us and the only way to be protected from the sheitan (who will automatically lead us to bad actions) is to purify by using the religious practice intensely and obsessively		Believes that the world is invaded and leaded by satanic forces
12	DAESH/NEED OF JUSTICE	Trusts justice even if it seems to him still imperfect and unequal according to the individuals and the different contexts	Has doubts on the republican devise and on its promises and believes that it is an objective to reach. Modifies easily his vision of justice and injustice	Does not believe in human and republican justice and feels angry at the way it is administered. Detached himself from the idea that Charia could be the only justice on earth and is bereft and disillusioned of the notion of justice itself		Still believes that only Divine law could assure a justice

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13	ZEUS/NEED OF POWER	Does not feel threatened and humiliated anymore because of having reciprocity relationships and does not feel the need and desire of dominating others	Is easily drawn to reciprocity relationships rather than domination relationships	Is now able to modulate his relation to power but feels diminished in this new ratio of power which is more balanced but considers it as a weakness		Is still in need of taking the power, dominating and manipulating other to feel powerful and to enjoy it fully
14	ZEUS/NEED TO GET THE UPPER HAND ON AUTHORITY FIGURES	Respects authority figures around him (parents, educators, institutional representatives, police, justice) and rules/interdictions	Displays a certain behavioral and verbal ambivalence towards anyone who has authority on him. Can also rule out some limits or authority figures he does not want to respect	Dismays an interdiction and needs to test his limits by transgressing the law		Objects to authority figures, does not accept the rules given by an authority figure and thinks that he is not accountable to anyone
15	ZEUS/NEED TO DEFY DEATH	Realized that being put in jeopardy induced by his risky/oradical practices and searches to fill them in differently	Is no longer in risky/oradical practices because he accessed to tests that do not provoke death	Still wants, briefly, to be put in danger without acting out		Continues his risky/oradical practices
16	ZEUS/NEED OF SELF-CONFIDENCE	Is able to affirm himself by being positive and respectful of others	Adopts aggressive behaviors only when he feels insecure	Can still adopt aggressive behaviors without feeling insecure		Still expels his internal insecurity and his lack of self-confidence by verbal and/behavioral violence
17	ZEUS/NEED OF VALORIZATION	Is feeling valorized and feels like a man without needing to prove it: appreciates himself and feels appreciated by others	Became aware that he has a valorization issue and works on his relations with others and himself to feel appreciated in the eyes of others	Is feeling devalorized by others but considers having a certain value		Is feeling devalorized by everyone and does not find any aspect in him to be valorized
18	ZEUS/NEED OF AN EQUAL TREATMENT	Knows that there are unequal treatments but manages to take a step back: is aware that the causes of inequalities could be personal and societal	Still feels anger (again) on a daily basis towards unequal treatments but starts to take a step back and is taking it less personally	Feels personally targetted by unequal treatments and believes that this is a fatality for anyone but him		Feels treated unfairly on a daily basis by his environment (police, educators, family, close relative, teachers, etc.) and believes that the only possible defense is attack and destruction

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19	SAVIOR/NEED TO BE FREED FROM HIS RESPONSIBILITIES	Found in his environment the necessary resources to share responsibilities without feeling guilty	Starts to delegate some responsibilities while feeling guilty	Does not yet know how to delegate a part of his responsibilities (and how to choose which one to delegate)		Is still feeling crushed by the burden of his responsibilities and thinks only his radical group can help him
20	SAVIOR/NEED OF BEING A SAVING HERO FOR THE PEOPLE HE LOVES	Did almost grieved the fact that it was not his role of being a saving hero to the people he loved without feeling guilty	Searches for a balanced range to feel simply useful and by helping the people he loves	Does not know yet how to better gauge his help to others		Still sacrifices himself automatically for others
21	SAVIOR/NEED OF REFOCUSING AND TO BE ATTENTIVE TO HIS OWN NEEDS/TO INDIVIDUALIZE	Acts in the respect of his own needs without feeling guilty	Is more independent and respectful of his own point of views and priorities but still has difficulties to apply them	Begins to be attentive to his own priorities and personal needs while granting more importance to the ones of others		Is still prioritizing others before him, to his own cost
22	SAVIOR/NEED TO BE REASSURED ON THE FUTURE OF THE ONES HE LOVES THAT ARE CLOSE TO DEATH	Is aware of the manipulations he suffered about the loved ones (already dead or close to it): sacrificing himself would have not change anything	Questions himself on the becoming of the dead or close to loved ones. Believes that good actions could guaranty redemption and permit access to heaven of those people and accets the mystery related to the afterlife	Is anxious and feels guilty of abandoning the dead or close to loved ones that will end in hell according to him, while thinking that the "jihadist" project could not save them		Still believes that the only way to save a loved one from hell is to be a part of the "jihadist" project and to sacrifice himself
23	SAVIOR/NEED TO BE REASSURED ON THE END OF THE WORLD	Can think (or not) that the end of the world does exist no matter his vision but is not anxious about an imminent end of the world	Thinks that the signs of the end of the world have always existed and remains attentive to the actualization of the signs in the present time	Regularly perceives the signs of the end of the world without distinguishing the minors from the majors (same sex marriage, transgender people, etc.) without thinking that it is imminent		Is anxious on a coming end of the world and sees signs of the end of the world on a daily basis
24	SAVIOR/NEED TO BE REASSURED ON THE AFTERLIFE	Thinks more on refocusing on his general ethics and is no longer obsessed on the "licit" or "illicit" aspect of each action	Thinks regularly about the afterlife and remains focused on his actions fearing hell but without being obsessed about it	Decides in his daily life with a double fear : to avoid by all means hell, and to access heaven		Thinks that no matter what he will do, he will go to hell: nothing would ever be enough to access heaven

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25	FORTRESS/NEED OF CONTENT	Found liberation modes of his pulsions that are non-pathological. Found means to regulate his pulsions without being repressive or excessive	Searches to regulate his pulsions without completely succeeding and without finding shelter in other dependences	Begins to jugulates his anterior pulsions but by changing the object of the addiction		Devotes himself to passions and/or unspeakable dependences without any limit
26	FORTRESS/NEED OF PURIFICATION	Accepts himself as he is with or without pulsions without worrying on being "pure"	Accepts himself more through compromises he found in anterior and/or present pulsions while still being worried on his purity	Desperately searches to feel "pure" with his anterior and/or still present pulsions		Is not comfortable with himself: feels like a bad person. Believes that it is impossible for someone like him to find "purity" and that he will forever be "impure"
27	FORTRESS/NEED TO STOP BEING GUILTY AND BEING FREED FROM HIS OBSESSIONS	Is feeling freed from an important part of his guilt, reconciled with his past and is accepting his former or current weaknesses	Feels less guilty for his past and/or current excesses and stopped being obsessed of erasing completely the behaviors he does or used to consider as faulty	Senses and verbalizes an important guilt for having, now or before, behaviors he does or used to consider as illicit		Still obsessed by his anterior and potentially present excesses / Searches by all means to cancel the effects (to expiate what he still considers as sins) Is still tortured on the inside by the idea of committing irreparable faults
28	FORTRESS/NEED OF REDEMPTION	Is feeling reconciled with God and forgiven by Him despite his anterior parcource and/or his pulsions that are still present	Believes that he can be forgiven by God by respecting some strict requirements that he believes he could more or less meet	Has strong doubts on his abilities to be forgiven by God		Is still convinced that he will forever suffer the reject of God
29	FORTRESS/NEED TO FREE THE EVIL PART THAT IS IN HIM	Does not think (anymore) that devil is inside of him and is aware that he never was	Believes that the part of evil that is inside of him still influences some of his attitudes while having faith in his force and his will to overcome them	Wishes and believes that he can fight against the part of evil that is inside of him but still have difficulties to dissociate them from him		Believes that the evil is inside of him and that he cannot do anything to fight it
30	FORTRESS/NEED OF LIBERATION/REST	Feels capable of handling his internal struggles and is proud of it	Feels the need to free himself from this tenacious internal struggle he carries out on a daily basis but does not consider death as a solution anymore and searches for others	Wonders sometimes if dying is not the easiest and the most efficient solution in order not to fall (again) of his former or still present pulsions		Misses the promise to die to facilitate this internal struggle he must carry out against his pulsions that are anterior



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31	LICIT SUICIDE/NEED TO BE FREED FROM EXISTENTIAL PAIN	Feels peaceful and being able to find positive ressources to feel better and more balanced	Believes in the possibility of better days. Works on reaching this objective.	Is still torn between hope and the possibility to distantiate from a painful past		Is still cogitating constantly on sufferings and existential questions
32	LICIT SUICIDE/NEED TO FIND A MEANING TO LIFE	Found a strong motivation for a creative activity, a personal or professional project, for a meeting, etc. that gives meaning to his life	Feels hope again and perceives some motivation leads without having really found a meaning to life	Did not find significant landmark yet in his life while looking for someone or something to hold live		Is defeatist, thinks that nothing could ever fill the void felt on the inside of himself and no cause, project or person could help him to find a meaning to life
33	LICIT SUICIDE/NEED TO FIND A SELF- APPRECIATION AGAIN	Feels valorized in his own eyes and in the eyes of others for who he really is (personal values...)	Feels valorized (again) in his own eyes and in the eyes of others in certain professional, friendly, familial circumstances...	Feels less devalorized but would like to have more occasions to demonstrate his own worth		Feels constantly devalorized and does not find any means to demonstrate his own worth
34	LICIT SUICIDE/ NEED TO DIE	Is no longer drawn to death: feels happy and develops himself in this life	Does not think that death is solution to his distress feeling	Feels like dying would be easier than living but does not want to abandon his relatives and/or his life		Is fascinated and obsessed for death. Idealizes death as the only way to be freed from the perceived pain
35	LICIT SUICIDE/NEED OF FINDING A PLACE	Feels like he is a good person, with flaws and qualities and found a place in this world	Believes that he deserves to be here below and does not feel any temptation towards death and is still looking for his place in this world	Wonders on the legitimacy of his place on Earth: does he deserve to be here below ? Hesitates between the desire to die and to live		Only perceives him as a bad person who does not deserve to be on Earth: "the world and/or my relatives would be better off without me"
36	LICIT SUICIDE/NEED OF HOPE	Has high hopes in life even if he perceives it as complex and full of difficulties, found or know that he will find his own fulfilment	Begins to perceive and live moments in which he has hopes even if doubts are still actual (hesitates between darkness and light / between hope and despair)	Feels like he is in a long tunnel where light will never appear but still wants to fight to reach this hypothetical light		Feels downhearted on a daily basis: cannot manage to feel joy

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37	MOTHER TERESA/NEED OF BEING USEFUL	Found humanitarian projects or a profession or voluntary work related to mutual aid that give him/her satisfaction	Found humanitarian projects or a profession or voluntary work related to mutual aid without being satisfied of his/her impact	Found humanitarian projects or a profession or voluntary work related to mutual aid without concretely any success (considering his legal case, his "jihadist" past, his house arrest, her headscarf, etc.)		Has doubts on the possibility of being solidarian in his own environment (in a "miscreants" country) or considers that any tradition involvement is valid to build a fairer world
38	MOTHER TERESA/NEED OF VALORIZATION	Feels valorized for his personal qualities	Feels valorized through charitable actions or the favors he gives in his/her everyday life	Does not feel yet valorized enough by his environment		Always feels devalorized, except from her former group
39	MOTHER TERESA/NEED TO FIND A MEANING TO LIFE	Found a true calling in altruism and mutual aid and a strong way to reach his/her ideals	Found a strong motivation for a creative activity, a personal or professional project, for a meeting, etc. that corresponds to his/her aspirations	Feels hope again and perceives some motivation leads without having really found a meaning to life		Does not find anything to hold on to
40	MOTHER TERESA/NEED OF PARTICIPATING TO A FAIRER WORLD	Believes that people (Malcom X, Martin Luther King, Gandhi...), associations managed to improve inequalities and then it is possible, with a lot of patience and passion, to get things moving to arrive to a fairer world	Thinks that the world will not evaluate but on a small- scale, people can help their fellow beings and try to settle on promixity humanitarian projects event if they feel frustrated	Refuses to involve in "easy" proximity humanitarian projects because it is not enough. Looks for means to change the world and to have a grand impact		Believes that no action will ever be sufficient to get things moving and change the world he perceives has cruel, unfair and unequal: is defeatist and feels totally powerless
41	MOTHER TERESA/NEED TO BE FREED FROM HER GUILT	Manages to feel joy and happiness without feeling guilty and making an automatic connection with people and/or people that suffer in the world	Starts to feel joy in her daily life while being riddled with guilt of being happy whereas people are suffering in the world	Feels powerless and useless towards others' misery and is suffering a lot about it		Feels like a hypocrite and like he is a bad person because he does not/ any more move to defend the oppressed people: does not accept the possibility of being happy
42	MOTHER TERESA/NEED TO MODULATE HER EMPATHY	Manages to distance from the suffering others went through while remaining sensitive	Hesitates according to situations, concerned people, viewed report (etc.) between distanciation and interiorization towards the suffering of the other	Feels the pain of her close relatives without succeeding in taking a step back but starts to be distant from the pain of the rest of the world (children starving in Africa, etc.)		Feels the suffering of the world but cannot take a step back: is drowned with all the hardships she feels and feels downhearted on a daily basis

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43	SLEEPING BEAUTY/ NEED OF PROTECTION	Feels safe in her personal and professional life	Found a way of living that corresponds to her need of protection and that relieves her (dressing with large clothes, never goes out at night, not going alone with a man in an elevator, etc.)	Still has moments of fear, insecurity and anxiety on a daily basis		Lives in a constant state of worry and fear of being attacked to the extent that she withdraws into herself
44	SLEEPING BEAUTY/ NEED OF ETERNAL LOVE	Works on her definition of eternal love and gets some distance on her conviction that this is the only way for her to exist	Doubts on the definition and her need of accessing to eternal love to exist	Believes that she can only exist in the eyes of a man while looking for a balanced and a healthy relationship or, on the contrary, does not believe in love at all: became defeatist		Gives the impression of only existing when she is under a man's influence
45	SLEEPING BEAUTY/ NEED OF RESPECT FOR HERSELF	Believes that the value of her person is not reflected in her body but far beyond	Works on the fact that her body must not be a unique criter to constitute an interest for someone of the other sex (even if she complexes about it or on the contrary is proud of it)	Thinks that her body is a window display she must improve or maintain to please men even if it suits her or if revolts her		Believes that the only positive or interesting thing about her is her body (can hide her body or on the contrary dress very provocatively)
46	SLEEPING BEAUTY/ NEED TO FILL HER ABANDONMENT FEELING	Is feeling surrounded - Accepted the abandonment she might have been through with feeling the need to fill it	Is aware that a man cannot fill her loneliness and is still looking for other means to fill this void	Is looking for internal resources inside of her and by her relatives to feel less lonely, unloved and empty, while looking also for a man figure to satisfy her		Thinks that only a man could fulfil her abandonment, loneliness, uneasiness feeling... that she constantly feels
47	SLEEPING BEAUTY/ NEED OF SELF-ESTEEM	Believes that she deserves to be loved and/ or to feel loved	Believes that true love is not the only way of feeling loved and glooming and searches for another way to appreciate herself even more	Begins to think that she deserves to be loved but constantly fears to be attached to others because she is afraid of being abandoned by them		Believes that she does not deserve being loved and no one will ever love her: she always will be abandoned by all
48	SLEEPING BEAUTY/ NEED OF INDEPENDENCE	Feels independent and grieved her former dependence to a man	Broke up with "her man" and is aware of her previous dependence. Tries to achieve her independence healthily	Detached herself from "her man" for different reasons but still is sensitive to a next sentimental dependence		Is still feeling dependent and faithful to "her man" in spite of the diverse reasons and wishes to go back to him or to stay at his sides

## GENERAL REMARKS FOR PRIMARY PREVENTION

Prevention and detection policies could be more effective if the conceptual framework of the radicalization problem was better defined. Right now, the programs set up in France are not really effective as there is no clear consensus between politicians and researchers with regard to the problematic aspects to be treated. Each specialist tends to reduce the "jihadist" problem to his/her own reading grid. Moreover, there is a transversal debate: for some, individuals' radical views are nobody's concerns as long as they don't lead to commit a terrorist crime. For others, we cannot treat terrorist acts if we do not treat the ideology behind it. Explaining why the assessments of detection plans of action and experiments lead to a controversy both at the level of intellectuals and politicians, each one trying to reduce the complexity of the "jihadist" process to the sphere he/she knows and masters. However, we should cross the different point of view through a multidisciplinary approach, as the "Daesh's thinkers" do, to achieve a real efficiency and consistency between the various players.

For now, many programs tend to deal with only one angle. Assuming that "jihadists" have a distorted view of Islam, some use religious actors who will position themselves only in the knowledge<sup>148</sup> sphere, not dealing with the multiple emotional and relational interactions behind the relationship with the radical group. As for models working on the psychological and emotional dimension, they do not generally take into account the ideological dimension and use prevention frameworks that have already been implemented before for drug addiction, delinquency or sectarian influence<sup>149</sup>. In France, it is the current choice of the Comité Interministériel de la Prévention de la Délinquance et de la Radicalisation<sup>150</sup> ('Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Delinquency and Radicalization').

Our feedback leads us to think that the articulation between the emotional, relational and ideological dimensions is not sufficiently emphasized in studies and prevention programs probably because observers have no access to the radicalism "small steps", neither to the "invisible threads" and even less to the "implicit motives" of the "jihadist" commitment. However, the relationships that radicalized-ones establish between them are recognized as essential before our own work, by many experts<sup>151</sup>.

The problem is probably due to the fact that only 31% of global terrorism research has been based on empirical data<sup>152</sup>.

<sup>148</sup>The Saudi Arabia model described by El-Said, H. (2015), *New approaches to Countering Terrorism: Designing and Evaluating Counter Radicalization and De-Radicalization Programs*. London: Palgrave Macmillan and the Singapor model, and Singapor's rehabilitation model, described by Briggs, R. (2014). *Policy Briefing: De- radicalisation and Disengagement*. London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue.

<sup>149</sup>CIPC. (2017). *6th International Report on the Prevention of Violent Radicalization: An International study on the issues of intervention and stakeholders*. Montreal, Canada: Centre International de Prévention de la Criminalité (International Center for Crime Prevention).

<sup>150</sup><http://www.lagazettedescommunes.com/490888/prevention-de-la-radicalisation-muriel-domenach-repond-aux-pole-miques/>

<sup>151</sup>SAGEMAN, M. & HOFFMAN, B. (2008, a). *Leaderless Jihad: terror networks in the twenty-first century*. *Foreign Affairs*, 87(3), 133-138. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/36897831?accountid=20032730> ; TAARNBY, M. (2005). *Recruitment of Islamist terrorists in Europe. Trends and perspectives*.

<sup>152</sup>SILKE, A. (2001). The devil you know: Continuing problems with research on terrorism. *Terrorism and political violence*, 13(4), 1-14.

And these, when they exist, come mainly from testimonies of “jihadists” who have chosen to “make statements” to journalists<sup>153</sup>.

The study of radicalized conversations with their recruiters leads us to highlight the fact that the rejection of the “Other” and democracy is realized both by ideology and by the jihadist anxiogenic emotional approach, concomitantly. All young individuals followed by us had a kind of obsessive anxiety about human aspects, shared by and within their group, and had accepted the ideology based on the idea that the appreciation of a human thing would be a betrayal to God’s uniqueness<sup>154</sup>. From our point of view, the intermingling of ideology and strong emotional reactions leads to violent action<sup>155</sup>.


### Triple approach leading to « jihadist » involvement

> Triple approach leading to the «jihadist» commitment

> Contemporary «jihadists» use **a triple dimension** : emotional; relational; and ideological,

> To delude a motive for commitment corresponding to the ideal of each recruit

> These recruits have generally less than 30 years old and **are looking for those three dimensions**: an ideal; a group; and strong emotions.



In other words, to strengthen the resilience capacities of young people against the radicalization process, we must also associate the emotional and relational approach to the ideological approach. Even if the radicalization process is based on an ideology of a binary world, we cannot change this conviction by using the vein of the knowledge and the reason<sup>156</sup>. It seems counterproductive to speak directly about the ideas of the individual,

<sup>153</sup>ROY O., explains in his latest book that he only deals with the phenomenon from the journalist data, ignoring the methodological process required for any scientific reflection; Roy, O. (2016). *The jihad and the death, Seuil*.

<sup>154</sup>See testimonials in the report STAGES OF THE RADICALIZATION AND DERADICALIZATION PROCESS.

<sup>155</sup>See the report STAGES OF THE RADICALIZATION AND DERADICALIZATION PROCESS.

<sup>156</sup>BOUZAR D. (2015). *How to get out of the jihadist influence?* Editions de l'Atelier

which will automatically reinforce his/her suspicion towards anyone outside the radical group (believing we are jealous and want to distract him/her from the Truth). Moreover, all the experiments show that the counter-speech does not work as such<sup>157</sup>. The goal is to move the cognitions, but the cognitive approach without an emotional-relational approach is not possible. As the “Jihadist” discourse has associated the emotional, relational and ideological approach to encourage the membership to their radical project, the actors who want to fight against the phenomenon must also rely on this triple approach.

To lead the young person to mourn the jihadist group and the ideology, the conceptual framework of prevention programs must take into account this triple emotional, relational and ideological dimension:

- Emotional: an emotional (reassuring) approach must strengthen trust in institutions and the democratic system, undermined by the jihadist and conspiracy discourses which are strengthened by becoming the only “voices” denouncing the dysfunctions of democracy. Anticipating their anxiogenic approach requires offering free speech areas where young people can analyze the gap between the promises of the French Republican motto and the realities, the political dysfunctions (national and international), geopolitics, etc., in a complex and rational way. It also includes prevention against discrimination, stigma, sexual abuse, etc. (basically anything that can achieve the promised equality of all individuals). We can integrate in these actions an “education to the secularism”, allowing young people to understand the rights and duties of this legal concept, but also to be able to find their bearings if they were taken apart in political issues overtaking them from the different extremist movements (“jihadist” discourses but also far-right ones, even some political approaches that do not belong to extremist parties). Basically, the emotional approach that aims to reassure young people about the reliability of democracy must include a political dimension. It must be supported by another approach based on affects through relatives. In our experience feedback, we implemented reassuring experimental emotional approach methods with families of young individuals already radicalized.<sup>158</sup> Those methods provided good results (See below and tables in Part II - VARIABLES OF BECOMING).<sup>159</sup>

- Relational: the importance of the search for fusion within the radical group proves that young people are suffering from the individualism of our society. So it is necessary to use tools to work on the vulnerability of young people regarding their quest for a peer group. We urge educational institutions to reinvest the collective dimension of their approaches and educational projects: collective sports rather than individual sports, projects based on mutual aid rather than personal effort, citizen programs based on exchanges rather than unilateral giving, etc. Working on the relational dimension obviously includes the development of the education to new virtual forms of communication (internet, social networks ...) to which we must integrate the parents, often showing a “generational gap”.

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<sup>157</sup>CIPC. (2017). *6th International Report on the Prevention of Violent Radicalization*, Ibid.

<sup>158</sup>Cf. BOUZAR D., 2015, and the report STAGES OF THE RADICALIZATION AND DERADICALIZATION PROCESS

<sup>159</sup>The results of these tables show that minors and girls came out of radicalization more quickly because their parents called the Police Green Number as soon as they have seen the first signs of radicalization. The characteristic of these families, compared to others of our sample, is they have immediately applied and tested our reassuring emotional approach method (called the «Madeleine de Proust» by parents). The fact that their child has statistically escaped more quickly than others, proves that this approach has been effective.



- Cognitive-ideological: this dimension is widely developed by the various educational institutions, working on the development of free will, analytical reasoning, ideological flexibility, etc. Sometimes, some prevention programs use Muslim historians or theologians to talk about Islam. We refer and send professionals to the report STAGES OF THE RADICALIZATION AND DERADICALIZATION PROCESS in order to help them to adapt their cognitive approach to the "jihadist" process (part III). Sometimes, some prevention programs use historians or muslim theologians to talk about islam.

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But this desire to equip young people in their relational and cognitive capacities, to restore their confidence in democracy, is skipping France's specific relationship with religion in general (history of 8 religious wars, etc.) and negative representations coming from colonial memory in particular.

Indeed, we cannot close this conclusion on recommendations of prevention against radicalism without recalling the long generation struggles of French Muslim to be accepted as "full citizens". We cannot forget in 1982 their March for equality (the March for Equality and Against Racism, called by the media Marche des Beurs, was an anti-racist march), where they did not put forward neither the colonial past nor their Muslim membership, but they were struggling in a purely social prospect. At that time, they believed in the French republican motto, hoped for social mobility and did not accept to be victims of racism, discriminated further because they were living in the suburbs in which they were relegated. The beginning of the lack of trust in the state appears in this general context of the 90s. We cannot forget today, 30 years later, that it was the disappointing results of the March for Equality that changed the relationship with the French government for this youth born of immigration and led some to want to break with the obligation of "discretion" which their fathers had more or less complied to. We cannot forget that at that time, they started to put their Arab-Muslim references forward not to isolate themselves and break with the social contract but to find a place in democracy<sup>160</sup>. Many researches have highlighted how some of these young people claim to be society's actors by mobilizing Muslim references with educational, social and public scope<sup>161</sup>.

Some researchers have shown, among other things, through the associative environment they frequented and supported, how young people expressed their desire to be recognized individually and collectively, not only as people to whom policies apply, but also as real subjects<sup>162</sup>, not only as consumers finding in the association's formula an access to public resources, but also as autonomous originators of their trajectory, as producers of their own existence<sup>163</sup>. When these young people got interested by Islam, in the 80s, it was for them an identity and a political approach related to a quest for meaning: it was the perception of their discrimination in the French society that has raised in them a Muslim conscience. Beyond a real search for identity, Islam has become at this time a way to be heard, to be "taken into

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<sup>160</sup>BOUZAR D., Thesis to obtain the «Doctor» degree of the University: *"The importance of the citizen experience over the journey of Muslims born in France, sensitive to the political Islam line"*, Paris 8, presented the 19th December 2006 at Paris 8 University in front of the jury: Pierre BONTE (Director), Catherine DELCROIX, Mustapha DIOP, Didier GAZA-GNADO, Olivier ROY.

<sup>161</sup>KHOSROKHAVAR F., *Youth Islam*, Flammarion, Paris, 1997, CESARI J., *Muslims and Republicans, youth, islam and France*, Ed. Complexe, Bruxelles, 1998; TIETZE N., *Young Muslims from France and Germany*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2002.

<sup>162</sup>*Ibid* previous note; TOURAINE A., *Can we live together? Equal and different?*, Paris, Fayard, 1997; BOUZAR D., *Mr Islam doesn't exist, for a de-Islamization of debates*, Hachette Littérature, 2004.

<sup>163</sup>WIEVIORKA M., *A divided society? Multiculturalism in debate*, Ed. La Découverte, 1997.



account", to challenge, so to find a place. Religion was more a tool than an objective. It was 'a way of challenging' among other. Their behavior was sometimes seen as a provocation, but it was not a waiver of citizenship. At that time, there will was nurtured by the hope to be taken into account and to participate.

From their associative beginnings, the "confrontation with secularism" leads the leaders to study the two concepts presented to them as incompatible by their main interlocutors: Islam and secularism<sup>164</sup>. On one hand, the foreign leaders, to whom they identified, coming from radical Muslim movements, consider that the concept of secularism is strictly related to antireligious models rejecting any moral order and denying any possibility of truth in the divine message. On the other hand, French political and / or institutional leaders are not far from sharing the same opposite point of view, also considering Islam as incompatible with secularism, since intrinsically, specifically in this religion, there is no distinction between the spiritual and the temporal order. This way of claiming that Christianity, unlike Islam, is intrinsically secular, removes the entire historical dimension of the declensions of the two religions. This ignores the basic anthropological observation that any religious message evolves according to historical circumstances<sup>165</sup> and that it is precisely secularism that has forced Christians to redefine their way of believing and existing, thus freed from the guardianship of historical religions<sup>166</sup>.

Basically, all of their interlocutors convey the same assignment: young people must choose between their religion and French secularism, and so democracy. However, in the 90s, some began an interesting work of elaboration of Islam, making a difference between the foundations lived as religious, intended to manage the social relations, and organization's rules to be put place, so the laws that could emerge from it to build the social organization<sup>167</sup>. For this reason, they had gradually begun to work on some points, like the Christians had done, a distinction between the Islam principles (untouchable and sacred divine word for Muslims) and the historical aspect of Islam (as a result of human understandings coming from anthropological, social and historical normative processes)<sup>168</sup>, which was as recognizing that the Qur'an contained principles but did not provide a method to put them in place. These believers then were building their Islam, which no longer appeared to them as an external system determining them but as a reference that they could adjust to their human experience in France<sup>169</sup>. In this secular French context, the responsibility of the individual was at the center of their logical construct. They were building their own religiosity which was no longer the product of a system of organization or social regulation. There was then an opening of a channel leading to the abandonment of traditional and institutional Muslim religious forms having general principles translating into binding rules applied by all the believers, and where those who challenge them are treated as infidels. These young people

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<sup>164</sup>BOUZAR D., (2004), *Ibid*.

<sup>165</sup>Regardless of the content of their religion, believers interpret their text according to the mentality of the time in which they live. Many authors have shown how the disenchantment of the world does not mean the end of religion but the decline of traditional religious institutions and forms. We must remember the long debate of Catholics on how to live in a secular space. The "rallying" to the Republic call of Pope Leo XIII, inviting believers to give up a "catholic city" and no longer live "in the dream of a theocracy" was in 1892.

<sup>166</sup>HERVIEU-LEGER D., *Religion as memory*, Paris, Editions du Cerf, 1993.

<sup>167</sup>BOUZAR, Thesis (2004), *Ibid*.

<sup>168</sup>Work made by the anthropologist Mohammed Arkoun throughout his life...

<sup>169</sup>BOUZAR, 2004, *Ibid*.

began a work of questioning some interpretations of Islam, gradually changing their vision of the world, of themselves and others<sup>170</sup>.

Despite the fact that human experiences coming from the secular democratic pluralism context were leading young Muslims to reorganize their way of living and believing, most of the French media, political and institutional speeches were still talking of them as a homogeneous entity.

Thirty years later, representations about Islam have not changed in media and political discourses, which continue considering Islam as a religion different from other monotheisms, incompatible with modernity and secularism, such as an external system determining individuals in the same way. French media and political speeches are naming the Muslims individuals who appear to be democrats "musulmans modérés" (moderate Muslims), validating by this term the postulate that Muslims have to choose between Islam and democratic and French republican values<sup>171</sup>. Thirty years later, the participation of French Muslims citizens is still hindered. The comparative European research of Danièle Joly and Khursheed Wadia proves it<sup>172</sup>: there is a real problem of exercising the citizenship for Muslims in France, especially for women, because the "visibility" of their Islam hinders them in their will of participation in the society. This study highlights the fact that French associative environment is mainly financed by public money (and not by private foundations like in other European countries) and that sponsors of these public authorities demand a "Muslim invisibility" as a guarantee of adherence to the "Republic values", as disregard for the French laws guaranteeing freedom to manifest conviction, and this despite the important work of the "Observatoire de la laïcité" (Observatory of secularism), led by Jean- Louis Bianco, who has published many manuals<sup>173</sup> available to elected officials to recall the legal framework of secularism.

Can we make a connection between this national context and the success of the «jihadist» line on French youth? The high proportion of French people who have committed themselves to this utopia of a better world managed by the divine law is it a kind of self- fulfilling prophecy? When one cannot take root in a territory with all his/her references, when the media and political discourses continue to present the references constituting you as incompatible, is there a desire to become a "hero of the world revolution"? Has this representation of the

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<sup>170</sup>DJAÏT H., *The Great Discord, Religion and Politics in the Islam of Origins*, Paris, Gallimard, 1989; FILALI- ANSARY A., *Is Islam hostile to secularism ?* Casablanca, Le Fennec, 2000 ; ABDERRAZIQ A., *Islam and the foundations of power*, La Découverte/CEDEJ, 1994; JABRI M.A., *Introduction to criticism of Arab reason*, Paris, La Découverte, 1995; NASR ABOU ZEID, *Criticism of religious line*, Sindbad/Actes Sud, 1999; ABDERRAZIQ A., *Islam and the foundations of power*, La Découverte, 1994; CHARBI Mohamed, *Islam and freedom*, Albin Michel, 1999; ESACK FARID, *Quran, instructions for use*, Albin Michel, 2004; FERJANI Mohamed Chérif, *Islamism, secularism and human rights*, L'Harmattan; SOROUSH Abdul Karim, *Reason, Freedom and Democratie in Islam*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000; TALBI Mohammed, *A plea for a modern Islam*, Cérès et Desclée de Brouwer, 1998; Universalité du Coran (Coran universality), Actes Sud, 2002; BENZINE Rachid, *The new thinkers of Islam*, Albin Michel, 2004; and all the works of ARKOUN Mohammed....

<sup>171</sup>BOUZAR Dounia & BOUZAR Lyli, *The Republic or the burqa, Public services agaisnt the manipulated Islam*, Albin Michel, 2010, BOUZAR Dounia & BOUZAR Lyli, Albin Michel 2009 ; BOUZAR Dounia & BOUZAR Lyli, *Fight against harassment at work and decrypt discrimination mechanisms*, Albin Michel 2013 ; BOUZAR D. & DENIES N., *Convictional diversity, how to apprehend it? How to manage it?* Academia, L'Harmattan, BOUZAR D., *Secularity manual, legal framework and practical solutions*, Eyrolles, 2010.

<sup>172</sup>JOLY D., KHUESHEED W., *Muslim Women and Power, Political and Civic Engagement in West European Societies*, Gender and Politics, 2017.

<sup>173</sup><http://www.gouvernement.fr/observatoire-de-la-laicite>

incompatibility between Islam and democracy also affected non-Muslims young disappointed by the Republic?

In any case, our results prove that knowledge of the civilization and Arab-Muslim culture appear as protection factors against radicalization<sup>174</sup>, probably because they allow to escape the binary assignment we can find in many religious and political discourses, especially extremist discourses. The majority of other young people, like French citizens, are in the middle of "pro-Islam" or "anti-Islam" speeches which are the two sides of the same definition of this religion, characterized as having an essentialist particularity preventing from separating what is religious from what is private. If those who fight against "jihadization" define Islam the same way as the "jihadists" they fight, it is not surprising that the actions of detection, prevention or follow-up put in place, may be counter-productive. Put every practicing Muslim who goes to the mosque, in the file "fiché S" do not fight against the "jihadism" but strengthen its authority, illustrating its basic theory: France will never let you practice Islam on its soil.

**Preventive action prior to all others would consist in working on the conscious and unconscious negative representations related to the Arab-Muslim civilization, in order to get out of this climate of "mutual validation of belief"<sup>175</sup> shared by both "jihadists" and a large part of society.**

It must be understood that these negative representations prevent Islamic thinkers from expressing their views, redefining Islamic notions and interpretations, and give power to the most normative and literalist ones. Indeed, the negative representations correspond to the most obscurantist interpretations from the Wahhabi current.

While secularism could be a privileged setting in which Muslims could make use of the freedom to "think their Islam" independently of conservative religious institutions having power abroad, negative representations contribute in freezing and reinforcing these most archaic movements of Islam, by maintaining a bipolar worldview, opposing Islam and modernity. The knowledge of the Arab-Muslim culture must be part of the common culture transmitted to all French people, in order to reintroduce anthropological and historical data into the debate on Islam and thus finally be able to consider Muslim individuals as thinking subjects, carrying a history that cannot be diluted in a predetermined group identity.

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<sup>174</sup>Table 10: the socio-cultural level is a significant protection factor for young people of Arab-Muslim culture, as we have 61% of young people (radicalized) from popular class and 29% from middle class. We make the assumption that this result, which is specific to young people of Maghreb origin, is due to the fact that Arab-Muslim families of the middle class having access to some culture have transmitted knowledge of the Arab-Muslim civilization to their children, in a direct or indirect way, and that protects them from the manipulation by "jihadist" line. So we can say that knowledge of the Arab-Muslim civilization is a protection factor.

<sup>175</sup>HERVIEU-LEGER D., *Religion as memory*, édition du cerf, Paris, 1993.

## ANNEX : SPECIAL FOCUS ON THE ROLE OF THE PSYCHOLOGIST BY ALAIN RUFFION <sup>176</sup>

Classically, protection factors are defined as "influences that modify, enhance, or change a person's responses to environmental risks that predispose to maladaptation<sup>177</sup>" or as a characteristic of a person, their environment, or their situation which reduces the risk of subsequent recidivism.

We will present some new approaches that can be used by youth workers who want to adapt the psychological approach to the primary and / or secondary prevention of radicalization.

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<sup>176</sup>This part is written largely by the psychoanalyst Alain Ruffion, contributor of our report, who resumed our tender of the Ministry of the Interior when we refused its renewal and which in turn followed radicalized youths reported by French prefectures.

<sup>177</sup>DE VOGEL V., DE VRIES ROBBÉ M., DE RUITER C., BOUMAN Y., *Assessing Protection factors in forensic Psychiatric Practice: introducing the SAPROF*, International Journal of Forensic Mental Health, n°10, 2011, p. 171-177.

## ANNEX.1 INCLUDE THE THEME OF THE HUMAN BEING BASIC NEEDS INTO THE PREVENTIVE AND EDUCATIONAL PROJECTS AIMED AT YOUNG PEOPLE.

The issue of the radicalization primary prevention is crucial because it represents the deepest sense of a true substantive strategy for fighting all forms of violent extremism and radicalization. We propose here a preventive approach that refers to Public Health. Since its inception in 1948, the World Health Organization (WHO) has defined health as "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not just the absence of disease or infirmity." To be healthy, the nutritional, health, educational, social and emotional needs must be met. In 1952 WHO defined public health as the science and art of preventing disease, prolonging life and improving physical and mental health on an individual and collective level. The notion of Public Health integrates social and political factors, the question of "mentalities" and even integrates historical, sociological and psycho-sociological data into the analysis of the conditions of well-being. This is well suited to a multifactorial approach to the root causes of radicalization.

To a certain extent the basic needs more or less present in each one of us have a great importance in the psychological and social balance and growth of the individuals. The results of this report join many psycho-social theories, which have recalled the impact of the imbalance of these psychic and psycho-social needs in the creation of vulnerable personalities to extremism<sup>178</sup>. The presentation below is taken from the first program of radicalization prevention that we have experimented from the resilience resources and the existential positive psychology<sup>179</sup> in France, linked to the Wheel of Universal Human Values (Shown immediately after).

<sup>178</sup>Might Depression, Psychosocial Adversity, and Limited Social Assets Explain Vulnerability to and Resistance against Violent Radicalisation ? K. BHUI, B. EVERITT, E. JONES, PLOS ONE, September 2014 - <http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0105918> The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism : Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why ? REX A. HUDSON, MARILYN MAJESKA, ANDREA M. SAVADA, HELEN C. METZ, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, September 1999 - [https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc\\_Psych\\_of\\_Terrorism.pdf](https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf)

Suicide Terrorism - Genesis of, A. SPECKHARD, Georgetown University, January 2006 - [file:///C:/Users/asus/Desktop/dossier%20ressource/DOSSIERS%20RESSOURCES/psy%20et%20rad/Suicide%20Terrorism%20-%20Genesis%20of%20\(PDF%20Download%20Available\).html](file:///C:/Users/asus/Desktop/dossier%20ressource/DOSSIERS%20RESSOURCES/psy%20et%20rad/Suicide%20Terrorism%20-%20Genesis%20of%20(PDF%20Download%20Available).html)

Terrorism – A (Self) Love Story, A. W. KRUGLANSKI, J. BELANGER & M. GELFAND, R. GUANRATNA, M. HETIARACHCHI, F. REINARES, E. OREHEK, J. SASOTA, K. SHARVIT, American Psychologist, October 2013 - <http://www.gelfand.umd.edu/Terrorism%20Self%20Love%20Story.pdf>

The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization : How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism, A. W. KRUGLANSKI, J. BELANGER & M. GELFAND, A. SHEVELAND, M. HETIARACHCHI, R. GUANRATNA - [http://www.gelfand.umd.edu/KruglanskiGelfand\(2014\).pdf](http://www.gelfand.umd.edu/KruglanskiGelfand(2014).pdf)

<sup>179</sup>BONIWELL I., TUNARIU A., RUFFION A. Towards sustainable prevention of youth radicalization. The Philosophical Dialogues Program - An existential positive psychology intervention for resilience, wellbeing and affirmative mind-set. Manual and training materials (2018).

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*Annexes***UNIVERSALISM**

Understanding, appreciation, tolerance & protection for the welfare of all people and for nature.

**HEDONISM**

Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself.

**BENEVOLENCE**

Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact.

**CONFORMITY**

Restraint of action, inclinations and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms.

**TRADITION**

Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self.

**SECURITY**

Safety, harmony, and stability of society or relationships, and of self.

**POWER**

Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources.

**STIMULATION**

Excitement, novelty and challenge in life.

**ACHIEVEMENT**

Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards.

**SELF DIRECTION**

Independent thought and action – choosing, creating, exploring.



## Universal human values



Source: Shalom Schwartz's (2012) Wheel of Universal Human Values. Openness to Change vs. Conservation values & Self-Transcendence vs. Self-Enhancement values.



## Universal human needs



Source: The Centre for School Transformation (2012). Inspired by the work of Manske (2005) <http://radicalcompassion.com>; Rosenberg (2005) <http://www.cnvc.org>.

Another approach to basic needs emerges from the experimental work of Jean-Pierre Pourtois and Huguette Desmet<sup>180</sup>, who developed the "paradigm of the twelve psychopedagogical needs", which aims to establish guidelines in the children education.


"Parents, practitioners and researchers can find an overview of the various psychopedagogical components that are essential to the child needs. From there can come proposals for educational practices that best meet these needs."<sup>181</sup>

"The paradigm has four dimensions in that it considers simultaneously the emotional, cognitive, social and value needs. To each of these dimensions corresponds three specific child needs that imply categories of attitudes among parents. The following diagram shows the various paradigm dimensions and their possible interactions"<sup>182</sup>.

<sup>180</sup> The paradigm of the twelve psychopedagogical needs has been elaborated at the « Centre de Recherche and d'innovation en Socio-pédagogie familiale and scolaire » (CERIS) of Mons.

<sup>181</sup> POURTOIS J. P. and DESMET H. (1997): « Postmodern education », PARIS, PUF

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*

Table of the twelve needs<sup>183</sup>

The needs of the affective domain are part of the need for affiliation, which refers to the dimension of intergenerational continuity, of family and social history. It is impossible to grow and develop without being attached, accepted or invested by one's environment. The notions of attachment, acceptance and investment constitute the three essential poles of this domain.

The need for fulfillment reflects the importance of the cognitive domain in the development of every human being. To be able to act on one's environment, to understand it, to master it, seems indispensable to man. The curiosity need of the child is considerable. It is a question of responding to this need by stimulating, encouraging and reinforcing behaviours.

Every individual who is building himself presents another essential need, that of social autonomy. Socialization involves the need for the subject to differentiate himself from his group of origin and to "individuate himself". This process involves responding to the need for communication, consideration and the existence of structures that must be flexible enough to create a sense of belonging to one's home environment and to encourage openness to the outside world.

**A multidirectional paradigm:** The paradigm of the twelve needs is multi-directional in the sense that it shouldn't be used only in the micro-family environment. Thus, the model must also reflect on: does society respond well to the needs of its citizens? Does the school meet the needs of the children entrusted to it? To what extent does the family - the school - society establish structures that can both ensure the safety and independence of individuals?

<sup>183</sup>*Ibid.*

**An interactions paradigm :** It is important to draw attention to the fact that if we present, for the sake of clarity, the different components of the paradigm separately, we immediately specify that each dimension exists only in interaction with the others.

**A training paradigm :** The paradigm of the twelve needs is not only a theoretical framework for analysing conditions that are favourable or unfavourable to child development. Admittedly, this use of the paradigm does not escape us: it allows us to carry out research in the field of the child school adaptation, drug addiction, violence, abuse. However, the model presented also includes an adult training tool that examines the education they provide to children for whom they have an educational responsibility (parents, educators, etc.).

**An open model :** As Pourtois and Desmette<sup>184</sup> remind us, "the psychopedagogical paradigm of the twelve needs is in no way frozen once and for all because it must be able to be modified according to contexts including learning.

### **The paradigm of the twelve psychosocial needs and their possible involution**

Resistant and / or resilient development is also made unlikely from a cognitive point of view when, beyond the traumatic phase, the subject uses postures of desocialization, debasement and unrealism that fundamentally contradict his or her own way of being in the world. This is reflected in the involution scheme below<sup>185</sup>, which illustrates the mechanism of those who engage in the radicalization processes.


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<sup>184</sup>POURTOIS J. P., HUMBEECK B., DESMET H. (2012) « *The resilience resources* », Paris, PUF, pages 7.

<sup>185</sup>POURTOIS J. P., HUMBEECK B., DESMET H. (2012) « *The resilience resources* », Paris, PUF, pages 12.

### Diagram: Psychosocial Involution

To avoid this regression, the resilience and post-traumatic growth presented in II will help us to mobilize the right resources



## ANNEX.2 SYSTEMATICALLY INTEGRATE THE KEY CONCEPT OF RESILIENCE INTO PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEMS.

For theoretical and practical reasons, we will favour the "process" side of the resilience concept because resilience is linked to stages of development, to the evolution of the parental and relational environment, to variable cultural and social contexts of life. Eventually, it is on the one hand never acquired once for all and on the other hand, it is not only a resistance, as Boris Cyrulnik likes to remind but "it is also to learn how to live".<sup>186</sup> This makes us retain the definition of Jacques Lecomte: "Resilience is a dynamic process of developing well despite difficult living conditions or traumatic events, based on the interaction of potentialities internal to the individual and environmental support and likely to be operationalized in a certain time and by certain result (s), specific depending on the area covered"<sup>187</sup>.

If we consider resilience as a key concept to highlight in the prevention, it must be developed in a comprehensive way, both within individuals, within their immediate environment and within health and socio-educational institutions.

Integrating resilience is a statement of principle that must be made by the institutions, by putting in place protocols that allow professionals to learn how to isolate the forces of character that preside over such resistance: courage, endurance, optimism, etc. and to think about coping strategies in Public Health that help to push everyone's limits by providing keys to understanding the defensive and offensive resistance mechanisms. Thinking of introducing resilience into prevention is also about ensuring the conditions for sustainable development of the latter within the individual (capacity development) and in the immediate environment (preparation and formation of the life community: parents, families, schools, integration partners).

The simple act of multiplying interlocutors with a different way of arousing or awakening the young person resilience resources causes multiple protective effects. If professionals all feel like holders of a "transmission of resilience", chaining will strengthen the resilience of the young.


This shows the importance of integrating the concept of resilience in an efficient way into a public health policy<sup>188</sup>.

<sup>186</sup> CYRULNICK B. (1999): *"A wonderful misfortune"*, Paris, Odile Jacob.

<sup>187</sup> LECOMTE J. (2002): *"What is resilience? Falsely simple Question. Necessarily complex Answer"*, Psychological Practices, 2002, 1, 7-14;

<sup>188</sup> A general systemic approach, which suggests that the ability of dynamic systems to resist or recover from a significant disturbance, has recently been proposed as potentially more relevant, DAVYDOV M. STEWART R., RITCHIE K., CHAUDIEU I. (2010): *"Resilience and mental health,"* Clinical Psychology Review 30, page 481

**“Model of the three mechanisms of the system of mental resiliency (health protection, promotion and reduction of risks) towards aversive events (stress factors of different levels): before during and after a perturbation of health.”**



This diagram leads us to distinguish:

- "Harm reduction" factors that may work in response to risk factors that may themselves be difficult to change (such as genetic risk factors or poverty);
- Protection factors that reduce the probability of pathology;
- Promotion factors that actively improve the positive psychological well-being<sup>189</sup>.

All of these factors are illustrated in the figure above which has the merit of showing the importance of resilience mechanisms for the health promotion and protection, resilience mechanisms that we will develop in the following paragraph. Resilience based on protection factors implies that difficult life elements have already occurred and emphasizes the importance of rebalancing through positive experiences.

Another fact to take into account: the aversive and difficult situations that individuals encounter during their life can lead in some cases to a strengthening of the character and the development of positive characteristics including psychological resources, which has been proven in the recent research on Post-Traumatic Growth<sup>190</sup> (CPT). This concept of post-traumatic growth refers to a positive psychological change experienced as a result of the struggle against very difficult life circumstances, Antonia Csillik explains that the concept of

<sup>189</sup>HOGE, E. A., AUSTIN, E. D., & POLLACK, M. H. (2007). *Resilience: Research evidence and conceptual considerations for posttraumatic stress disorder*. *Depression and Anxiety*, 24, 139–152.

PATEL, V., & GOODMAN, A. (2007). *Researching protective and promotive factors in mental health*. *International Journal of Epidemiology*, 36, 703–707..

<sup>190</sup>CSILLIK A. (2017): *"The psychological resources"*, Dunod, Paris, which refers in particular to the work of TEDESCHI R.G. AND CALHOUN L.G. (2004): "Posttraumatic growth: conceptual foundations and empirical evidence. *Psychological inquiry*, 15, 1, 1-18.

CPT "describes the positive changes that can result from traumatic events. It is the experience of individuals whose development has surpassed what they were before the crisis phase in areas as varied as appreciation of life, intimacy, spirituality or changing values"<sup>191</sup>. However, she also points out that "CPT is favoured by high socio-economic status and education, personality traits such as optimism and extraversion, positive emotions, social support and adaptive coping strategies"<sup>192</sup>. It is therefore essential to understand not only which resources should be mobilized but also and above all how to help individuals to mobilize them.

The CTP would be more interesting to use in secondary prevention as the statistical analyses of this report prove that the young people in the sample present numerous traumas (mourning, separation, experience of abandonment, sexual abuse, physical violence...) more important than in the rest of the population. The process by which resources come to life in difficult conditions is illustrated in this report: "surviving the death or divorce of one parent" appears as a feature of "CPDSI successes". The death of a parent or the divorce thus appears not as a vulnerability preventing deradicalization of the young person but as a positive becoming variable, akin to a factor facilitating deradicalization... Insofar as the young people have developed their capacities to Resilience during this family tournament before radicalization, they use it again when it comes to getting out of the group and the "jihadist" utopia.

A psychological disposition can be considered as a psychological resource and become a protection factor<sup>193</sup> when it:

- Protects against stress and psychopathology in difficult situations;
- Contributes to life satisfaction and individual well-being;
- Is measurable: could have been objectively identified and evaluated as an interindividual difference;
- Appears stable: it is a stable trait and not a fluctuating state;
- Appears malleable: can be modified by psychological intervention;
- Appears renewable: despite fluctuations, this resource once activated, can be reactivated quite easily, depending on the situation.

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<sup>191</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>192</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>193</sup>*Ibid.*



## ANNEX.3 INTEGRATE POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AS A PREVENTIVE AND EDUCATIONAL RESOURCE

It is important to define positive psychology well and to remember that it is not a remake of the positive thinking of the 19th century. Positive psychology (PP) is a new school of thought in psychology that appeared in the United States in the late 1990s<sup>194</sup>. Noting that most of the theoretical and empirical work in psychology and psychiatry was systematically concerned with the understanding and treatment of psychic disorders, the psychologist Martin Seligman wanted to focus on the study of the psychological forces and resources of individuals left behind. Indeed, the study of the factors which make it possible to enrich the existence and the human experience has long been neglected in psychology, since the focus was on the psychological defaults of individuals and the treatment of mental disorders. In fact, the definition of the positive psychology objectives is: "The scientific study of the conditions and processes that contribute to the optimal development or functioning of individuals, groups and institutions"<sup>195</sup>.

From this angle, Ilona Boniwell<sup>196</sup> presents three priority axes: the first refers to all the positive experiences felt by an individual: well-being, contentment and satisfaction for experiences related to the past, joy and "the optimal experience" for the present experience; hope and optimism for the future. The second level consists in identifying the elements that make up a fulfilling life and concerns the study of positive individual qualities such as interpersonal skills, creativity, courage, the sense of forgiveness, perseverance, spirituality or wisdom. Finally, the third level is that of the community and includes civic virtues, social responsibilities, encouragement to rise, altruism, civility, positive institutions and other factors that contribute to the development of citizenship and incite to tend towards something beyond oneself<sup>197</sup>. This last level appears fundamental, insofar as in the first part of this report, there is identified a great need for belonging and surpassing among the radicalized youths. This echoes Sheldon's thinking that in a world of adversity and uncertainty, the new science of positive psychology aims to "understand, test, discover, and promote the factors that enable individuals and communities to thrive."<sup>198</sup>

As Antonia Csillik recalls in her book<sup>199</sup>, taking into account the personality positive resources had already inspired the humanistic psychology current in the United States in the 60s with Carl Rogers leading the way, who defined this trend (actualising tendency) as

<sup>194</sup>At the initiative of Martin SELIGMAN, professor at the University of Pennsylvania, then president of the American Psychologists Association (APA).

<sup>195</sup>GABLE, S. L. AND HAIDT J. (2005): *what (and why) is positive psychology?* Review of General psychology, 9(2), 103-110.

<sup>196</sup>BONIWELL I. (2012): *Introduction to positive psychology*, Payot, Paris.

<sup>197</sup>Declined by BONIWELL I. in *Ibid*.

<sup>198</sup>SHELDON and AL (2000): *Positive Psychology Manifesto*, [www.ppc.sas.upenn.edu/akumalmanifesto.htm](http://www.ppc.sas.upenn.edu/akumalmanifesto.htm). See also the links between the difficulty of civic engagement of young people of Arab-Muslim origin (especially girls) and their radicalization, appeared in the over-representation of the reason for commitment ISIL-LAND (see table 17.a in chapter I.2.4 Dynamics of variables related to engagement patterns).

<sup>199</sup>CSILLIK A. (2017): *Psychological Resources*, Dunod, Paris.

"the inherent tendency of the organization to develop all the person potentialities in order to ensure its maintenance and enrichment"<sup>200</sup>. It is not a matter of erasing the negative part<sup>201</sup>, "the Shadow part " as would say the followers of psychoanalysis Carl Gustave Young<sup>202</sup> or that of violence and individual and collective drive parts, to take again the concerns of the founder of psychoanalysis<sup>203</sup> and more recent ones by the founder of social therapy<sup>204</sup>. It is a capacity for both self-understanding and solving problems and difficulties in order to achieve proper functioning. According to Rogers<sup>205</sup>, the human being is endowed with self-regulation and self-determination abilities and with psychological resources from which he can draw, especially in a facilitative interpersonal climate. Many studies have confirmed that in addition to genetics and the environment, human beings have a change capital of at least 30% to influence these behaviours. This is important for two reasons: one-third of our capacity for change is within our direct reach, another third is related to the quality of the environment and resource persons who can help us to enhance our psychological and relationship capital. This last point is strategic for our questions of accompaniment and prevention of the radicalized ones.

Beforehand, professionals must learn to identify potentials that have been identified and verified scientifically. Let us recall above all that psychological resources are protection factors in that they facilitate resistance to adversity, as well as psychological adaptation in difficult situations of life. These resources act as protection factors, that is, factors that attempt to reduce the effect of stressors and allow the person to maintain his or her skills in distressful circumstances including maintaining a constructive role in relation to his/her community and above all a sufficiently benevolent vision of his/herself. Among these psychological resources, we can present the most quoted in the scientific literature by choosing those that could have taken the opposite needs identified among the radicalized in the first part of the report: optimism, hope, personal control (auto control), search for meaning, self-efficacy, mindfulness and self-compassion. These resources will also have an influence on the tools proposed in our report.

<sup>200</sup>ROGERS C. (1959) : *A theory of therapy, personnality and interpersonnal relationships as developped in the client-centere framework*. In JS Koch (Eds). *Psychology : a study of science. Formulations of the person in the social context* (vol3, pp 184-256) ; New York Mc Graw-Hill.

<sup>201</sup>GREEN A. (2011): *The work of the negative*, Edition de Minuit, Paris.

<sup>202</sup>C.G. JUNG (1951), *Studies on the Phenomenology of the Self*, Paris, Albin Michel, 1983. See the excellent dossier of Jungian Psychoanalysis Papers 2007 / 3 (N ° 123).

<sup>203</sup>FREUD (1929): *Unease in civilization*, PUF, Paris: "Man is not this debonair, heart thirsty love, which is said to defend itself when you attack, but a being on the contrary, which must bring to the account of his instinctive data a good amount of aggression. For him, therefore, the neighbour is not only an auxiliary and a possible sexual object, but also an object of temptation. The man is indeed tempted to satisfy his need for aggression at the expense of his neighbour, to exploit his work without compensation, to use it sexually without his consent, to appropriate his property, to humiliate him, to inflict pain, martyrise, and kill him. Homo homini lupus: who would have the courage, in front of all the lessons of the life and the history, to register in false against this adage? This tendency to aggression, which we can detect in ourselves and which we rightly supposed to exist in others, constitutes the principal factor of disturbance in our relations with our neighbour; it is she who imposes so much effort on civilization. As a result of this primary hostility that sets men against each other, civilized society is constantly threatened with ruin. "

<sup>204</sup>ROJZMAN C. (1999), *Fear, Hatred and Democracy*, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, coll. " Provocation "; Freud, a humanism of the future, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, coll. " Humanity Witnesses ", 1998; *Breaking Out of Violence Through Conflict, A Social Therapy for Learning to Live Together*, Paris, La Découverte, 2008; *Live well with others A new approach: social therapy*, Paris, Larousse, coll. "The psychological universe", 2009; *Towards the civil wars. Preventing Hate*, Paris, Lemieux Editor, 2017.

<sup>205</sup>ROGERS C. (1961): *"Development of the person"*, translation Dunod, PARIS, 1968.

### **The dispositional optimism of Scheier and Carver<sup>206</sup>**

As the book on the health psychology<sup>207</sup> reminds us, according to the behaviours self-regulation model<sup>208</sup>, the behaviour of individuals is affected by beliefs about their actions outcome. Optimism would be shaped by contextual factors (emotional and financial security during childhood, experiences of success and failure) and 25% of its action would be genetic<sup>209</sup>. Peterson and Seligman<sup>210</sup> propose to consider optimism and pessimism as cognitive styles. People's expectations of the future come from their interpretation of past experiences. An optimistic explanatory style consists in explaining the positive events passed by internal causes, stable and global. Optimists perceive their efforts as effective and adopt healthy behaviours more easily. In addition, depressive affects and perceived powerlessness go hand in hand with the activation of certain systems (eg corticotropy), inducing excessive cardio-vascular reactivity and lower immune competence<sup>211</sup>. This is related to the part of radicalized whose needs are related to a certain nihilistic tendency (expression of a total disillusionment in the politician capacity to change the corrupted world). This desperation would induce a devastating pessimism, which once manipulated by the "jihadist" speech would be turned into a completely artificial optimism, carried by an ideology and in no case connected to a disposition in itself. In the context of religious radicalization that uses eschatological visions to anguish the young, working the optimism is a form of fundamental rebalancing to bring out the deradicalization.

### **The locus of control by Rotter<sup>212</sup>**

The LOC is the generalized belief that subsequent events (or reinforcements) depend either on internal factors (actions, efforts and personal abilities), or on external factors (destiny, luck, chance and all-powerful characters). Individuals who make a causal connection between their actions or abilities and the events that affect them have internal control. Those who attribute subsequent reinforcements to external factors have external control. In health psychology, "control would be acquired through social learning, especially during experiences of success and failure and by observation of others behaviour and its results (vicarious learning). During early childhood, the family, the main source of reinforcements and models, plays an important role. Attentive, rewarding and coherent parents (regarding expected behaviours) will facilitate the development of an internal LOC in children. The LOC is built from other experiences (childhood, adolescence, adulthood, old age) and

<sup>206</sup>SCHEIER M F. and CARVER C S (1985): *Optimism, coping and health: Assessment and implication of generalized outcome expectancies*. Health Psychology, 4, 3, 219-247.

<sup>207</sup>BRUCHON-SCHWEITZER M. and BOUJUT E. (2014), *Psychology of Health: Concepts, Methods and Models*, Dunod, Paris.

<sup>208</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>209</sup>PLOMIN, R, SCHEIEIR, M.F., BERGEMAN, CS, PEDERSEN, N.L., NESSELROAD, J.R. and MCCLEAN, GE (1992): *Optimism, pessimism, and mental health: a twin adoption analysis*. Personality and individual differences, 13, 8, 921-930.

<sup>210</sup>PETERSON C and SELIGMAN MEP (1984). *Causal explanations as risk factors for depression: theory and evidence*. Psychological review, 91, 347-374.

<sup>211</sup>PETERSON C. (2000): *Optimistic explanatory style and health*. In J E Gillham (ed) *The sciences of optimism and hope: research, essays in honour of Martin EP Seligman*. Radnor Templeton Foundation Press, pages 141- 161.

<sup>212</sup>ROTTER JB. (1966): *Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement*. Psychologies Monographs, 80, 1, 1-28.

results from complex information, often reconstructed a posteriori. It can be unrealistic and only an illusion of control<sup>213</sup>. When one judges an irresponsible individual, it is because he has an undeveloped internal LOC and an overstimulated external LOC because he attributes everything that happens to him to external events and systematically releases himself from any responsibility. In prevention, it is therefore essential to make young people aware that they have a share of autonomy and responsibility in the choices that engage them. Professionals must learn to develop the internal LOC of young people in terms of prevention.

### **Endurance (hardiness)**

According to Suzanne Kobasa and Salvatore Maddi<sup>214</sup>, endurance is defined by three elements:

- Control: to believe that we can influence what happens to us;
- Implication (commitment): engaging with pleasure in activities;
- The challenge: to consider changes as opportunities to progress and not as threats.

These authors called hardiness (endurance) the grouping of these "three Cs". Beliefs and behaviours associated with endurance would protect individuals from the harmful effects of stressful situations. Indeed, endurance would reinforce the beneficial effect of certain beliefs and behaviours because it leads to a repeating effect, which allows these beliefs and behaviours to become stronger and stabilize. The repetition effect that sets in place on new beliefs leads to new behaviours, which in turn lead to the reinforcement of beliefs by inscribing themselves in time. Endurance is a form of persistence that promotes new beliefs and behaviours.

### **The sense of coherence (SOC) Antonovsky**

Antonovsky calls Sense of COHERENCE (SOC)<sup>215</sup> "the set of cognitive, behavioural and emotional factors that make it possible, despite adversity, to manage tensions, seek solutions, identify and mobilize diverse resources and adopt strategies. of adjustment to solve problems and stay healthy (...) The "coherent" individual perceives events as understandable (structured, predictable, explainable, clear), controllable (he thinks he has the resources to manage them) and significant (the coherent individual with a value system will give them meaning<sup>216</sup>. In other words, when we talk about an individual who is centred and / or refocused, this is part of the sense of coherence. When he has the feeling of getting back in coherence with his values and his beliefs, his decisions and his behaviours appear to him more satisfactory and he can then better carry them.

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<sup>213</sup>BRUCHON-SCHWEITZER M. AND BOUJUT E. (2014): *Psychology of Health: Concepts, Methods and Models*, Dunod, Paris Aad also DUBOIS N. (2009), The various control bias, in Y package (ed) *Psychology Control, Theories and Applications*, Brussels, De Boeck, chap 2, pages 27-49.

<sup>214</sup>KOBASA SC. (1979): *Stressful live events, personality and health: an inquiry onto hardiness*. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 37, 1, 1-11.

KOBASA SC. and all (1985), *Effectiveness of hardiness, Exercise and social support as resource against illness*. *Journal of psychometric Research*, 29, 525-533.

<sup>215</sup>ANTONOVSKY A. (1979): *Health, stress, and coping*, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass.

ANTONOVSKY A. (1987): *Unravelling the mystery of health: how people manage stress and stay well*, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass.

<sup>216</sup>*Psychology of Health*, p. 306.

## **The self-efficacy of Bandura**

According to Antonia Csillik<sup>217</sup>, this notion introduced by Bandura<sup>218</sup> refers to “the assessment by the person of his ability to succeed in a specific field”. According to Bandura's theory of social learning, psychological processes create and reinforce expectations of personal effectiveness. Bandura<sup>219</sup> defines self-efficacy or perceived self-efficacy as a productive capacity within which cognitive, social, emotional and behavioural sub-skills must be organized and harmonized effectively to serve many purposes. According to Bandura<sup>220</sup>, “Self-efficacy involves a perceived control over the environment and its own behaviours, setting high goals and thinking about being able to achieve them. It depends on personal and contextual factors: previous experience of success in valued activities, encouragement from significant people reinforcing the feeling of control in its activities, observation and imitation of successful people, positive emotional and physiological states or negatives associated with the activity<sup>221</sup>. Depressed people feel most of the time a low self-efficacy: previous failures or being devalued by the entourage could induce this perceived helplessness<sup>222</sup>. Some therapies carried out with depressive subjects are specifically intended to reinforce their feelings of personal effectiveness”<sup>223</sup>.

## **From self-esteem to benevolence towards oneself**

As Antonia Csillik defines it, "self-esteem can be defined as the positive or negative appreciation of the individual about himself, resulting from his system of personal values or imposed from outside (...) But an esteem too much of self can lead to narcissism, a lack of consideration for others and aggressive behaviour and violence against those perceived as threatening our ego<sup>224</sup>". Given our subject related to the processes of radicalization, which can concern particularly strongly narcissistic personalities (see "megalomania" in the clinical denominations of Professor Cohen, Table 18), it seems appropriate to highlight the concept of benevolence towards oneself. in order to lead young people to feel competent, in full possession of their means and to be certain that they are useful.

## **What is benevolence towards self (self-compassion)?**

It is a form of inward-looking, self-directed benevolence, a form of self-empathy, through which people understand their own pain and difficulties and have the desire to reduce them, avoiding to judge themselves severely in the face of their own shortcomings<sup>225</sup>. Benevolence

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<sup>217</sup>CSILLIK A. (2017): *Psychological Resources, Contributions of Positive Psychology*, Paris, Dunod.

<sup>218</sup>BANDURA A. (1997): *Self-efficacy: the exercise of control*, freeman.

<sup>219</sup>BANDURA A; (2002): *Self-efficacy: the feeling of personal efficiency*, Trad J. Lecomte, Paris, De Boeck.

<sup>220</sup>*Ibid* 1997.

<sup>221</sup>*Ibid*.

<sup>222</sup>RASCLE N. BOUJUT AND IDIER L. (2009): *Control and Health*, in *Package Y (ed) Psychology of control. Theories and applications*, Brussels, De Boeck, p.116.

<sup>223</sup>BRUCHON-SCHWEITZER M. AND BOUJUT E. (2014): *Psychology of Health: Concepts, Methods and Models*, Dunod, Paris.

<sup>224</sup>BRUCHON-SCHWEITZER AND BOUJUT E. (2014), *Ibid*.

<sup>225</sup>NEFF, KD (2003): *the development and validation of a scale of measure self-compassion*. *Self and Identity*, 2, 223-250.



towards oneself consists in realizing and accepting that suffering, failures and weaknesses are part of the human experience and that everyone, including oneself, deserves to receive benevolence<sup>226</sup>. People who have this ability treat each other with kindness and kindness<sup>227</sup>. This benevolence includes self-indulgence, which consists in being warm and understanding towards oneself instead of overwhelming oneself with criticism when one suffers, one is in check, or one's self-indulgence. we are going through difficult situations, the common humanity meaning that to be human means to be imperfect and that everyone can suffer failures and difficulties, which requires integration its experience of suffering and failure in a broader perspective common to all humans and to become aware of the fact that we are not alone in our suffering, the fully conscious awareness (mindfulness) of being aware of his painful thoughts and emotions as they are, without trying to suppress or avoid them, so as to accept this experience while being connected to his emotions but s negative judgment, mindfulness-trait or disposition to conscious attention, a sort of state of consciousness that "results from intentionally paying attention to the present moment, without judging, to the experience that unfolds moment by moment"<sup>228</sup>, The positive character, composed of forces of character that can be defined as psychological mechanisms that operationalize the virtues<sup>229</sup>.

If psycho-criminology has already incorporated a certain philosophy of positive psychology in its tools<sup>230</sup>, especially for incarcerated criminal figures and at risk of recidivism, this is not the case in the field of radicalization. We believe that positive psychology is extremely well placed to address radicalization protection factors because a dimensional rather than a dichotomous understanding seems well suited to the complexity of resources devoted to this type of prevention. Based on the statistics of this report on the characteristics and the historicities of the young people before their radicalization (table 15 in particular of this report but also testimonies of the young people of the report STAGES OF THE RADICALIZATION AND DERADICALIZATION PROCESS), it is a question of identifying and to prioritize the good resources that could have protected them.

It is for this reason that we have reflected on how to convey to professionals the means of integrating the contributions of Positive Psychology into their approaches and postures (Paragraph IV).

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<sup>226</sup>NEFF, KD (2003): *self-compassion: an alternative conceptualization of a healthy attitude toward oneself*. Self and Identity, 2, 85-101.

<sup>227</sup>BRUCHON-SCHWEITZER M. and BOUJUT E. (2014), *Ibid*.

<sup>228</sup>KABAT-ZINN J. (2009), *At the heart of the turmoil, Mindfulness, MBSR, stress reduction based on Mindfulness: comprehensive program in 8 weeks*, Brussels, De Boeck.

<sup>229</sup>PARK N., PETERSON C., AND SELIGMAN MEP (2004): *Strengths of character and well-being*, *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, 23, 603-619. The "Values in Action" (VEA) or VIA (Values in Action) project, named after the VIA Values in Action Institute in the United States, created in 2000, which funded the initial work, aims to study the forces of character and operationalize them. This classification (The Values In Action Classification of Strength): currently includes 24 character strengths included in a classification system, based on intercultural research conducted in many disciplines and covering a very large number of topics.

<sup>230</sup>Good Live Model

## ANNEX.4 INTEGRATE IN THE RADICALIZATION PREVENTION THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

We refer psychologists to existing tools that they can use as compassionate-centred therapy, the Penn Resilience (PRP) program that enhances cognitive and social skills, positive psychotherapy (PPT) that integrates "symptoms with forces, regrets and hopes, weaknesses and values so as to understand in a balanced way the complexity of human experiences"<sup>231</sup> and the tools of the BOUNCE program, supported by the European community STRESAVIORA (Strengthening Resilience against Violent Radicalization)<sup>232</sup>, as well as the program INEAR, set up in the context of school education in England<sup>233</sup>.

Beyond these already existing tools abroad, we have thought about a more specific program to prevent the risk of young people radicalization in France, which we have called Existential and Philosophical Dialogues<sup>234</sup>. This psycho-educational intervention of 12 stages is based at the same time on the study of extreme beliefs acquisition systems, on certain principles of existential philosophy and on the contributions of positive psychology.

The Philosophical Dialogues Programme is an existential positive psychology intervention for tackling the risk of youth radicalization, with emphasis on personal capital as a crucial social asset to achieving sustainable prevention through:

- a. Destabilising extremist views, values and belief systems;

<sup>231</sup>RASHID, T. (2015), Positive Psychotherapy: «A strengths-based approach», The journal of positive psychology, 2015, vol 10, n°1, 25-40.

RASHID, T. (2008), Positive psychotherapy Positive psychology: *Exploring the best in people*. In Lopez Shane, J. (Ed.) Pursuing human flourishing (Vol. 4, pp. 188–217). Westport, CT: Praeger

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<sup>232</sup> Especially two reports in English available in:

SUMMARY home/2011/ISEC/AG/4000002547, APART, THOMAS MORE, February 2014.

Part III Conclusions and recommendations HOME/2011/ISEC/AG/4000002547; Presentation text from their internet page: <https://www.bounce-resilience-tools.eu/fr>

<sup>233</sup>TUNARIU, A.D. (2015). *The iNEAR psychological intervention. A resilience curriculum programme for children and young people*. Teacher and Student Guides. UEL, London, UK.

TUNARIU, A.D. (2017a). *Positive Psychology in my practice*. Presentation and workshop at the "Adverse Childhood. Experiences (ACEs): What it means for you" Public Health Network Cymru Conference, Cardiff, Wales.

Tunariu, A.D. (2017b). Coaching for resilience within an Islamic context (case study). In C. van Nieuwerburgh and R. Al-Laho. *The Principles and Practice of Coaching in Islamic Culture*. London: Karnac.

<sup>234</sup>Annex A in TUNARIU A.D. BONIWELL, A. RUFFION, A. & CLAMY-SEBAG, V. (2017). *Towards sustainable prevention of youth radicalization. The Philosophical Dialogues Program - An existential positive psychology intervention for resilience, wellbeing and affirmative mind-set*. Manual and training materials.



- b. Providing a philosophical inquiry platform for reflecting and authoring alternative, socially inclusive narratives and worldviews;
- c. Recognising the critical contribution of normal psychological conditions and factors in the quest for combating ideological propaganda;
- d. Fostering opportunities to enhance resilience, catalyse self-actualisation, develop existential skills and scaffold positive future perspectives.

The philosophy of the program is based on the link between the development of a positive identity and the increase in the resistance of individuals. Putting in place habits of reflective and analytical thinking and the acquisition of tools to help people flourish can increase young people's resistance to the rhetoric or pressure that promotes extremist value systems. All 12 sessions of the program aim not only to increase young people's resistance to coercion or attempts by those who want to dictate what to think (indoctrination), but also to increase their confidence and skills to think for themselves by taking responsibility. As the program builds on the ingredients of resilience development, it also allows participants to better deal with adversity in general and to see these difficult times as opportunities to learn and grow.

The program is a starting point for new learning, for changes in a world view that the individual takes for granted, for the acceptance and development of personal development tools that promote emotional regulation, relationships with others, resilience and personal well-being. All these elements will in turn accelerate the journey of young people to a positive state of mind where reflection and social ethics have their place. The program uses philosophical dialogue to normalize reactions (emotional and cognitive) to events that, in a sense, could be perceived as threats to the usual social order or the place of the individual in society. At the same time, it lays the groundwork for the individual to take responsibility, helping him to regulate his answers by appealing to his personal choices, autonomy, methods of moral reasoning, questioning binary conceptions, promoting openness to multiple points of view and values of empathy and positive relationships to develop optimal living conditions. Experience is at the heart of the program and it exacerbates the need for self-realization through confrontation with existential issues. The intention here is to increase young people's tolerance of uncertainty for the benefit of emotional control and the development of the individual.

To master the art of learning to 'stand' where I would rather not, and expand in ways I never knew I could:


- 1. **Positive identity:** self-concept; self-relatedness; self-presentation; self-control;
- 2. **Emotional regulation:** emotional intelligence; relational competence; empathy; moral reasoning;
- 3. **Ideological flexibility:** creative habits of thought; analytic reasoning; options and alternatives; ethics and social justice;

4. **Bravery and resilience:** growth mind-set; grit; perseverance; wellbeing; self-actualisation;
5. **Meaningfulness:** existential conflict; choice and responsibility; ‘standing’ with uncertainty.

It is advised to keep the program as it is and to propose the 12 sessions in the order that is indicated below:

The Philosophical Dialogues Programme: An existential positive psychology intervention for resilience, wellbeing and affirmative mind-set.

#### Schema Existential and philosophic dialogs – a 12 sessions program<sup>235</sup>



It is about developing positive education and education about responsibility. The experiments mentioned above are to be generalized to have a multiplier effect up to the stakes raised by the new risks incurred by the youth of our European countries, risks which are unfortunately not limited to ideological misdemeanours and their shifts in horror and violence. The school and recreation areas are strategic points of support for achieving this goal.

<sup>235</sup>This protocol is being experimented in the South of France in interesting prevention frames: youngsters in insertion work sites, youngsters followed by community aid project, supervised by Alain Ruffion.

## ANNEX "GLOBAL STATISTICAL TABLES"

Notes :

These statistics were made by Hugues Pellerin, of the team of Professor David Cohen, who heads the Child and Adolescent Psychiatry Service at Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris.

Comparison of Salafist Pietists and Jihadists - Table A

	DJIHADISTES DE CLASSE MOYENNE (N = 100)	SALAFISTES DE CLASSE MOYENNE (N = 100)	P-VALUE
ÂGE_PEC	19.44(4.67)	21.38(4.78)	0.001

	DJIHADISTES (N = 100)	SALAFISTES (N = 100)	P-VALUE
SEXE (FÉMININ/MASCULIN)	67(67%) / 33(33%)	67(67%) / 33(33%)	1
QUITTE_DOM_PARENTS (0/1)	75(75%) / 25(25%)	62(62%) / 38(38%)	0.048
QUITTE_FRANCE (0/1)	86(86%) / 14(14%)	86(86%) / 14(14%)	1
ARRETE_PAR_POLICE (0/1)	20(20%) / 80(80%)	97(97%) / 3(3%)	< 0.001
DAESH (0/1)	10(10%) / 90(90%)	100(100%) / 0(0%)	< 0.001
AL.QAIDA (0/1)	82(82%) / 18(18%)	100(100%) / 0(0%)	< 0.001
OMSEN (0/1)	84(84%) / 16(16%)	100(100%) / 0(0%)	< 0.001
SALAFI (0/1)	77(77%) / 23(23%)	2(2%) / 98(98%)	< 0.001
AUTRE (0/1)	97(97%) / 3(3%)	82(97.6%) / 2(2.4%)	1
DEPTMT (HORS IDF/IDF)	59(59%) / 41(41%)	62(62%) / 38(38%)	0.664
ENV_SOCIAL_ENFANCE (CAMPAGNE/ VILLE)	17(17%) / 83(83%)	21(21%) / 79(79%)	0.471
SIGNALEMENT (0/1)	26(26%) / 74(74%)	50(50%) / 50(50%)	< 0.001
STATUT_FAM_JEUNE (CELIB OU DIVORCE/MARIE)	76(76%) / 24(24%)	65(65%) / 35(35%)	0.088
ENFANT (0/1)	79(79%) / 21(21%)	70(70%) / 30(30%)	0.144
STATUT_FAM_PARENTS (CELIB OU DIVORCE OU VEUF/MARIÉ)	55(55%) / 45(45%)	63(63%) / 37(37%)	0.25
AFRIQUE (0/1)	96(96%) / 4(4%)	98(98%) / 2(2%)	0.683

<b>MAGHREB (0/1)</b>	72(72%) / 28(28%)	81(81%) / 19(19%)	0.133
<b>EUROPE (0/1)</b>	80(80%) / 20(20%)	78(78%) / 22(22%)	0.728
<b>ANTILLES (0/1)</b>	94(94%) / 6(6%)	97(97%) / 3(3%)	0.498
<b>AMÉRIQUE.DU.SUD (0/1)</b>	99(99%) / 1(1%)	97(97%) / 3(3%)	0.621
<b>JUIVE (0/1)</b>	99(99%) / 1(1%)	99(99%) / 1(1%)	1
<b>ASIE (0/1)</b>	98(98%) / 2(2%)	97(97%) / 3(3%)	1
<b>USA (0/1)</b>	100(100%) / 0(0%)	99(99%) / 1(1%)	1
<b>PARENTS_SEP_VEUFS (0/1)</b>	45(45%) / 55(55%)	36(36%) / 64(64%)	0.195
<b>CATHOLIQUE.EXTREMISTE (0/1)</b>	86(93.5%) / 6(6.5%)	70(97.2%) / 2(2.8%)	0.468
<b>CATHOLIQUE.PRATIQUE (0/1)</b>	78(83.9%) / 15(16.1%)	64(80%) / 16(20%)	0.508
<b>CATHOLIQUE.NON.PRATIQUE (0/1)</b>	63(67.7%) / 30(32.3%)	50(62.5%) / 30(37.5%)	0.47
<b>MUSULMAN.PRATIQUE (0/1)</b>	83(89.2%) / 10(10.8%)	71(87.7%) / 10(12.3%)	0.742
<b>MUSULMAN.NON.PRATIQUE (0/1)</b>	78(83%) / 16(17%)	71(88.8%) / 9(11.2%)	0.279
<b>ATHÉE (0/1)</b>	51(51%) / 49(49%)	57(57.6%) / 42(42.4%)	0.352
<b>CULTURE.ARABO-MUSULMANE (0/1)</b>	65(69.1%) / 29(30.9%)	59(72.8%) / 22(27.2%)	0.592
<b>CULTURE.CATHOLIQUE (0/1)</b>	19(19%) / 81(81%)	17(17.2%) / 82(82.8%)	0.738
<b>AUTRE_1 (0/1)</b>	87(93.5%) / 6(6.5%)	67(88.2%) / 9(11.8%)	0.22
<b>REL_FUSION_AVANT_RAD (0/1)</b>	34(34%) / 66(66%)	61(61%) / 39(39%)	< 0.001
<b>REL_EMPIRE_AVANT_RAD (0/1)</b>	63(63%) / 37(37%)	71(71%) / 29(29%)	0.229
<b>RAD_CONNUE_PROCHE (0/1)</b>	62(62%) / 38(38%)	74(74%) / 26(26%)	0.069
<b>TENT_EMBRIGADE_ENTOUR (0/1)</b>	66(66%) / 34(34%)	66(66%) / 34(34%)	1
<b>TS_SCAR_AVANT_RAD (0/1)</b>	66(66%) / 34(34%)	77(77%) / 23(23%)	0.085
<b>HOSPI_PSY_AVANT_RAD (0/1)</b>	89(89%) / 11(11%)	91(91%) / 9(9%)	0.637
<b>SUIVI_PSY_AVANT_RAD (0/1)</b>	59(59%) / 41(41%)	69(69%) / 31(31%)	0.141
<b>ENFERMEMENT_AP_RAD (0/1)</b>	74(74%) / 26(26%)	86(86%) / 14(14%)	0.034
<b>MALAD_DECLAREE_PROCHES_AVANT_RAD (0/1)</b>	74(74%) / 26(26%)	76(76%) / 24(24%)	0.744

MALAD_DECLAREE_JEUNE_AVT_RAD (0/1)	85(85%) / 15(15%)	79(79%) / 21(21%)	0.269
DEP_DECLAREE_PROCHES_AVT_RAD (0/1)	55(55%) / 45(45%)	73(73%) / 27(27%)	0.008
DEP_DECLAREE_JEUNE_AVT_RAD (0/1)	51(51%) / 49(49%)	66(66%) / 34(34%)	0.031
ABUS_VIOL_PROCHE (0/1)	92(92%) / 8(8%)	90(90%) / 10(10%)	0.621
ABUS_VIOL_JEUNE (0/1)	75(75%) / 25(25%)	78(78%) / 22(22%)	0.617
SI_ABUS (0/1)	16(64%) / 9(36%)	29(78.4%) / 8(21.6%)	0.213
VIOLENCE_PHY_PROCHE_AVT_RAD (0/1)	80(80%) / 20(20%)	84(84%) / 16(16%)	0.462
VIOLENCE_PHY_JEUNE_AVT_RAD (0/1)	82(82%) / 18(18%)	86(86%) / 14(14%)	0.44
VIOLENCE_PSYTRAUMA_JEUNE_AVT_RAD (0/1)	24(24%) / 76(76%)	26(26%) / 74(74%)	0.744
ABANDON_JEUNE_AVT_RAD (0/1)	25(25%) / 75(75%)	38(38%) / 62(62%)	0.048
DC_ENTOURAGE_JEUNE_AVT_RAD (0/1)	66(66%) / 34(34%)	70(70%) / 30(30%)	0.544
ADDICTION_PROCHE_AVT_RAD (0/1)	74(74%) / 26(26%)	85(85%) / 15(15%)	0.054
ADDICTION_JEUNE_AVT_RAD (0/1)	81(81%) / 19(19%)	87(87%) / 13(13%)	0.247
INCARC_CONNUE_PROCHE_AVT_RAD (0/1)	95(95%) / 5(5%)	98(98%) / 2(2%)	0.445
SUIVI_EDU_AVT_RAD (0/1)	84(84%) / 16(16%)	94(94%) / 6(6%)	0.024
SUIVI_EDU_AP_RAD (0/1)	48(48%) / 52(52%)	74(74%) / 26(26%)	< 0.001
LIEN_RADIC_PHYSIQUE (0/1)	52(52%) / 48(48%)	57(57%) / 43(43%)	0.478

Current condition p-value = < 0.001

	DJIHADISTES	SALAFISTES
DÉCÉDÉ OU SUR ZONE	6	0
RADICALISÉ	11	62
DÉSENGAGÉ	21	0
DÉRADICALISÉ	62	38

## Scholar level

<b>BAC</b>	23(11.5%)
<b>BAC +10</b>	1(0.5%)
<b>BAC +2</b>	14(7%)
<b>BAC +3</b>	9(4.5%)
<b>BAC +4</b>	1(0.5%)
<b>BAC +5</b>	3(1.5%)
<b>BAC +8</b>	1(0.5%)
<b>BEP</b>	9(4.5%)
<b>CAP</b>	10(5%)
<b>COLLÈGE</b>	12(6%)
<b>LYCÉE</b>	92(46%)
<b>UNIVERSITÉ</b>	25(12.5%)
<b>NA</b>	0(0%)

**Univarried analysis of significant variables in the output of radicalization- Table B**  
Trend test, which tries to evaluate a trend of becoming

	DÉCÉDÉ SUR ZONE	RADICALISÉ	DÉSENGAGÉ	DÉRADICA- LISÉ	P
SEXE (FÉMININ / MASCULIN)	9(60%) / 6(40%)	9(47.4%) / 10(52.6%)	12(57.1%) / 9(42.9%)	71(74.7%) / 24(25.3%)	0.016
DEPTMT (HORS IDF / IDF)	6(40%) / 9(60%)	11(57.9%) / 8(42.1%)	13(61.9%) / 8(38.1%)	55(57.9%) / 40(42.1%)	0.49
SIGNALEMENT (OUI / NON)	8(53.3%) / 7(46.7%)	2(10.5%) / 17(89.5%)	12(57.1%) / 9(42.9%)	34(35.8%) / 61(64.2%)	0.745
STATUT_FAM_JEUNE (CELIB OU MARIE)	6(40%) / 9(60%)	11(57.9%) / 8(42.1%)	18(85.7%) / 3(14.3%)	74(77.9%) / 21(22.1%)	0.008
ENFANT (NON / OUI)	7(46.7%) / 8(53.3%)	14(73.7%) / 5(26.3%)	19(90.5%) / 2(9.5%)	78(82.1%) / 17(17.9%)	0.031
STATUT_FAM_PARENTS (DIVORCE_VEUF / MARIÉ)	7(46.7%) / 8(53.3%)	10(52.6%) / 9(47.4%)	6(28.6%) / 15(71.4%)	61(64.2%) / 34(35.8%)	0.024
PARENTS_SEP_VEUFS (NON / OUI)	7(46.7%) / 8(53.3%)	10(52.6%) / 9(47.4%)	15(71.4%) / 6(28.6%)	35(36.8%) / 60(63.2%)	0.039
ATHÉE (NON / OUI)	9(60%) / 6(40%)	12(63.2%) / 7(36.8%)	15(71.4%) / 6(28.6%)	55(57.9%) / 40(42.1%)	0.475
CULTURE ARABO-MUSULMANE (NON / OUI)	6(40%) / 9(60%)	12(63.2%) / 7(36.8%)	6(28.6%) / 15(71.4%)	70(73.7%) / 25(26.3%)	0.001
CULTURE CATHOLIQUE (NON / OUI)	8(53.3%) / 7(46.7%)	6(31.6%) / 13(68.4%)	11(52.4%) / 10(47.6%)	23(24.2%) / 72(75.8%)	0.012
AUTRE (NON / OUI)	13(86.7%) / 2(13.3%)	19(100%) / 0(0%)	21(100%) / 0(0%)	87(91.6%) / 8(8.4%)	0.421
REL_FUSION_AVT_RAD (NON / OUI)	8(53.3%) / 7(46.7%)	9(47.4%) / 10(52.6%)	9(42.9%) / 12(57.1%)	34(35.8%) / 61(64.2%)	0.136
REL_EMPRISE_AVT_RAD (NON / OUI)	9(60%) / 6(40%)	10(52.6%) / 9(47.4%)	11(52.4%) / 10(47.6%)	51(53.7%) / 44(46.3%)	0.842
RAD_CONNUE_PROCHE (NON / OUI)	6(40%) / 9(60%)	8(42.1%) / 11(57.9%)	14(66.7%) / 7(33.3%)	57(60%) / 38(40%)	0.141
TENT_EMBRIGAD_ENTOUR (NON / OUI)	4(26.7%) / 11(73.3%)	8(42.1%) / 11(57.9%)	11(52.4%) / 10(47.6%)	70(73.7%) / 25(26.3%)	0
TS_SCAR_AVT_RAD (NON / OUI)	14(93.3%) / 1(6.7%)	15(78.9%) / 4(21.1%)	16(76.2%) / 5(23.8%)	61(64.2%) / 34(35.8%)	0.016
HOSPI_PSY_AVT_RAD (NON / OUI)	15(100%) / 0(0%)	17(89.5%) / 2(10.5%)	18(85.7%) / 3(14.3%)	81(85.3%) / 14(14.7%)	0.223
SUIVI_PSY_AVT_RAD (NON / OUI)	12(80%) / 3(20%)	14(73.7%) / 5(26.3%)	15(71.4%) / 6(28.6%)	56(58.9%) / 39(41.1%)	0.048
ENFERMEMENT_AP_RAD (NON / OUI)	15(100%) / 0(0%)	15(78.9%) / 4(21.1%)	10(47.6%) / 11(52.4%)	75(78.9%) / 20(21.1%)	0.951
MALAD_DECLAREE_PROCHE_AV T_RAD (NON / OUI)	11(73.3%) / 4(26.7%)	17(89.5%) / 2(10.5%)	14(66.7%) / 7(33.3%)	67(70.5%) / 28(29.5%)	0.364
MALAD_DECLAREE_JEUNE_AVT_ RAD (NON / OUI)	12(80%) / 3(20%)	16(84.2%) / 3(15.8%)	17(81%) / 4(19%)	77(81.1%) / 18(18.9%)	0.915
DEP_DECLAREE_PROCHE_AVT_ RAD (NON / OUI)	8(53.3%) / 7(46.7%)	12(63.2%) / 7(36.8%)	15(71.4%) / 6(28.6%)	54(56.8%) / 41(43.2%)	0.595
DEP_DECLAREE_JEUNE_AVT_RA D (NON / OUI)	8(53.3%) / 7(46.7%)	13(68.4%) / 6(31.6%)	13(61.9%) / 8(38.1%)	50(52.6%) / 45(47.4%)	0.335
ABUS_PROCH_AVT_RAD (NON / OUI)	15(100%) / 0(0%)	16(84.2%) / 3(15.8%)	17(81%) / 4(19%)	78(82.1%) / 17(17.9%)	0.263
VIOLENC_PHY_PROCHE_AVT_RA D (NON / OUI)	10(66.7%) / 5(33.3%)	13(68.4%) / 6(31.6%)	16(76.2%) / 5(23.8%)	63(66.3%) / 32(33.7%)	0.68
VIOLENC_PHY_JEUNE_AVT_RAD (NON / OUI)	10(66.7%) / 5(33.3%)	14(73.7%) / 5(26.3%)	16(76.2%) / 5(23.8%)	70(73.7%) / 25(26.3%)	0.783



Annexes

<b>VIOLENC_PSY_JEUNE_AVT_RAD (NON / OUI)</b>	2(13.3%) / 13(86.7%)	2(10.5%) / 17(89.5%)	6(28.6%) / 15(71.4%)	12(12.6%) / 83(87.4%)	0.596
<b>ABAND_JEUNE_AVT_RAD (NON / OUI)</b>	3(20%) / 12(80%)	2(10.5%) / 17(89.5%)	6(28.6%) / 15(71.4%)	16(16.8%) / 79(83.2%)	0.794
<b>DC_ENTOUR_JEUNE_AVT_RAD (NON / OUI)</b>	7(46.7%) / 8(53.3%)	14(73.7%) / 5(26.3%)	13(61.9%) / 8(38.1%)	61(64.2%) / 34(35.8%)	0.642
<b>ADDICT_PROCH_AVT_RAD (NON / OUI)</b>	9(60%) / 6(40%)	12(63.2%) / 7(36.8%)	12(57.1%) / 9(42.9%)	69(72.6%) / 26(27.4%)	0.139
<b>ADDICT_JEUNE_AVT_RAD (NON / OUI)</b>	12(80%) / 3(20%)	11(57.9%) / 8(42.1%)	18(85.7%) / 3(14.3%)	76(80%) / 19(20%)	0.351
<b>INCARC_AVT_RAD (NON / OUI)</b>	10(66.7%) / 5(33.3%)	15(78.9%) / 4(21.1%)	17(81%) / 4(19%)	84(88.4%) / 11(11.6%)	0.032
<b>SUIV_EDU_AVT_EMBR (NON / OUI)</b>	13(86.7%) / 2(13.3%)	14(73.7%) / 5(26.3%)	12(57.1%) / 9(42.9%)	78(82.1%) / 17(17.9%)	0.324
<b>SUIVI_PSYCHO-EDU_AP_EMBR (NON / OUI)</b>	15(100%) / 0(0%)	11(57.9%) / 8(42.1%)	9(42.9%) / 12(57.1%)	51(53.7%) / 44(46.3%)	0.054
<b>LIEN_RADIC_INTERNET (NON / OUI)</b>	0(0%) / 15(100%)	0(0%) / 19(100%)	0(0%) / 21(100%)	1(1.1%) / 94(98.9%)	0
<b>LIEN_RADIC_PHYSIQ (NON / OUI)</b>	5(33.3%) / 10(66.7%)	7(36.8%) / 12(63.2%)	8(38.1%) / 13(61.9%)	46(48.4%) / 49(51.6%)	0.146
<b>FORTERESSE (NON / OUI)</b>	15(100%) / 0(0%)	18(94.7%) / 1(5.3%)	17(81%) / 4(19%)	93(97.9%) / 2(2.1%)	0.298
<b>ZEUS (NON / OUI)</b>	15(100%) / 0(0%)	12(63.2%) / 7(36.8%)	16(76.2%) / 5(23.8%)	92(96.8%) / 3(3.2%)	0.006
<b>PARA.SUICIDAIRE (NON / OUI)</b>	14(93.3%) / 1(6.7%)	18(94.7%) / 1(5.3%)	17(81%) / 4(19%)	78(82.1%) / 17(17.9%)	0.179
<b>LANCELOT (NON / OUI)</b>	11(73.3%) / 4(26.7%)	13(68.4%) / 6(31.6%)	15(71.4%) / 6(28.6%)	83(87.4%) / 12(12.6%)	0.02
<b>SAUVEUR (NON / OUI)</b>	13(86.7%) / 2(13.3%)	19(100%) / 0(0%)	18(85.7%) / 3(14.3%)	78(82.1%) / 17(17.9%)	0.14
<b>DAESHLAND (NON / OUI)</b>	8(53.3%) / 7(46.7%)	19(100%) / 0(0%)	12(57.1%) / 9(42.9%)	61(64.2%) / 34(35.8%)	0.381
<b>MÈRE THÉRÈSA (NON / OUI)</b>	13(86.7%) / 2(13.3%)	18(94.7%) / 1(5.3%)	18(85.7%) / 3(14.3%)	70(73.7%) / 25(26.3%)	0.029
<b>BELLE (NON / OUI)</b>	14(93.3%) / 1(6.7%)	13(68.4%) / 6(31.6%)	21(100%) / 0(0%)	66(69.5%) / 29(30.5%)	0.029
<b>TOUJOURS_MUSULMAN (NON / OUI)</b>	0(0%) / 15(100%)	0(0%) / 19(100%)	0(0%) / 21(100%)	12(12.6%) / 83(87.4%)	0
<b>PRATIQUEANT (NON / OUI)</b>	10(66.7%) / 5(33.3%)	15(78.9%) / 4(21.1%)	8(38.1%) / 13(61.9%)	70(73.7%) / 25(26.3%)	0.252
<b>FAMILLE CATHOLIQUE (NON / OUI)</b>	11(73.3%) / 4(26.7%)	10(52.6%) / 9(47.4%)	16(76.2%) / 5(23.8%)	57(60%) / 38(40%)	0.446
<b>FAMILLE MUSULMANE (NON / OUI)</b>	8(53.3%) / 7(46.7%)	13(68.4%) / 6(31.6%)	8(38.1%) / 13(61.9%)	71(74.7%) / 24(25.3%)	0.02
<b>ORIGINE (AUTRE / FRANCE_EUROPE)</b>	12(80%) / 3(20%)	7(36.8%) / 12(63.2%)	17(81%) / 4(19%)	39(41.1%) / 56(58.9%)	0.008
<b>ABUS (NON / OUI)</b>	12(80%) / 3(20%)	16(84.2%) / 3(15.8%)	14(66.7%) / 7(33.3%)	69(72.6%) / 26(27.4%)	0.466



### Comparison of minors and majors- Table C

Comparison of the two groups - Quantitative variables - Results in Average Form (Standard Deviation)

	< 18 (N = 70)	18 ET + (N = 80)	P-VALUE
ÂGE_PEC	15.82(1.14)	23.32(4.99)	< 0.001

Comparison of the two groups - Binaires variables

	< 18 (N = 70)	18 ET + (N = 80)	P-VALUE
SEXE (FÉMININ/MASCULIN)	57(81.4%) / 13(18.6%)	44(55%) / 36(45%)	0.001
DEPTMT (HORS IDF/IDF)	44(62.9%) / 26(37.1%)	41(51.2%) / 39(48.8%)	0.152
SIGNALEMENT (0/1)	21(30%) / 49(70%)	35(43.8%) / 45(56.2%)	0.082
STATUT_FAM_JEUNE (CÉLIBATAIRE/MARIÉ)	62(88.6%) / 8(11.4%)	47(58.8%) / 33(41.2%)	< 0.001
ENFANT (0/1)	67(95.7%) / 3(4.3%)	51(63.7%) / 29(36.2%)	< 0.001
STATUT_FAM_PARENTS (DIVORCÉ VEUF/MARIÉ)	36(51.4%) / 34(48.6%)	48(60%) / 32(40%)	0.291
PARENTS_SEP_VEUF (0/1)	33(47.1%) / 37(52.9%)	34(42.5%) / 46(57.5%)	0.568
ATHÉE (0/1)	42(60%) / 28(40%)	49(61.3%) / 31(38.8%)	0.876
CULTURE ARABO-MUSULMANE (0/1)	43(61.4%) / 27(38.6%)	51(63.7%) / 29(36.2%)	0.769
CULTURE CATHOLIQUE (0/1)	25(35.7%) / 45(64.3%)	23(28.7%) / 57(71.2%)	0.362
AUTRE (0/1)	61(87.1%) / 9(12.9%)	79(98.8%) / 1(1.2%)	0.006
REL_FUSION_AVT_RAD (0/1)	29(41.4%) / 41(58.6%)	31(38.8%) / 49(61.3%)	0.738
REL_EMPIRE_AVT_RAD (0/1)	38(54.3%) / 32(45.7%)	43(53.8%) / 37(46.2%)	0.948
RAD_CONNUE_PROCHE (0/1)	47(67.1%) / 23(32.9%)	38(47.5%) / 42(52.5%)	0.015
TENT_EMBRIGAD_ENTOUR (0/1)	53(75.7%) / 17(24.3%)	40(50%) / 40(50%)	0.001
TS_SCAR_AVT_RAD (0/1)	39(55.7%) / 31(44.3%)	67(83.8%) / 13(16.2%)	< 0.001
HOSPI_PSY_AVT_RAD (0/1)	61(87.1%) / 9(12.9%)	70(87.5%) / 10(12.5%)	0.948
SUIVI_PSY_AVT_RAD (0/1)	41(58.6%) / 29(41.4%)	56(70%) / 24(30%)	0.144
ENFERMEMENT_AP_RAD (0/1)	50(71.4%) / 20(28.6%)	65(81.2%) / 15(18.8%)	0.156
MALAD_DECLAREE_PROCH_AVT_RAD (0/1)	50(71.4%) / 20(28.6%)	59(73.8%) / 21(26.2%)	0.75
MALAD_DECLAREE_JEUNE_AVT_RAD (0/1)	56(80%) / 14(20%)	66(82.5%) / 14(17.5%)	0.695
DEP_DECLAREE_PROCH_AVT_RAD (0/1)	41(58.6%) / 29(41.4%)	48(60%) / 32(40%)	0.859
DEP_DECLAREE_JEUNE_AVT_RAD (0/1)	41(58.6%) / 29(41.4%)	43(53.8%) / 37(46.2%)	0.553
ABUS_PROCH_AVT_RAD (0/1)	60(85.7%) / 10(14.3%)	66(82.5%) / 14(17.5%)	0.592
VIOLENC_PHY_PROCHE_AVT_RAD (0/1)	46(65.7%) / 24(34.3%)	56(70%) / 24(30%)	0.575
VIOLENC_PHY_JEUNE_AVT_RAD (0/1)	49(70%) / 21(30%)	61(76.2%) / 19(23.8%)	0.388
VIOLENC_PSY_JEUNE_AVT_RAD (0/1)	9(12.9%) / 61(87.1%)	13(16.2%) / 67(83.8%)	0.558
ABAND_JEUNE_AVT_RAD (0/1)	16(22.9%) / 54(77.1%)	11(13.8%) / 69(86.2%)	0.148
DC_ENTOUR_JEUNE_AVT_RAD (0/1)	43(61.4%) / 27(38.6%)	52(65%) / 28(35%)	0.651
ADDICT_PROCH_AVT_RAD (0/1)	48(68.6%) / 22(31.4%)	54(67.5%) / 26(32.5%)	0.888
ADDICT_JEUNE_AVT_RAD (0/1)	58(82.9%) / 12(17.1%)	59(73.8%) / 21(26.2%)	0.179

Annexes

<b>INCARC_AVT_RAD (0/1)</b>	62(88.6%) / 8(11.4%)	64(80%) / 16(20%)	0.153
<b>SUIV_EDU_AVT_EMBR (0/1)</b>	51(72.9%) / 19(27.1%)	66(82.5%) / 14(17.5%)	0.155
<b>SUIVI_EDU_AP_EMBR (0/1)</b>	29(41.4%) / 41(58.6%)	57(71.2%) / 23(28.7%)	< 0.001
<b>LIEN_RADIC_INTERNET (0/1)</b>	0(0%) / 70(100%)	1(1.2%) / 79(98.8%)	1
<b>LIEN_RADIC_PHYSIQ (0/1)</b>	38(54.3%) / 32(45.7%)	28(35%) / 52(65%)	0.018
<b>FORTERESSE (0/1)</b>	66(94.3%) / 4(5.7%)	77(96.2%) / 3(3.8%)	0.706
<b>ZEUS (0/1)</b>	62(88.6%) / 8(11.4%)	73(91.2%) / 7(8.8%)	0.585
<b>SUICIDE LICITE (0/1)</b>	55(78.6%) / 15(21.4%)	72(90%) / 8(10%)	0.053
<b>LANCELOT (0/1)</b>	59(84.3%) / 11(15.7%)	63(78.8%) / 17(21.2%)	0.385
<b>SAUVEUR (0/1)</b>	63(90%) / 7(10%)	65(81.2%) / 15(18.8%)	0.131
<b>DAESHLAND (0/1)</b>	48(68.6%) / 22(31.4%)	52(65%) / 28(35%)	0.643
<b>MÈRE THÉRÉSA (0/1)</b>	52(74.3%) / 18(25.7%)	67(83.8%) / 13(16.2%)	0.153
<b>BELLE (0/1)</b>	44(62.9%) / 26(37.1%)	70(87.5%) / 10(12.5%)	< 0.001
<b>TOUJOURS MUSULMAN (0/1)</b>	10(14.3%) / 60(85.7%)	2(2.5%) / 78(97.5%)	0.008
<b>FAMILLE CATHOLIQUE (0/1)</b>	48(68.6%) / 22(31.4%)	46(57.5%) / 34(42.5%)	0.162
<b>FAMILLE MUSULMANE (0/1)</b>	45(64.3%) / 25(35.7%)	55(68.8%) / 25(31.2%)	0.563
<b>ORIGINE (AUTRE/FRANCE_EUROPE)</b>	35(50%) / 35(50%)	40(50%) / 40(50%)	1